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Introduction 
 
In the past forty years, the victims’ rights movement has had an outsize effect on the 
proceedings of the criminal justice system in the United States. Beginning in the 1970s, advocates of 
victims’ rights sought to transform juridical notions of the principal stakeholders in criminal 
proceedings. In the common law view of criminal justice, the state stands in for the victim against 
the defendant.1 In this, victims’ rights advocates saw neglect of the victim(s) of the defendant’s 
crimes. They argued that victims of crime and those aggrieved by the loss of murdered loved ones 
should have a more prominent role in the criminal justice system. To this end, they sought a wide-
variety of reforms: They called for monetary reparations for persons who suffered financial losses 
due to crime; courtroom proceedings more sensitive to the epidemic of victim blaming, especially 
for those who suffered sexual assault; notice given to victims of crime and relatives of deceased 
victims at every stage of the juridical proceedings; closer ties between prosecutors and persons 
victimized by crime; the opportunity for victims and aggrieved persons to testify during courtroom 
proceedings and parole hearings; and, in many cases, longer, harsher sentences for persons 
convicted of crime. Although there is still much work to be done to avoid victim-blaming in the 
court proceedings, most jurisdictions have codified the other demands of victims’ advocates through 
state and federal legislation, the establishment of a federal Office for Victims of Crime, and Supreme 
Court decisions.2  
I share much of the motivation behind victim rights’ advocacy. The work towards 
acknowledgement and response to the needs of victimized and aggrieved persons in institutions of 
criminal justice serves ethical duties to provide support for those who have suffered unjustified 
physical and psychic harms as well as unanticipated grief. Insofar as this is a movement that calls for 
reform in social, political, and legal spheres, advocates speak to the social and political stakes of 
serving persons victimized and aggrieved by crime. Being victimized or aggrieved by crime often 
damages trust and the ability to take part in the pleasures, challenges, and norms of communal life. 
At its best, support for victimized and aggrieved persons acknowledges the irreparable nature of the 
harm suffered and seeks to reconstruct communal life in memorial to what was lost and what was 
learned in the experience of harm.  																																																								
1 Lynne N. Henderson, “The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights,” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 4 (1985): 938–42, 
doi:10.2307/1228587. 
2 Marlene Young and John Stein, “The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States” (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 12/04), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2005/pdf/historyofcrime.pdf. 
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I diverge with victim rights advocates on the means by which they conceive of support for 
victimized and aggrieved persons. Although I affirm the importance of providing material 
reparations, considering the means by which courts can resist victim-blaming, and notifying 
aggrieved persons of the proceedings of the criminal justice system, I reject the call for closer 
relationships of victims with the prosecution and longer, harsher sentences for perpetrators. These 
demands identify the satisfaction of victims and aggrieved persons with the harsh punishment that 
prosecutors seek. Throughout this dissertation, I argue that this notion of satisfaction is inadequate 
to the needs of victimized and aggrieved persons in the aftermath of traumatic violence. Further, I 
argue that it undermines opportunities for victimized and aggrieved persons to develop 
memorialization and share the meaning of their experience of loss. 
My rejection of the notion that harsh punishment serves victimized and aggrieved persons 
puts me at odds with the most influential demand of the victims’ rights movements. This demand 
has buttressed the anticrime reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that codified “habitual criminal 
statutes” like California’s Three Strikes Law3 and New York’s widely emulated Rockefeller Drug 
Laws.4 Satisfaction of victims was the basis of prolonged life sentences5 and a renewed justification 
for capital punishment.6  Combined, these measures have contributed to the extraordinary increase 
in U.S. incarceration rates.7 The doxa of serving aggrieved persons via punitive treatment is 
enshrined in state constitutions through victims’ rights amendments.8 Advocacy for these 																																																								
3 Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights (New York: NYU Press, 2006), 1. 
4 Governor Nelson Rockefeller said, “I have one goal and one objective and that is to stop the pushing of drugs and to 
protect the innocent victim.” Brian Mann, “How the Rockefeller Drug Laws Changed America,” North Country Public 
Radio (Saranac Lake, NY, January 24, 2013), 
http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/21316/20130124/how-the-rockefeller-drug-laws-changed-
america. 
5 Marie Gottschalk, “Days Without End: Life Sentences and Penal Reform,” Prison Legal News, January 15, 2012, 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/jan/15/days-without-end-life-sentences-and-penal-reform/. 
6 Marie Gottschalk writes, “...the judicial decisions and legal arguments involving capital punishment over the past three 
decades or so helped transform the death penalty into ‘the ultimate form of victim recognition,’ something it had never 
been before in U.S. history.” Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 217. 
7 “From 1978 to 2014, our prison population has risen 408%” ACLU, “The Prison Crisis,” American Civil Liberties Union, 
2016, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis. 
8 Thirty-two states have passed victims’ rights amendments. Many include language like Alaska’s, which offers juridical 
authorities more reasons to reject parole for defendants: “the right [of victims] to be reasonably protected from the 
accused through the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of release by the court.” Some include California’s call 
for harsher sentences in light of previous convictions, “Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal 
proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or 
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding.” Most all of the states include the provision of the victims’ right to 
be heard in court. As I will argue in the third chapter, this testimony is often on behalf of prosecutors in support of 
harsher sentences. National Center for Victims of Crime, “Constitutional Amendments,” National Center for Victims of 
Crime, 2016, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/public-policy/amendments. 
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amendments and harsher sentences for defendants have come from national advocacy groups like 
Parents for Murdered Children, Citizens Against Homicide, and Justice for All.9 One does not need 
to look far into the testimony of aggrieved persons to find such sentiment.10  
In this dissertation project, I argue that the institutional acknowledgement and inclusion of 
the needs of persons victimized and aggrieved by crime can and should leave a richer legacy than an 
extraordinarily punitive criminal justice system. I offer a reorientation of victims’ rights advocacy 
towards institutional support for memorialization and testimony on the meaning of their experience 
of victimization. In this effort, I focus my attention on those who are aggrieved by the murder of 
loved ones. I do so for historical, instrumental, and personal reasons. Many of the earliest victims’ 
rights advocacy groups were formed by persons aggrieved by murder.11 My intervention thus speaks 
to the experiences at the source of the victims’ rights movement. It seeks to reframe the demands 
that the movement has derived from those experiences. I also have reasons of efficacy: If we are 
able to rethink what aggrieved persons deserve in the aftermath of what is supposedly the “worst of 
the worst” crime, then there are possibilities of applying this thought throughout the criminal justice 
system. Finally, as a Jewish philosopher who has grown up among family aggrieved by the murder of 
loved ones in the Holocaust, I have seen the great and prolonged struggle of grandparents to live 
with great loss. The question of what aggrieved persons deserve and require for recovery and 
meaning-making in the aftermath of murder thus arises from lived experience. 
Throughout my dissertation, I explicate and respond to arguments for the good of harsh 
punishment for persons aggrieved by murder. I look to contentions that harsh punishment delivers 
“closure” for aggrieved persons. In the most compelling discourses of closure, harsh punishment 
creates separation and safety from potentially triggering reminders. Insofar as the perpetrator is 
permanently incarcerated or executed, the aggrieved persons can move from a state of debilitating 																																																								
9 Parents of Murdered Children assist aggrieved persons secure harsher sentences for defendants through their “Parole 
Block Program.” Justice for All and Citizens Against Homicide advocate for aggrieved persons with a decidedly pro-
punishment approach. All these organizations are involved in writing amici briefs in support of judicial decisions in the 
interest of harsher penalties for persons convicted of murder. See “Justice For All - A Criminal Justice Reform 
Organization,” 2011, http://www.jfa.net/deathpenalty.html; “Citizens Against Homicide,” 2016, 
http://www.citizensagainsthomicide.org/; Parents of Murdered Children, “Parole Block Program,” National Organization 
of Parents of Murdered Children, 2016, http://www.pomc.com/pbp.html. 
10 See Gregory Kane, “To Murder Victims’ Families, Executing Killers Is Justice,” Baltimore Sun, February 5, 2003, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-md.kane05feb05-column.html; Peter Bronson, “A Cruel Penalty for 
Victims,” Cincinnati Enquirer, February 3, 2003, http://enquirer.com/editions/2003/02/03/loc_bronson03.html. An 
academic surveys of the testimony of the aggrieved makes this brutally plain: Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. 
Umbreit, “Assessing the Ultimate Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State 
Comparison,” Marquette Law Review 96, no. 1 (2012), 
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5144&context=mulr. 
11 Young and Stein, “The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States,” 4. 
			 4 
grief to grief that is more conducive to living, loving, and other future-oriented projects. I look to 
arguments that harsh punishment is an essential means of affirming the value of the lost victim. I 
look to arguments that punishment satisfies moral demands for accountability among those 
aggrieved by murder, which are the condition for moral recovery in the aftermath of traumatic 
experience.  
I respond to each of these arguments by suggesting that the ends they seek—support for 
recovery from traumatic grief, affirmation of the value of the victim, and accountability for crimes—
can be meaningfully sought and delivered by communities organized in support of aggrieved persons 
and the memorialization of the victim of crime. I envision a forum for support for grief and redress 
separate from the traditional guilt and sentencing functions of the criminal justice system. Such a 
measure provides sustained community support for grief that is better suited for the ongoing effects 
of traumatic loss. I argue the support for grief that comes through punishment fails to meet those 
ongoing needs. I envision this forum creating artifacts of memorialization for the persons lost to 
murder that not only affirm their value, but also share their teachings with the community and polity 
that remains. I suggest that this forum can include opportunities for testimonial responsibility-taking 
from perpetrators of crime that would satisfy moral demands for accountability while opening the 
possibility of redress and shared reconstructive projects between aggrieved persons and perpetrators. 
The traditional criminal proceedings would remain, but the responsibility for serving aggrieved 
persons would be shifted from those proceedings to the proceedings of the forum.  
When the criminal justice system serves victims solely by the punitive treatment of 
perpetrators, they deprive aggrieved persons, their communities, and the polity in which they live of 
lessons with the potential to transform understandings of violence and grief. Such understandings 
could be the catalyst for richer means of recovery, resisting repetitions of violence, and constituting 
communities in support of grief. My aim in this dissertation project is to offer reasons in support of 
an alternative institutional response for those aggrieved by murder that would prioritize support for 
the teaching of aggrieved persons.  
This notion of teaching is derived from W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of “contribution.” He 
contends that a life worth living is one where humans are engaged in the free creation, study and/or 
enjoyment of beautiful, truthful, or moral artifacts. For Du Bois, the lineage of Black peoples’ 
struggle in the U.S. has two aspects. The restrictions that create the need for struggle have severely 
limited opportunities for flourishing while also opening richer avenues for flourishing. For Du Bois, 
living under white supremacy’s restriction reveals the insufficiency of the ideals of life of the white 
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majority. Without access to fulfilments that are unjustly limited to white U.S. citizens, Black people 
needed to create alternative life-sustaining ideals. Despite the pain of white supremacist restriction, 
Black traditions of thought have articulated these ideals and many Black communities have enacted 
those ideals to the ends of the healing and flourishing of their members. The flourishing that these 
ideals offer is richer because they speak to needs that are neglected in mass culture. To work on 
behalf of these ideals is to memorialize and develop a tradition of struggle rather than a tradition 
that is upheld with invidious hierarchical racial valuations.  
 Although there are distinctions in the harms of losing loved ones to murder and suffering 
the harms of white supremacy, both share the dynamic of oppressive restriction and the promise for 
richer flourishing. In murder, the commonplace expectation that one’s loved one will be present is 
violently undermined. Trust in the safety and shared moral norms of communal life are also 
undermined. In my dissertation project, I am centrally concerned with two popular forms of 
response to these tremendous wrongs: First, the attempt to approximate status quo ante as in 
discourses of closure. Second, the call for punishment such that the perpetrator is adequately 
condemned by political and legal institutions. In the first response, there is an understandable desire 
to get out from under the challenges of traumatic grief. In the second response, there is an 
understandable desire for acknowledgement and thus memorial of the gravity of one’s loss. Neither 
of these responses, however, are adequate to supporting tremendous task of reconstructing lives in 
the aftermath of traumatic loss. Without the presence of the lost loved one, there is a need for 
memorializing ritual and narrative. In the effort to rebuild trust in the world, there is the need to 
convene community to affirm norms that once seemed in no need of examination. There is an 
ability to connect with others whose trust has also been undermined and imagine relationships that 
could rebuild trust. There may be commitment to understanding violence and resisting its future 
iterations. 
 In the effort to serve persons aggrieved by murder, I argue that institutions of criminal 
justice should constitute communities that cultivate the potential for aggrieved persons’ action and 
insight. This requires time and care, but the outcomes have the potential for much richness. Rather 
than serve aggrieved persons through the removal of the restriction that comes with traumatic grief 
or the punitive acknowledgement that a great wrong has occurred, I argue for an alternative 
response that honors the impossibility of return to the time before loss and the need for 
communities and the polity to transform to accommodate those who are inexorably changed by 
their experience of loss.  
			 6 
Chapter Review 
In my first chapter, I foreground my dissertation’s argument through a case study drawn 
from my grandparents’ experience as persons aggrieved by the murder of family members in the 
European Jewish holocaust. I argue that their experience called for support to speak of the wrongs 
they suffered and resist the repetition of those wrongs. I argue that such support goes beyond safety 
and protection from those who perpetrated wrongs against them. This insight motivates me to 
envision what this support for aggrieved persons might look like in the U.S. criminal justice system. 
I look to Du Bois’ notion of imaginative reconstruction beyond white supremacy to justify my 
methodological choice to do this imaginative work rather than engage directly with the 
contemporary crises of racism, sexism, violence, and inequality in the U.S. criminal justice system. 
In my second chapter, I challenge the popular conception—put forth in discourses of 
“closure”—that harsh punishment should function as a form of support for those aggrieved by 
murder. I look to psychosocial research on the long-term consequences of traumatic experience, 
which suggests that traumatic memory and symptoms do not cease with the distance from 
perpetrators and trials that closure promises. I look to my familial case study to broaden our notion 
of possible harms in the aftermath of trauma. I point to the psychosocial phenomenon of the 
repetition of trauma, where the aggrieved person repeats aspects of the harms they suffered upon 
themselves and non-responsible others. I suggest that discourses of closure fail to address the 
vicious cycle wherein an initial trauma produces further harms. I look to Du Bois’ notion of 
“contribution” to guide a notion of supporting recovery among aggrieved persons that opens the 
possibility for a virtuous cycle in the aftermath of traumatic loss. 
In my third chapter, I respond to the contention that victim impact statements in the 
sentencing phase of trials offers sufficient opportunity for the testimony and contribution of 
aggrieved persons. I locate deficiencies in the testimony allowed in victim impact statements insofar 
as their content is limited by juridical principles like equal protection under the law and consistency 
of sentencing. I also point to limits around the court’s framing and possibilities of response to the 
testimony of the aggrieved. I argue that there is a fundamental conflict between the aims of serving 
the aggrieved and the aims of deciding appropriate punishment. I argue that this should motivate an 
alternative forum for the testimony of aggrieved persons. I contend that such a forum can more 
adequately carry the burden of supporting traumatic grief and meeting the criteria of contribution 
that I offered in my second chapter. 
			 7 
In my fourth chapter, I respond to a contention from Jean Améry that the experience of 
being victimized by crime creates a moral demand for accountability of the perpetrator. For Améry, 
this accountability is the condition for the forward-looking goods, like contribution, which I seek 
throughout my dissertation. Indeed, throughout I argue that demands for redress can be satisfied by 
non-juridical means—by means of proceedings separate from that of holding perpetrators 
accountable. I recognize Amery’s commitment to perpetrator accountability as one that the forum I 
have proposed must take seriously. I integrate this demand for accountability by offering a place for 
perpetrator testimony in a separate meeting of the forum. Through testimony that takes 
responsibility for crimes committed and offers a plan for redress, the proceedings of the forum can 
satisfy demands for accountability without collapsing support for aggrieved persons with the 
punishment of the perpetrator.  
Definition of terms  
When I speak of “murder,” I include any instance of unjustified killing under the jurisdiction 
of U.S. state and federal courts. When I speak of “persons aggrieved by murder” I mean to point to 
those who relied upon the victim and shared intimate relationships with them. This includes family 
members, partners, and close friends. But there is no principled reason that others could not fall into 
this category. When I speak of “communities of the aggrieved” I refer to persons who make the 
choice to stand in support of aggrieved persons as they navigate grief and envision the 
reconstruction of their lives in the aftermath of traumatic loss. I understand “redress” as the 
collective effort of communities and social, political, and legal institutions to reconstitute the well-
being of victims of and persons aggrieved by violence in the context of justice. A context of justice 
is one in which the claims for the well-being of victims do not restrict claims for fair treatment of 
defendants and persons convicted of crimes. It is one where the experiences and testimony of 
aggrieved persons are taken up for the purposes of resisting repetition of harms and better 
supporting those aggrieved by violence in the future. I use “recovery” to refer to the attainment of 
various aspects of well-being. Throughout the dissertation, I describe the elements of this well-being 
as the reconstruction of trust, the ability to imagine a future resistance to the repetition of the 
violence they suffered, and the ability to organize efforts in the interest of memorial for the one who 
was lost.		
 
			 8 
When I speak of the “perpetrator” I am referring to the person responsible for murder. In 
many instances, I assume that the perpetrator and convicted person are the same, despite the fact 
that this equivalence is not guaranteed in the context of any criminal justice system. In my third 
chapter on victim impact statements, I use the language of “defendant” instead of convicted person 
or perpetrator to recognize the mediating context of the juridical procedures. When I use the term 
“juridical,” I refer to processes and procedures that are a part of the traditional adversarial criminal 
justice system.  
My conception of the polity refers to all persons who live under the coercive juridical 
authority of the nation-state (in the case of this project, the U.S. is my nation-state of interest). The 
responsibility of the polity is not only to prevent harm among members, but to cultivate and 
strengthen communal bonds among its members. As I will argue in my first and second chapters, 
such a nation-state calls for amplification of the intellectual and aesthetic contributions of groups 
that its members identify with. 
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Chapter I 
Responding to Trauma in Aftermath of Murder: The Methodology of Criminal Justice in the 
Interest of Recovery from Trauma 
 
In this chapter, I develop an argument for re-envisioning institutions of criminal justice so 
that they can properly address experiences of traumatic loss due to murder. My argument proceeds 
through the analysis of a case study. In this case study, I outline the methodological strategies that 
ground my attempt to take learning and reflection from my family’s experience of loss and grief in 
the Holocaust. I contend that reflection on the resources that could have helped them in their search 
for recovery can be meaningful to the task of rethinking the relationship of institutions of criminal 
justice to aggrieved people. Insofar as this case study stands as an instance of the social-
psychological phenomenon of trauma, the forms of recovery that could have been helpful there can 
serve as guideposts for the recovery of persons who experience traumatic experience in distinct 
contexts. In the context of institutions of criminal justice, I bring these insights to the traumatic 
experience of those who have lost loved ones to murder.  
Through the case study—backed by empirical studies—I suggest that there is a threefold 
distinction in the meaning of the “aftermath of trauma.” One can experience aftermath as a having 
experienced trauma, but still exposed and threatened by further trauma. I call this “aftermath under 
conditions of ongoing violence.” It can also be experienced as having experienced trauma, but no 
longer threatened by it. This space provides survivors with a reasonable expectation of safety from 
re-traumatization. I call this “aftermath in spaces of protection.” Finally, it can be experienced as 
aftermath in a context where trauma is confronted and recovery is sought. I call this “aftermath 
under conditions of transformative recovery.” My contention—both within the case study and in 
reference to the criminal justice system—is that although “aftermath in spaces of protection” is the 
goal of many institutions, there are ethical and political reasons to encourage aftermath that offers 
more support for the recovery of the aggrieved.  
 In this essay, I outline this threefold distinction and its normative implications. I take up the 
methodological challenges of applying this insight to the U.S. criminal justice system. In the case of 
the U.S. criminal justice system, the problems of injustice and inequality muddy the question of 
“aftermath.” Such inequalities make it such that some aggrieved people do even not have the 
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opportunity to experience “aftermath in a space of protection.”1 Thus, there is dissonance between 
my attempt to offer a critique of the criminal justice via the elaboration of the “aftermath in a space 
of recovery” and the conditions within the criminal justice system that call for critique. In light of 
this dissonance, I look to W.E.B. Du Bois for a theoretical frame to justify the counterfactual 
aspects of my critique of the criminal justice system. For Du Bois, the counterfactual framing of 
“aftermath” should be upheld for its aesthetic and social contributions to ongoing struggles against 
unjust institutions.  
Section I: The Aftermath of Murder in the Context of My Family Ties to Victims of the 
European Holocaust 
In this section, I will look to my family’s experience in the Holocaust as a case study to ground 
the threefold distinction in my notion of the “aftermath of trauma.” In addition to grounding the 
descriptive claim—that there is a threefold distinction in notions of the “aftermath of trauma”—this 
case study also motivates my normative claim: Institutions of criminal justice should offer those 
aggrieved by murder the resources to take up the third formation.  
I am a Jewish philosopher with intergenerational ties to victims of the European holocaust: 
My grandparents and great aunts and uncles lived their lives aggrieved by the violence done to their 
fathers, mothers, aunts, uncles, cousins, friends, and lovers. I am three generations removed from 
the European holocaust, yet I count myself as one who is aggrieved by the murderous violence that 
killed and subjected my family to sexual violence and exile. Like many members of the third 
generation, I have grown up with experience of the ways that the grief and sadness are lifelong 
struggles for those who are living in the aftermath of murder, even those who are two generations 
removed from it.2  
Like many members of the second and third generation, I’ve seen grandparents who lost 
many in the Holocaust struggle and fail to avoid inflicting their anger on themselves, their partners, 
and their children.3 I’ve grown up loved and shaped by people living in the aftermath of murder. I 																																																								
1 For instance, in cases of police-involved shooting deaths of unarmed Black men, women and children police officers 
are rarely held accountability for their actions. Zusha Elinson, “More Police Go to Trial in Killings, but Convictions 
Remain Rare,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2015, sec. US, http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-police-go-to-trial-in-
killings-but-convictions-remain-rare-1443044871. 
2 Eli Somer and Moshe Nizri, “Ripples of Trauma and Resilience: Partner Relationships among Second-Generation 
Survivors of the Holocaust,” Kavod: A Journal for Caregivers and Family, no. 4 (Spring 2014), 
http://kavod.claimscon.org/2014/06/ripples-of-trauma-and-resilience-partner-relationships-among-second-generation-
survivors-of-the-holocaust/. 
3 Dov Shmotkin et al., “Resilience and Vulnerability Among Aging Holocaust Survivors and Their Families: An 
Intergenerational Overview,” Journal of Intergenerational Relationships 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 7–21, 
doi:10.1080/15350770.2011.544202. 
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want to reflect on the senses and meanings of “aftermath” from my lineage to frame the perspective 
from which I am considering the issues of criminal justice. In the canonical philosophical, literary, 
and psychological treatments in trauma studies, “aftermath” has referred to living, reflecting, and 
struggling after the experience of trauma.4 It is conceived as an opportunity for recovery and 
reflection towards the reconstitution of the self as robustly relational, future-oriented, and even 
capable of contribution to political life.  My lineage reveals that “the aftermath of murder” has 
distinct resonances that depend upon socio-political conditions. I will position my project in light of 
those resonances. 
First, I make a distinction between “aftermath under conditions of ongoing violence” and 
“aftermath in protected spaces.” The massacre my family suffered outside their homes in Romania 
in July 1941 happened under conditions where there was no defense force that conceived of them as 
persons worthy of protection.5 Those who survived and were transferred to ghettos were “living in 
the aftermath of murder”: guns were no longer trained on them as in the massacre. I imagine the 
expressions of grief there to be powerful and rich; however, possibilities for this “aftermath” in 
circumstances where the aggrieved’s life is as vulnerable to violence as the one who is grieved are 																																																								
4 The tendency of writers to address trauma from the point of view of aftermath, of post-trauma follows from the 
paradigmatic case studies in the academic literature. Psychologists working with Vietnam veterans were the first to 
translate what was formerly called “shell-shock” into a more nuanced diagnosis of “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.” 
See Robert Jay Lifton, Home from the War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973). In the 1990s, the canonical trauma 
studies texts in literary theory took up Lifton with a focus on the European Jewish Holocaust. See Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1992); Cathy Caruth, 
Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Marianne 
Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013). Such work laid the foundations for philosophical literature concerned with conceptions of self in the aftermath of 
sexual violence and institutional formations of post-conflict justice (post-apartheid South Africa or post-genocide 
Rwanda). See Susan J Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2002); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Across disciplines, these authors share the methodological commitment to insight into trauma 
through reflection on past traumatic events. The focus is on the aftereffects, aftermemory, psychic fear of repetition, and 
compulsion to repeat trauma, but the veterans are outside the warzone, the victims of concentration camps and sexual 
violence are survivors. The traumatic events may be psychically feared, but they are not recurrent. There is more recent 
literature that conceives of trauma as continuous rather than past. The cases studies at stake here focus on young Black 
people living in urban neighborhoods where violence is an ongoing threat. Journalist Stephen A. Crockett, Jr. has 
suggested a shift to Continuous Traumatic Stress Disorder. See John A. Rich, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Trauma and 
Violence in the Lives of Young Black Men (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); Stephen A. Crockett, Jr, 
“PTSD in the Inner City Needs a Name That Respects Its Victims,” The Root, May 20, 2014, http:// 
www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2014/05/let_s_rename_hood_disease_to_signify_what_it_really_means.html. 
5 For a scholarly account of my family’s experience in the present-day Ukraine, see Vladimir Solonari, “Patterns of 
Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July-August 1941,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 749–87. 
6 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers 
5 For a scholarly account of my family’s experience in the present-day Ukraine, see Vladimir Solonari, “Patterns of 
Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July-August 1941,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 749–87. 
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substantively different than “aftermath in protected spaces” where reoccurrence of violence no 
longer threatens in the same way. 
I’m thinking here of the post-genocidal lives that my family took up once they emigrated to 
the U.S. and Israel. Their whiteness in the racial ordering of the U.S. afforded them the socio-
political protection they lacked in Europe.6 Israeli military prowess and the contribution of the U.S. 
and Europe toward the establishment of Israeli protection provided the sense of safety that my 
family desperately needed in the aftermath of shattered childhoods, livelihoods, language, culture, 
and kinship networks. Even with the benefit of this “aftermath in protected spaces,” I still cannot 
comprehend how family members who faced such abyssal cruelty could have maintained rituals of 
community and reconstituted kinship networks. Yet, I am here. I am the result of and beneficiary of 
that work.  
It is that “aftermath in protected spaces” that I’ve grown up with, and it is from the position 
of one who has reaped much benefit from it that I identify its shortcomings. Beyond the astonishing 
maintenance of ritual and kinship in my Jewish family and community, I have also been troubled at 
the ways that many people in my community see the maintenance of this protection as the central 
claim of Jewish identity. Like the Prime Minister of Israel, they contend that the security of Israel 
trumps the needs and demands of all others, especially Palestinian people.7 As Karen Brodkin argues 
in How Jews Became White Folks and What that Says About Race in America, many white Jewish people 
accepted their racial privilege in the U.S. without meaningful resistance to the ways that such 
privilege comes at the expense of living a just and ethical life.8 Identification of this state of 
protection with fulfillment of recovery in the aftermath of traumatic experience leaves unaddressed 
the interpersonal issues of persons who have suffered trauma as a result of their experience of 
persecution. Specifically, it leaves unaddressed the needs of those who have suffered to rebuild trust 
in the world. It leaves unaddressed the propensity of persons who have suffered trauma to visit 
aspects of that trauma on others.  
The silence that characterized my grandfather and great grandparent’s relationship to the 
trauma they experienced in the Holocaust has been identified as a feature of the experience of many 																																																								
6 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers 
University Press, 1998). 
7 International Middle East Media Center, “Netanyahu: ‘We Will Forever Live by the Sword.,’” IMEMC News, October 
27, 2015, http://imemc.org/article/73591/. 
8 Brodkin contrasts the racial understandings of assimilating immigrants (specifically white Jewish people) to that of 
people who were born in the U.S.  She writes, “But fluidity and assimilation have meant assimilation into the practices 
and meanings of whiteness, of the dominant culture and values, of creating oneself as worthy by contrast with 
blackness.” Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America, 178. 
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who survived the Holocaust and survived traumatic experiences more generally.9 Holocaust 
survivors, according to psychotherapist Yael Danieli, remained silent about their experiences, 
especially in two decades proceeding the war, because they thought that their stories would not be 
believed, that they would be greeted with horror, that they would be shamed for not resisting more, 
or suspected that they committed immoral acts to secure their survival.10 The testimony cited by 
Danieli points to the enormous difficulty of testimony in the aftermath of trauma. To speak one’s 
trauma requires trust that listeners will listen compassionately after one has experienced an event that 
has very likely undermined the traumatized person’s capacity to trust others. In Trauma and Recovery, 
Judith Herman writes “The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness. 
Certain violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning of the 
word unspeakable.”11  
Without putting words to the experience of victimization, it is difficult for persons living in 
the aftermath of trauma to identify the dynamics of violence that they might unconsciously repeat 
upon non-responsible others. It is difficult for family members or members of the community to 
assist the aggrieved or victimized person in the effort to resist this repetition. I will look back to my 
familial case study as well as psychosocial research to explicate the phenomenon of “repetition 
compulsion” in my second chapter. For now, I want to highlight the way “aftermath in the space of 
protection” is committed to resisting the repetition of the group violence that has past, but is 
insufficiently attentive to the ways in which that violence can live on in interpersonal relationships.  
I contrast the values of safety and security that guide living in “spaces of protection” with 
the dedication to building a legacy of recovery and justice through engagement with the past, which 
characterizes “aftermath in spaces of transformative recovery.” This is a notion of recovery that asks 
not only whether the formerly victimized person is out of the state of danger and able to partake in a 
life free of the forces that previously constrained them, but whether they have the resources to 																																																								
9 Hadas Wiseman et al., “Parental Communication of Holocaust Experiences and Interpersonal Patterns in Offspring of 
Holocaust Survivors,” International Journal of Behavioral Development 26, no. 4 (July 1, 2002): 371–81, 
doi:10.1080/01650250143000346; Nina Thorup Dalgaard and Edith Montgomery, “Disclosure and Silencing: A 
Systematic Review of the Literature on Patterns of Trauma Communication in Refugee Families,” Transcultural Psychiatry 
52, no. 5 (October 1, 2015): 579–93, doi:10.1177/1363461514568442. 
10 Yael Danieli and Union for Reform Judaism, “Conspiracy of Silence: A Conversation with Dr. Yael Danieli,” Reform 
Judaism, Winter 2009, http://rjmag.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=1530. Hasia Diner has disputed claims about the silence 
of the Jewish community around memorialization of the Holocaust and pervasive victim-blaming in those decades. 
Hasia Diner, We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence After the Holocaust, 1945-1962 (New 
York: NYU Press, 2010). This the collective remembrance of the Holocaust on the part of the Jewish community, 
however, did not always translate into a support that people needed to testify to their experience. 
11 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence, from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York: 
Basic Books, 2015), 1. 
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create a legacy of beauty, justice, and/or truth from their traumatic experience. From the point of 
view of “aftermath in spaces of transformative recovery,” the crimes suffered are detested, but 
traumatic experience is respected. The one who has survived trauma has the potential to bring forth 
insight, moral demands, and artifacts from that experience. Institutions dedicated to creating this 
form of aftermath for victimized persons would support the realization of that potential.  
With regards to Jewish experience, and specifically that of white Ashkenazi people 
victimized and aggrieved by the Holocaust like my family, I see an opportunity for a wider, more 
incisive legacy that many Jewish scholars and activists have taken up: First, a broader sense of 
resisting repetition of the violence of the Holocaust. The memory of the Holocaust is not only a 
means to resist the repetition of the horrors of genocide, but to motivate resistance to the repetition 
of the dynamics of unjustified violence, racism, sexism, and homophobia that underlie Nazism. 
Second, lessons learned from the examination of the beauty and the missed opportunities in 
memorializing and recovering from loss in the seventy years since the Holocaust can support others 
who are victimized or aggrieved by traumatic violence. The creation of such a legacy requires 
support for the reconstruction of trust in the world and the future, which are undermined in the 
experience of trauma. Without this trust, it is difficult to see how the creation of this legacy can be 
meaningful to others. The preservation of such a legacy requires vigilance to the ways in which this 
legacy can be undermined by Jewish participation in invidious dynamics of unjustified violence, 
racism, sexism, homophobia, and cissexism. My contention is that the most robust form of recovery 
is that which grieves and recovers in concert with the disruption of cycles of violence and the effort 
to build legacies of learning.  
Section II: Connecting my familial ties to the critique of the U.S. criminal justice system   
In this dissertation, I’ll begin the work of developing this “space of transformative recovery” 
in the context of a schema of criminal justice in response to murder. I take up this notion of 
recovery by offering a schema of criminal justice that might be capable of responding to those 
aggrieved by violence in ways that would have met the often ignored or silenced needs of members 
of my family for recovery. These are needs that go beyond the call for the punishment of Nazi 
perpetrators and for lives protected from ongoing anti-Semitic violence. 
This project is my attempt to contribute the lessons from my family experience as an 
instance traumatic experience and repetition toward the critique of the punitive U.S criminal legal 
system. I believe that this case study can motivate a challenge to the present day doxa regarding 
punitiveness: That the satisfaction of those aggrieved by violent crime is measured by the harsh 
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punishment of the perpetrator combined with the sense of protection and safety felt by those 
aggrieved.12 In many ways, my family seemed to experience a form of redress that approximated this 
ideal. Those who survived took up lives in the U.S. and Israel where there was safety from anti-
Semitic violence. In these locations there was widespread condemnation of the Nazi violence that 
took so many of their family members. The shortcomings of this seeming ideal of recovery motivate 
me to think through an alternative form of responding to those aggrieved by murder in civil and 
criminal contexts.  
 My claim is that the study of insufficient recovery from trauma in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust can motivate alternative responses to murder in the context of criminal justice. This relies 
upon the analogical relationship between those aggrieved by murder in interpersonal and genocidal 
contexts. I frame the relationship between these two aggrieved groups by reference to their shared 
experience of trauma. I characterize trauma that comes with the murder of a loved one as an 
experience of a death within life. This is an experience where constitutive needs (and assumption of 
the satisfaction of those needs) regarding integrity, safety, and trust in others are violently 
undermined.  
This analogy of distinct experiences of loss interpreted through the lens of “trauma” opens 
the field of interlocutors quite widely. Through this analogy I connect my questions regarding the 
needs of recovery after the experience of murder to a community of thinkers who confront trauma 
in its other forms. Améry reflects upon his experiences of torture in Auschwitz; Brison reflects upon 
her experience of rape and assault; Du Bois reflects on the traumas caused by anti-Black racism. 
These diverse figures share projects of confronting grief (widely construed) and elaborating the 
possibilities of recovery in the wake of past and ongoing experiences of trauma. I will further 
elaborate the hermeneutic of trauma upon which this analogical relationship is based in my third 
chapter.  
I situate my project within a tradition of political thought that I see most clearly in the work 
of Du Bois, but which is also addressed in the work of Améry and Brison: These are intellectuals 																																																								
12 The language of “enhanced sentencing” in the California Victims’ Rights Proposition (both approved by voters): The 
1982 Victims’ Bill of Rights used language of “enhanced sentencing” to speak of longer sentences and the 2008 Marsy’s 
Law reduces the parole opportunities for convicted persons. On the 1982 proposition: Dan Morain, “Longer Sentences 
Upheld Under Victims’ Rights Bill,” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-01-
29/news/mn-13928_1_rulings; “California Proposition 8, Victims’ Bill of Rights (June 1982),” accessed October 16, 
2015, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_Victims’_Bill_of_Rights_(June_1982); Vanessa Barker, The 
Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 74; Marsy's Law: California Secretary of State, “California Voter Information Guide: Text of Proposed 
Laws,” 2008, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop9. 
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who look to the traditions of teaching and learning developed from their group’s experience of 
living outside the realm of state protection as a catalyst for the reconsideration of the ideals of 
redress for past, present, and future wrongs. Du Bois, Brison, Améry, and I all share a commitment 
to considering what I call “reconstructive ideals”: the ideals that might guide living together in the 
aftermath of violence. 
Section III: Justifying the role of imagination (and recognizing its limits) in my schema of 
criminal justice 
I have so far offered an account of living in the “aftermath” of violence through a 
recounting of my family’s history in the Holocaust. There I distinguished between “aftermath under 
conditions of ongoing violence” and “aftermath under conditions of protection.” I located my 
concern as a scholar on the creation of regulative ideals of redress that would support the recovery 
and reconstitution of persons who were aggrieved by murder. Thus, I located my concerns with 
engaging with “aftermath under conditions of transformative recovery,” which is a movement I am 
looking to effect from a distance of seventy years. This is seventy years my family spent with the 
privilege of “aftermath in protected spaces.” If I were to maintain focus on familial trauma, my 
decision to center the movement from “aftermath in protected spaces” toward “aftermath in spaces 
of transformative recovery” would be easily justified. However, there is dissonance insofar as I am 
seeking to apply these ideals of recovery to considerations of present criminal justice system in the 
U.S. Objections arise here insofar as I am bringing the considerations that are removed from the 
experience of trauma to an institution that is structured by ongoing and continuous traumatic 
violence.  
In the foregoing, I will to develop the claim that—when conditions of crisis adhere—
philosophical analysis should begin with the attempt to understand and contribute to the 
amelioration of the conditions of that crisis. This is a compelling metaphilosophical claim regarding 
the responsibility of philosophers when they undertake reflection on institutions that are structured 
by systematic oppression. I am compelled by this claim and I will seek to develop it further. The 
transformative recovery I described above sought to not only leave a legacy that speaks to 
reconstructive ideals of memorialization and recovery in the aftermath of violence, but also to resist 
future iterations of invidious socio-political arrangements and the violence that follows from them. 
Resistance to the current criminal justice system in the U.S. is an important opportunity for such 
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work. I do not wish to irresponsibly flee from the demands of resistance to unjust social 
arrangements for the sake of imagining what a just response to traumatic experience looks like. 13 
I respond to this claim, which I will refer to hereafter as the “responsibility of resistance” 
counterargument via Du Bois’s methodological considerations. Throughout his career, Du Bois is 
engaged by dynamics of emancipatory requirements and the importance of reconstructive visions 
amidst ongoing violence. Following Du Bois, I wish to suggest that there is a place for 
reconstructive and imaginative thought when conditions of traumatic violence persist. I will look to 
Du Bois’ “Criteria of Negro Art” (1926)14 to defend my attention to an imaginative vision of 
“aftermath under conditions of transformative recovery” in the context of criminal justice. 
Emancipation from conditions of racism, classism, and cis/heterosexism that define the present 
functioning of the U.S. criminal legal system are necessary; but, I will argue that such a project 
should not necessarily take methodological priority above the development of alternative visions of 
criminal justice.   
There is a distinction between philosophical writing in resistance to the current crisis of the 
criminal legal system in the U.S. and my work, which assumes the cessation of that crisis in order to 
imagine alternative forms of responding to criminal trespasses. For instance, when I speak of 
institutions of criminal justice serving those aggrieved by murder, this is premised on the notion that 
who is deserving of “victims’ rights” and services are no longer confined by racist notions that 
privilege white victims of crime in the present criminal justice system. The “responsibility of 
resistance” counterargument that I develop would suggest that the ideality of my schema of criminal 
justice is pernicious with regards to the kinds of responsibility demanded of theorists and citizens in 
view of the present crises of the U.S. criminal legal system. Advocates of this counterargument 
would call for the current crisis of the criminal legal system to orient my methodology.  
																																																								
13 This objection is a reflection of my own worries about theoretical negligence. The claims have been influenced by 
philosophers who advocate for non-ideal theory, especially Charles Mills, but I do not see my work here as a 
counterpoint to theirs. The ideal/non-ideal theory debate in political philosophy includes claims about the responsibility 
of philosophers to engage with socio-political injustices, but they do so against a Rawlsian tradition. The Rawslian 
tradition does not only imagine an ideally equal polity, but derives monistic principles of justice from such an ideally 
equal polity. The stakes of non-ideal theory in the philosophical literature are set against a problematic that is distinct 
from the one that I pursue here: The attempt to imagine pluralistic ideals in the aftermath of experience of violence and 
oppression. See Charles W. Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (August 1, 2005); Lisa Tessman, 
“Idealizing Morality,” Hypatia 25, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 797–824; Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” 
Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (September 1, 2012): 654–64. 
14 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Criteria of Negro Art,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary Classics of 
the United States, 1986), 993–1002. 
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This skeptical reader will rightly ask: Why focus on building an ideal schema of criminal justice in 
the aftermath of murder when the ongoing violence of the present criminal legal system grows ever 
worse? When working on an idealized level, this reader claims, I will miss salient features of the 
criminal justice system that make it what it is. At present, the criminal legal system is defined by a 
crisis of accountability. One cannot discuss criminal acts of murder and accountability without 
accounting for hierarchies of accountability. It is, for instance, very clear that police or white men 
who murder Black men, women, and children and claim self-defense (no matter how flimsy their 
stories) will very rarely be held accountable for their crimes. Violence by cissexual people against 
gender non-conforming people is viewed as outside of the realm of accountability. The degree of 
accountability that perpetrators are subjected to is very often determined by their financial capacities 
to hire effective counsel.  
 According to this reader, by working on the level of developing ideals in response to murder 
rather than engaging in critique of present conditions, I will fail to identify and redress the material 
conditions of oppression that make criminal punishment and accountability what they are. This 
skeptical reader would rightly distinguish theorists like myself who presume whose reflections on the 
law take the legal institution’s claim of impartiality, of the equality of all before the law for granted 
and those who adhere the “responsibility of resistance,” who seek to dismantle the claims of equality 
before the law, describe the ideological function of those claims, and attempt to remake or redress 
those inequalities. From the point of view of my interlocutor, it makes no difference if I 
acknowledge that the institutions are non-egalitarian at present; it matters that I am developing legal 
philosophical reflection as if they were.  
This challenges the efficacy of my methodological tack. There are compelling reasons for 
this: The adherent of the “responsibility of resistance” is correct that operating on a level of 
assumed equality will conceive of murder and the criminal justice system in ways that are more 
congenial to present ordering of the criminal legal system. The present U.S. criminal legal system 
claims to treat all cases of murder alike. Any observer of the criminal legal system knows this to be 
false in the vast majority of cases. Many critics, like Michelle Alexander does in her The New Jim 
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color Blindness, respond by denying narratives of legal 
“colorblindness,” “class blindness,” and “gender and sexuality blindness.”15 They address and 
																																																								
15 See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New Press, 2010). 
			 19 
redress the ways in which group identities track invidious distinctions in who is punished and how 
harshly. 
 Compelling methodological commitments follow for the adherent of the “responsibility of 
resistance.” They give methodological priority to the signification, description, and normative 
principles that are the non-egalitarian underside of the ideal of equality before the law which the 
criminal legal system claims to observe. They are devoted to the historical, philosophical, socio-
economic, and socio-political labor that is required to understand the genesis of an ideal of equality 
that is so consistently undermined. This analysis may be a foundation for work of reconstructing 
equality such that it would be substantial, meaningful, and delivered on a consistent basis. It can also 
be the ground for alternatives to equality: Is there another kind of legal ideal beyond equality that 
would be adequate to the diverse political, social, economic, and gender experiences of members of 
a polity? 
 A principled resistance to my methodological commitment to reconstructive ideals of 
criminal justice despite ongoing conditions of violence can also follow. For the adherent of the 
“responsibility of resistance,” the theoretical basis of assumed equality before the law (and dealing 
with harms among members of the polity through such a lens) fails to recognize that there are 
philosophical, political, and legal questions of enfranchisement that must be acknowledged and 
wrestled with before there can be meaningful consideration of how an ideally equal criminal justice 
system would respond to murder. Without the priority of criminal injustice and disenfranchisement, 
the I am engaging in a practice of imagination that continues to accept the present-day institutional 
goals of equality before the law as a stipulated premise. As such, I ignore that this premise that is 
deserving of a detailed exposition. Examination of the ways it might be achieved, how the failures of 
its achievement might be redressed, and perhaps more fundamentally, whether it is a worthy ideal in 
the first place are required.  
 The challenge of this counterargument can be summarized: My notion of criminal justice is 
built on a pernicious assumption of equality of all before the law. Despite your acknowledgement 
that this ideal is far from realized, the crisis of the inequality before the law ought to draw you to 
contend with the material conditions of disenfranchisement and offer philosophical resources to 
engage with its redress. Without such a component, you contribute to ongoing legal philosophical 
dereliction of this problem. Your notion of redress will be too many steps removed from the present 
crisis to be relevant to living together and teaching and learning in the world that we currently share.  
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Section IV: Du Bois on the interdependence of reconstruction and emancipation 
I diffuse the criticism of the adherent of the “responsibility to resist” by looking to the 
methodological considerations of W.E.B. Du Bois. Du Bois offers an alternative to the competing 
notions of priority that I’ve outlined above. For Du Bois, resistance to the injustice and oppression 
of white supremacy calls for a response that works on both ideal and non-ideal levels. Under 
conditions of ongoing violence, Du Bois argues for the interdependence of articulating 
reconstructive imaginative ideals (including those that stipulate counterfactual equality) and the work 
of resistance to concrete instances and formations of oppression. This interdependence, however, 
does not make the non-ideal and the ideal collapse into one another. They are distinct and mutually 
supportive forms of struggle. At the conclusion of this section, I will apply these insights to the 
project of creating a reconstructive vision for the U.S. criminal justice system. 
 In “Criteria of Negro Art,” Du Bois contends that Black resistance to white supremacy 
makes two inseparable demands on the U.S. polity and its members. First, there is a demand for 
Black people to live and love without the ongoing threat of violence and subordination. Second, 
there is the demand for material support and aesthetic and intellectual labor devoted to developing 
modes of living oriented by Black historical knowledge, intellectual lineages, cultural patterns, and 
the preservation of Black group identity. There is a relationship of mutual support between two 
sides of the struggle: life and love without violent subordination and intergenerational conservation 
and building of Black culture and politics. The former demand is that Black people in the U.S. be 
treated with the respect, dignity, and protection equal to that of privileged white citizens. The latter 
demand regards the aims those lives under conditions where white supremacy no longer persists. 
This is a call to preserve and contribute to contribute to the Black traditions of creativity and 
sustenance.  
 Du Bois argues for the inseparability of these demands: Reliable safety from white 
supremacy at the price of social, cultural, and political assimilation is insufficient. Too much 
attention to the work of the emancipation from violence risks inattention to the imaginative work 
that is necessary to challenge the aims and organization of life that white U.S. citizens have taken to 
be valuable. The shortcomings of the aims and organization of living held dear by white people in 
the U.S. have already been identified by Black traditions of thought and creativity. The work of 
building reconstructive visions of the polity conserves and develops those critiques into guiding 
principles of a reconstructed polity. In Du Bois’ 1960 “Whither Now or Why?” he underlines the 
critical importance of this cultural, reconstructive work: He contends that white supremacy will have 
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won if the opportunity to learn from Black history and develop traditions of thought and creativity 
is lost in the struggle for equality within the U.S.16  
 Du Bois motivates his argument for this interdependence by taking up a hypothetical 
rejoinder among his NAACP audience regarding the title of his speech. This interlocutor, like my 
non-ideal theorist, seeks to prioritize resistance to “conditions of ongoing violence” before the 
aesthetic/cultural focus of the speech. Du Bois imagines this skeptical retort:  
Such people are thinking something like this: “How is it that an organization like 
this, a group of radicals trying to bring new things into the world, a fighting 
organization which has come up out of the blood and dust of battle, struggling for 
the right of black men to be ordinary human beings—how is it that an organization 
of this kind can turn aside to talk about Art? After all, what have we who are slaves 
and black to do with Art?”17 
 
Before I explicate the challenge of Du Bois’s imagined NAACP interlocutor, I want to offer a broad 
working definition of “Art.” “Art” is the expression of creative capacities toward the end of 
“Beauty.” “Beauty,” for Du Bois, is the aesthetic experience of aesthetic creation or consumption 
that breaks the routinized temporalities of work and habit. It instantiates a temporality of curiosity, 
aesthetic pleasures and pains, imagination and vision, and in some instances, a “yes-saying” to life. 
The experiences of creation or consumption of “art” or “beauty” are not in themselves political acts. 
Of course, some artists explicitly express their protest, but there is no essential tie between the 
creation and consumption of artefacts of “art” and “beauty” and the political ends that the NAACP 
and other “fighting organizations” seek. 
 The tensions that drive the imagined NAACP challenge to Du Bois’ choice of topic, 
however, go beyond the mismatch of the political purpose of protest and the aesthetic 
indeterminacy of “Art.” For the non-ideal theorist, as for Du Bois’ challenger, there are competing 
projects and priorities between those who strive to do imaginative work under the heading of “Art” 
and those who are doing the work of political resistance. There are competing visions of novelty and 
of the resources that would support the flourishing of Black people. Du Bois’ NAACP challenger 
identifies with the lineage of Black resistance: From slave rebellions, to the work towards franchise, 
education, and more during Black Reconstruction, to those resisting lynching in their contemporary 
mid 1920s context. For the NAACP challenger, the ends of such resistance is “struggling for the 
right of black men to be ordinary human beings.” To strive for “ordinary” human being-ness is to 																																																								
16 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Whither Now and Why,” in The Education of Black People: Ten Critiques 1906-1960, ed. Herbert 
Aptheker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 193–204. 
17 Du Bois, “Criteria of Negro Art,” 993.  
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strive for a life that is economically and socially stable, politically enfranchised, supported, safe, and 
protected from harm. It is a life whose boundaries are unmarked by white supremacy. 
 Du Bois offers a metaphor of climbing to frame the striving that characterizes the work that 
his NAACP challenger prioritizes. He writes: “You and I have been breasting hills; we have been 
climbing upward; there has been progress and we can see it day by day looking back along blood-
filled paths. But as you go through the valleys and over the foothills, so long as you are climbing, the 
direction—north, south, east or west—is of less importance.”18 The progress is directed by saying 
“no” to present conditions of oppression and abuse. What is sought is freedom from violence, 
second class citizenship, and abusive white supremacist conceptions of beauty and sexuality. The 
direction of this striving is “of less importance” insofar as such resistance to white supremacy is by 
its nature reactionary and opportunistic. Those who engage in this work confront terrors and seek to 
move themselves and others to safety. For good reasons, the success of such work is measured by 
the harms that were avoided rather than unity of purpose.  
 Du Bois identifies with this work of resistance: His language is “You and I have been 
breasting hills. We have been climbing upward…” Yet, his analysis also speaks to the ways in which 
those successes bring about new questions. These are questions that point to the richness and the 
limitations of the action and thought that develop in resistance to oppression. Immediately following 
his remarks on his and his NAACP audience’s upward movement he writes: “But when gradually 
the vista widens and you begin to see the world at your feet and the far horizon, then it is time to 
know more precisely whither you are going and what you really want.”19 He is speaking of the 
moments of relief from the constancy of the struggle to simply live without fear and violence. These 
are the moments when those who are resisting can ask themselves: “What would make living the 
livable life we’re striving for meaningful?” “How would we orient our lives to make them rich and 
valuable in the future that we’re striving for?”    
 Du Bois fears that those who are so dedicated to creating protection, safety and survival will 
lack the resources to respond to those questions with the richness they demand. As an example, he 
refers to the talk of an NAACP convention speaker the night before. He writes, “As it was phrased 
last night it had a certain truth: We want to be Americans, full-fledged Americans, with all the rights 
of other American citizens.”20 The truth is that if the rights and protections that are constitutionally 																																																								
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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promised to Black citizens—but are in fact circumscribed by white supremacy—were made 
meaningful and real, many of the burdens of Black life in the U.S. would be lifted.  
Despite this truth, Du Bois articulates the limits of the vision of full US citizenship as a 
vision for a meaningful future. He asks: “But is that all? Do we want simply to be Americans? Once 
in a while through all of us there flashes some clairvoyance, some clear idea, of what America really 
is. We who are dark can see America in a way that white Americans cannot. And seeing our country 
thus, are we satisfied with its present goals and ideals?” 21 Du Bois contends that the traditions of 
teaching and learning among the Black U.S. community call for more than inclusion in the political 
and legal rights granted to white citizens of the USA. Political inclusion cannot be an end in itself.  
This inclusion would be inadequate to the legacy of Black creativity and thought that sustained and 
enriched Black life under conditions of political and social oppression. It would risk failing to sustain 
that legacy for the future of the Black people in the U.S. and human civilization writ large.  
Du Bois reworks the “present goals and ideals” of the U.S. by reference to the Black 
aesthetic tradition. He is concerned with “Beauty.” Specifically, the way in which the experience of 
creativity violently circumscribed—in slavery and in the aftermath of white supremacist responses to 
Black efforts at Reconstruction—teaches of the necessity of aesthetic experience for life. Du Bois 
frames the critical importance of aesthetic creativity and appreciation by asking his audience to 
imagine a time when white supremacy no longer persists. Here he asks his audience to imagine a 
time where Blackness is no longer a cause for threat or second class citizenship. He asks them to 
imagine the realization of equal political and legal protection and the attainment of economic 
affluence. He asks his audience if they would be satisfied to assimilate into a culture that equates 
flourishing with material accumulation and the status that such material accumulation can bring. Du 
Bois insists that expensive cars, expensive clothes and large notices in the newspaper announcing 
their social comings and goings cannot be a satisfactory end to the work of Black people who are 
fighting for meaningful equality. 
It may seem that Du Bois has created a strawman of his NAACP opponent insofar as he 
links the single-minded struggle for political equality to the conspicuous consumption of affluent 
white Chicagoans in the mid-1920s. However, his contention is not that conspicuous consumption 
is an inevitable outcome of the NAACP’s fight for equality; rather, he guides his audience to an 
imaginary space in the aftermath of white supremacy, to a time when the NAACP’s ends are 
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achieved. This imaginative space affords his audience the space to ask those questions of “whither 
they are going,” which are questions of the meaning and values that they would want to orient their 
lives under ideal conditions. Although this orientation can be indebted to the values of resistance to 
white supremacy, their scope goes beyond the necessities of the present struggle. This is an 
elaboration of a vision of living together that is catalyzed by experiential, intellectual, and aesthetic 
insight into the failures of the dominant conceptions of success, meaningful living, and flourishing.  
From such an imaginative space, Du Bois offers his vision of future living together. This is a 
vision of creativity and appreciation of aesthetic experience indebted to a tradition of Black 
experience, teaching, and learning in the U.S. He writes: 
You realize this sooner than the average white American because, pushed aside as we 
have been in America, there has come to us not only a certain distaste for the tawdry 
and the flamboyant but a vision of what the world could be if it were a really 
beautiful world; if we had the true spirit; if we had the Seeing Eye, the Cunning 
Hand, the Feeling Heart... lived in a world where men know, where men create, 
where they realize themselves and where they enjoy life. It is that sort of a world we 
want to create for ourselves and for America.22 
 
Being “pushed aside in America” has given black Americans first-hand experience of the wrong that 
comes from proscribed perceptual (“Seeing Eye”), creative (“Cunning Hand”), and empathetic 
(“Feeling Heart”) capacities. Given the memory of the ways in which slavery and poverty affected 
those capacities, Black people know the injury that comes with the inability to freely use and build 
these capacities. They know that money-making and property-accumulation cannot alone make for 
lives worth living. The unique vision of Black people for the future of the U.S., according to Du 
Bois, is a polity that cultivates perceptual, aesthetic, and ethical capacities. Hence it creates the “really 
beautiful world.” For Du Bois, these capacities are built through the aesthetic experiences of 
“beauty.” 
Du Bois defines “Beauty” by reference to his own diverse aesthetic experiences. He recalls 
“the Cathedral at Cologne”… “a village of the Veys in West Africa,”… “the Venus de Milo”… “a 
single phrase of music in the Southern South”23 The cultivation of moments of being aesthetically 
struck are critical to Du Bois’s vision of a political future oriented around “Beauty.” Du Bois’s 
experiences of “beauty” point to more than pleasure, they point to his diverse intellectual heritage: 
The Cathedral in Cologne points to his indebtedness to Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Weber; the West 
African village speaks to his abiding commitment to give voice to Africa whether it be the 																																																								
22 Ibid., 994-5. 
23 Ibid., 995.  
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reclamation of ancient Ethiopian and Egyptian civilizations or the traditions of common land 
ownership; the Venus de Milo speaks to his commitment to the ideals of golden age Greek 
philosophy and his insistence on classical education against Booker T. Washington24; and of course, 
the music of the South speaks to his most profound influence: the black U.S. American cultural and 
intellectual tradition.  
The experiences of architecture in Germany, village design in West Africa, Greek statue, and 
music in the U.S. South are aesthetic experiences that cultivate what Du Bois calls “true spirit”: 
perceptual, creative, and empathetic capacities. Those experiences have sharpened Du Bois’s own 
perceptual capacities insofar as he is able to perceive beauty in distinct idioms. This ability to 
perceive beauty translates into a pluralistic creativity: the capacity to take up and transform those 
conceptions of “beauty” via combination, comparison, and contrast. Conceived as the capacity to 
recognize another as distinct but nonetheless intelligible, empathy recognizes that while “beauty” 
arises from distinct social, political, geographic, racial, gendered contexts, it contributes to the 
meaningfulness of one’s own life. As such, “beauty” calls forth responsibility to the source of that 
beauty: the creator and the context out of which they create alike. 
For Du Bois, this orientation towards “Beauty” is essential to living a meaningful life. 
However, the consumptive capitalist orientation of life in the mid-1920s through the present in U.S. 
blocks off these possibilities. Of “Beauty,” he writes: “In normal life all may have it and have it yet 
again. The world is full of it; and yet today the mass of human beings are choked away from it, and 
their lives distorted and made ugly. This is not only wrong, it is silly.”25 Du Bois’s incredulity (“not 
only wrong, but silly”) is his sense that a denial of the capacity to live a life that allows for the pursuit 
of “Beauty” is not just a moral wrong: there is something wanton and cruel about a society that calls 
on a mass of people to work and struggle with such gritted teeth that there is not a moment to be 
awestruck. Without such moments, possibilities for richer ethical, creative, and perceptive life are 
blocked off. 
The vision that Du Bois derives from the history of Black living, loving, teaching, and 
learning is one where there is a political, social, and economic imperative for the support for 
aesthetic experience, creativity, and interpretation. Such a polity relies on the creation of conditions 
of citizenship and equality that the NAACP seeks, but it doesn’t take that as a sufficient condition 																																																								
24 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Souls of Black Folk,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary Classics of the 
United States, 1986), 424-438. 
25 Du Bois, “Criteria of Negro Art,” 995. 
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for a meaningful overcoming of white supremacy. A meaningful overcoming of white supremacy 
will make demands that call for the reorientation of the values by which members of a polity live and 
socio-political institutions are organized. Towards this meaningful overcoming of white supremacy, 
working for equality runs in concert with the work of developing and thinking through those 
reorienting and reconstructive demands.  
To follow Du Bois’ call to consider the transformations that would arise in the aftermath of 
white supremacy is a commitment to attending to the articulations of Black people envisioning 
justice and meaningful lives amidst oppression. At age 92, in his April 1960 address “Whither Now 
or Why?” at the Conference of the Association for Black Social Science Teachers, Du Bois 
forcefully articulates the imperative of maintaining Black culture whether or not white supremacy 
persists. He speaks to his audience in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education—at the doorstep of 
generations of Black children who will be integrated into mixed public schools where many of their 
teachers will be white. He writes:  
As I have said before and I repeat I am not fighting to settle the question of racial 
equality in America by the process of getting rid of the Negro race; getting rid of 
black folk, not producing black children, forgetting the slave trade and slavery, and 
the struggle for emancipation; of forgetting abolition and especially ignoring the 
whole cultural history of Africans in the world. 
No! What I have been fighting for and am still fighting for is the possibility 
of black folk and their cultural patterns existing in America without discrimination; 
and on terms of equality.26 
 
Without the history, traditions of thought, struggle, and love taught in all Black primary and 
secondary schools, the legacies of Black life in the U.S. are threatened. If those legacies are 
threatened, the notions of racial equality that will be articulated by the coming generations will lose 
their experiential cultural and historical soil. From that background come the resources to enrich the 
demands of the struggle for racial equality.  
To envision a world that is based upon (and thus dedicated to the development of) Black 
“cultural patterns,” which Du Bois earlier defined as aesthetic production and appreciation, is to 
resist the compromise where racial equality means the assimilation of Black people. To do the work 
of preserving the history and ideals for the future, Du Bois conceives of a simultaneous demand: To 
live and love on terms of equality and to continually create and gain inspiration from the legacy of 
Black people thinking, resisting, working, speaking, and loving.   
																																																								
26 Du Bois, “Whither Now and Why,” 195.  
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I share Du Bois’s methodological commitment to imagining the counterfactual end of white 
supremacy. This imaginative aspect of Du Boisian resistance to the crisis of white supremacy guides 
and situates my development of alternative ideals of responding to murder in the criminal justice 
system. As described above, the crisis of accountability in the U.S. criminal legal system is clear: 
White supremacy, classism, sexism, and cis/heterosexism structure the system such that people who 
are the most socially marginalized are punished severely for minor crimes or crimes they did not 
commit whereas the most socially privileged members are rarely punished for the more serious 
crimes they commit. My dissertation does not directly contribute to the transformation of the 
criminal justice system towards equality with regards to accountability for inequality. I am engaged in 
thinking and developing the ideals that might structure a future where this crisis no longer persists. I 
understand this work as a way to develop the knowledge—held by many who are engaged in 
resistance to inequitable accountability within the criminal justice system—that even if this crisis no 
longer persisted, the ideals of harsh punishment that guide the U.S. criminal legal system would still 
be insufficient. I am interested particularly in the ways that those ideals of harsh punishment are 
insufficient to the grief of the aggrieved. Those who have experienced the trauma of loss and sought 
to reimagine the criminal justice system’s response to their loss otherwise are my allies.  
I follow Du Bois in contending that imaginative work is a dimension of the resistance to the 
injustice of the present criminal legal system. The creation of equal justice remains of critical 
concern. For instance, the crisis of accountability that I mention above makes doubtful an 
affirmative answer to the question “Will the corrections officer who choked an inmate to death be 
convicted of their crime?” These are meaningful struggles for accountability and criminal justice 
within the present criminal legal system. Guilty and innocent sentences that go against the grain of 
established hierarchies of accountability—where, for instance, a corrections officer is convicted for 
their crimes against inmates—would mark meaningful progress. This instance of equal 
accountability, though, would not exhaust the demands of those who are living under conditions 
that made the accountability of correction officers so doubtful. Here, I would point to calls for guilty 
sentence to be supplemented with an attempt to ameliorate the antagonistic relationships between 
officers and inmates that are produced and exacerbated by the carceral system at large.  
It is the articulation of demands above and beyond equality of accountability in the criminal 
justice system that I seek in this dissertation. I take up the articulations when those who are 
victimized by violence speak to the remainder between what the justice system can provide and their 
needs and demands for more robust protection and recovery. These are reconstructive visions that 
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are attempts to expound the knowledge that is developed by people who are experiencing violence. 
Of course, there are quite diverse ways of framing the remainder of that’s left between present 
instantiations of criminal justice and the conceptions of those victimized. In this subsection, I’ve 
offered reasons for my focus on articulating alternative visions of the aftermath of the inequality of 
the criminal justice system. I’ve contended that this imaginative space of reconstruction has an 
important place alongside the work of resisting present injustice. I’ve denied my interlocutors 
contentions for the priority of intellectual work that contributes to the amelioration of that 
inequality on Du Boisan grounds. I’ve argued that demands for equality require supplement from 
imaginative reconstructive visions that take up the teaching and learning of groups who have 
suffered legal, social, and political exclusion. 
Conclusion 
Du Bois’s methodology speaks to the work I am setting forth to do on Jewish identity. The 
distinct yet interrelated senses of emancipation and reconstruction are not only at stake in sacred 
Jewish tradition (the movement from slavery to the establishment of law in Exodus being the 
archetypal narrative), but in my family’s lived experience. As with Du Bois, I believe that there is no 
meaningful Jewish emancipation from oppression without the dynamic attempt to take up Jewish 
experience and intellectual and aesthetic traditions to create a meaningful vision of the future. Du 
Bois demands that his audience remain vigilant to the threat of the belief that emancipation from 
inequality exhausts the ends of a tradition of thought and creativity that was developed before and in 
the midst of ongoing violence.   
My aim is to interpret Black and Jewish thinkers together to offer a reconstructive vision of 
criminal justice for the U.S. Such work is an attempt to enact the vigilance that Du Bois calls for 
from a Jewish perspective. Jewish people have taken up a relatively privileged space within the U.S., 
and with such a position, there is the threat of becoming complacent to the ways that such privilege 
produces assimilation to the dominant “goals and ideals.” Du Bois warns against identification with 
the political, social, and economic status quo. Such an identification does not adequately mine the 
experiences and traditions that sustained us when we lived outside of the status quo. It does not 
adequately take up the ways that those traditions sustained critique and called on future adherents to 
remain engaged in critique whether or not anti-Semitism persisted.  
The criminal justice system in the U.S. is an institution that requires this richer critique. Its 
institutions are structured by racism, sexism, and classism, but its injustices do not often reach white 
Jewish citizens. Through our history, Jewish people have experienced both exclusion and inclusion 
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with regards to criminal justice systems. I contend that we are called to examine the meanings and 
experience of exclusion to critique more deeply the ways in which we are included in the protection 
of criminal justice systems. My contention is that such a system calls not only for resistance to the 
ways in which oppression occurs in the criminal legal system, but that it also calls for reconsideration 
of the ideals and goals of such punishments. In this dissertation, I challenge the ideals that link harsh 
punishment to victim satisfaction, which underlie the powerful victims’ rights movement. I seek to 
transform our notions what support for aggrieved persons might look like.  
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Chapter II 
Contesting “Closure”: Du Boisian “Contribution” as the Aim of Victims’ Advocacy in the 
Aftermath of Murder 
 
In this chapter, I challenge the popular conception—put forth in discourses of “closure”—
that harsh punishment functions as a form of support for those aggrieved by murder. Closure refers 
to a movement of grief on the part of one who is aggrieved by murder. The experience of closure is 
the progression from a state of intense grief to a state of manageable grief. It is a movement of grief 
whereby aggrieved people achieve a welcome distance from the pain of loss. Discourses of closure 
suggest that the needs of the aggrieved are served through state control of perpetrators, public 
condemnation of perpetrators, and a speedy trial. Together, these works of the criminal justice 
system are said to offer the aggrieved distance from criminal proceedings and distance from the 
perpetrator. According to proponents of these discourses, such distance supports those who are 
aggrieved: It allows them to grieve on their own terms rather than being constantly returned to 
trauma via trials and confrontation with the perpetrator.  
I argue against seeking closure as a means to support those who are aggrieved by murder. I 
look to research on traumatic symptomology, which a majority of persons suffer in the aftermath of 
the murder of loved ones. The research suggests that support for those who are traumatized must 
go further than “closure” allows. Psychiatric research on the long-term consequences of traumatic 
experience suggests that traumatic recall does not cease with distance from perpetrators and trials. I 
interpret the research to call for ongoing measures of support for aggrieved persons. Such support 
contrasts with the achievement of freedom from reminders of the traumatic event that discourses of 
closure promise.  
I look to a familial case study to suggest that the concern in the aftermath of trauma is not 
only about traumatic recall, but also about the repetition of trauma, where the aggrieved person 
repeats aspects of the harms they suffered by inflicting the harms on themselves and on non-
responsible others. Traumatic recall and repetition creates a vicious cycle where the initial trauma 
create more harms. My aim is to offer institutional support for a virtuous cycle where the experience 
of trauma invokes ongoing community support for the aggrieved. In my schema of response, the 
aggrieved is supported in testifying on their experience and taking up that experience to articulate 
social and political demands that they develop out of their experience of trauma.  
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Given the too sanguine conception of recovery in the aftermath of trauma that underlies 
notions of closure through harsh punishment, I look to Du Bois’ notion of “contribution” to guide 
an alternative notion of supporting recovery among aggrieved persons. By contribution, Du Bois 
refers to the processes by which human beings engage with the group traditions with which they 
identify to create aesthetic, intellectual, and epistemic artifacts. The confrontation with group trauma 
is part of that engagement with group traditions. Taking my guidance from Du Bois’ notion of 
creating artifacts out of confrontation with group trauma, I argue for the importance of institutional 
support for aggrieved persons to create and share of artifacts of their own in the aftermath of 
trauma. These artifacts are the starting point for the virtuous cycle I seek in the aftermath of murder. 
Remembrance and the articulation of what aggrieved people need in the aftermath of trauma is a 
condition of possibility for invoking support for recovery from others. Such articulations also 
provide a legacy of support for those who those who have experienced or will experience similar 
harms. These stories also hold the potential for assisting in the construction of social and political 
institutions capable of responding to traumatic symptomology and resisting future iterations of 
trauma.  
Section I: Closure as the Aim of Criminal Justice for the Aggrieved 
In this section, I offer an elaboration of the claims of those who advocate for closure as the 
aim of supporting victims in institutions of criminal justice, and who argue that meting out harsh 
punishment a way to achieve the end of closure. To seek closure for the aggrieved is to offer them 
opportunities to be relieved of debilitating states of grief. It is an institutional orientation towards 
helping the aggrieved move into states of living where life proceeds without constant interruption 
from past trauma. Although the aim of “closure” is also sought by those who advocate for 
reparative or reconciliatory approaches to criminal justice, I  am concerned with the contentions of 
advocates of harsh punishment who take up the language of closure because the connection of 
“closure” to harsh punishment is one of the central ways that the good of the aggrieved is attached 
to the intensity of punishment.1  																																																								
1 We can find this sentiment in jurisprudential and political discourses. For instance, Justice Susan Huchinson in People 
v. Robinson (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) writes: “To wipe out the convictions of [the] defendants...on [a] legal technicality...would 
serve only to increase the misery of victims who have endured enough suffering. In our view, the law should serve as a 
salve to help heal those whose rights and dignity has been violated, not as a source of additional turmoil. To this end, we 
hold that victims of violent crime are entitled to retain whatever closure that may be brought by the finality of criminal 
conviction.” qtd. in Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime, 171. In defense of the “Marsy’s Law” victims’ rights bill, which 
reduces parole opportunities for convicted persons, Illinois Senate President John Cullerton suggests Marsy’s Law gives 
victims “more opportunities to secure a sense of justice and closure” Office of State Senator Heather Steans (D-Chicago 
7th), “‘Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights’ to Appear on November Ballot,” Capitol Fax, April 10, 2014, 
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The argument I examine here proceeds as a syllogism: Institutions of criminal justice should 
offer closure to those aggrieved by murder. Harsh punishment of perpetrators achieves the end of 
closure. Therefore, harsh punishment achieves a desirable end for criminal justice. The most 
compelling justifications of the major premise seek closure as a means to support the autonomy of 
the aggrieved. When people are aggrieved by murder, their loss is such that the everyday autonomy 
of their lives is disrupted by melancholy. Support is given by helping them recover a sense of self-
directedness in the world. We clarify this dynamic by reference to temporality: The aggrieved person 
becomes moored in the past and recovery is about taking up a sense of futurity. The most 
compelling justifications for harsh punishment achieving the aim of closure point to harsh 
punishment as an effective means of lifting the burdens of seeking justice from aggrieved persons 
and memorializing the gravity of their loss. Lifting burdens from the shoulders of the aggrieved and 
memorializing their loss show that they belong to community. It shows that the polity is behind 
them in their grief and anger. This is an important aspect of the work of relieving the aggrieved from 
isolation that is often a part of the experience of the aftermath of trauma.2 
 As critics of the language of “closure” in response to life-altering events have noted, it is 
necessary to distinguish a notion of closure that is sensitive to the articulations of aggrieved people 
from mass media notions of closure. In Killing McVeigh: The Death Penalty and the Myth of Closure, Jody 
Madeira describes the mass media conception as one that prescribes “absolute finality” to the 
grieving process where one returns to their pre-traumatic state. Such a conception is rejected by 
persons who have experienced the murder of a loved one. For instance, Charlie Younger, a survivor 
of the Oklahoma City bombing, expresses a sentiment shared by many aggrieved people: “I think 
things get better and get worse, but as long as a person’s alive and they have the state of mind that 
they can remember things, there’s never closure.”3 The expectation of “return to normal life” 
communicated by mass media conceptions of closure fails to respect the importance of the grief of 
the aggrieved. It assumes that pre-traumatic “normal” life is both possible and desirable. Many of 
the aggrieved see their grief—even in its debilitating and revolting aspects—as a memorial to their 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
http://capitolfax.com/2014/04/10/crime-victims-bill-of-rights-to-appear-on-november-ballot/.(Office of State Senator 
Heather Steans 2014) 
2 See “Chapter 1: Surviving Sexual Violence” in Brison, Aftermath. 
3 Jody Madeira, Killing McVeigh: The Death Penalty and the Myth of Closure (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 42. 
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loved one.4 To suggest that their grief can or should cease is not only impossible, but it can sound 
like an imperative to stop remembering the depth of their love for the one who is now lost.  
In contrast to the mass media conception that conceives of closure as the end of grief, I 
offer an articulation that is more sensitive to the testimony of people aggrieved by murder. This 
more compelling version views “closure” as an end to the  form of grief that Sigmund Freud calls 
“melancholia.”5 Closure would not be an end to grief as such, but the end of the particular aspect of 
grief that aggrieved people describe as being stuck and constantly disrupted by remembering. The 
symptoms are familiar from narratives of living with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD, 
hereafter). Social scientific surveys have suggested that a majority of family members and friends of 
those killed exhibit some symptoms of PTSD.6 Many aggrieved people describe the disruption of 
their lives by the compulsive need to visit grave sites, compulsive reliving of the moment when they 
found out that their loved one had died.7 “Closure” in its best articulation is framed as the end of 
the intensive aspect of repetitive and compulsive behaviors around grief.  
It is uncontroversial to suggest that release from such painful experience is desirable. Those 
who are aggrieved often speak of this as the desire to “close a chapter” of their lives and move to a 
new form of grief that is more conducive to their living, memorializing, and loving in the aftermath 
of murder. Survivor testimony in Madeira’s study is instructive: 
Dr. Paul Heath noted, ‘I don’t think there is such a thing as closure. There is such a 
thing as coming to live with the experience, the traumatic experience, in your own 
unique way.’ Survivor Lane Wharton explicitly rejected a definition of closure as 
absolute finality in favor of a more workable explanation as coping: “To me closure 
is just coming to grips I guess in my own mind with what has happened and being 
able to cope with what happened.” Vicki Hamm believed that people often used 
closure to refer to inner peace: “I think what they mean is they found a peacefulness 
about living with what happened to them. And I found that.’8 
 
																																																								
4 See the account of a Vietnam veteran suffering from traumatic nightmares who refuses to take medication. When 
asked why, he replied: “I realized that if I take the pills and the nightmares go away...I will have abandoned my friends, 
and their deaths will have been in vain. I need to be a living memorial for my friends who died in Vietnam.” Bessel van 
der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (New York: Viking, 2014), 10. 
5 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
ed. James Strachey, vol. 14 (1914–16): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement. Papers on Metapsychology 
and Other Works, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 243–58. 
6 Heidi M. Zinzow et al., “Examining Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in a National Sample of Homicide Survivors: 
Prevalence and Comparison to Other Violence Victims,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 24, no. 6 (December 2011): 743–46, 
doi:10.1002/jts.20692. 
7 Eric Schlosser, “A Grief Like No Other,” The Atlantic, September 1997, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/09/a-grief-like-no-other/376944/. 
8 Madeira, Killing McVeigh, 43. 
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The testimony of “coming to live with the experience,” “coming to grips with,” and “found a 
peacefulness about living with what happened” points to the aggrieved gaining a sense of control 
over their mourning. Temporality is again a helpful hermeneutic: The aggrieved find a sense of living 
in a future-oriented way that is not determined entirely by the past. Rather than grief as present, 
disruptive, and unremitting, these testimonies put value in gaining a sense of distance from the 
experience of violence. With such distance, they gain a measure of autonomy over the process of 
memorializing.  
  Although harsh sentences for perpetrators do not in themselves bring about this state of 
“closure” where the aggrieved gain distance and a sense of control over the grief for their loved one, 
advocates of harsh punishment of life without parole and capital punishment compellingly suggest 
that such sentences remove obstacles in the grieving process. These advocates argue—and here I 
agree—that the criminal justice system has a role to play as a contributor to the cessation of 
debilitating grief towards the more livable sense of grief described by survivors and aggrieved people 
in the paragraph above.  
Among her interviewees, Madeira finds a common sense of need for harsh punishment as a 
means to create a more livable sense of grief. The pain of McVeigh’s murders was not only about 
the loss of loved ones: there was an undesired relationship of fascination, anger, and concern with 
the perpetrator. Harsh sentences promise to put an end to that relationship: The state takes the role 
of permanent mediator of the relationship in favor of the aggrieved. For instance, never again does 
the aggrieved person have to worry about meeting the perpetrator outside the context of carceral 
control.  
McVeigh’s defiance in the face of mass condemnation rubbed salt in the antagonism, and 
created an even stronger desire for harsh punishment among the aggrieved. Madeira writes:  
Many described McVeigh’s continued existence as a barrier to reconstruction. 
Because McVeigh occupied one camp in the involuntary and adversarial relationship 
between family member/survivor and offender, he was linked to them and so 
became and remained a part of the collective, instead of being cast outside of it. 
Family members and survivors found his inclusion traumatizing because it delayed or 
diminished their control; at any time a message could issue from McVeigh and 
aggravate wounds just starting to heal.”9 
 
The fact that McVeigh lived and had a platform to speak, meant that he had the power to throw the 
aggrieved back to states of anguish and hurt that they believed they had already left. Thus, 																																																								
9 Ibid., 18 
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McVeigh’s execution promised a greater sense of regulation around their grieving process. She 
writes: “The vast majority…felt relief after the execution, the event that terminated the involuntary 
relationship.”10 Further, she finds that aggrieved people felt “‘Satisfaction’ that they no longer had to 
‘serve their own sentence,’ and that, in the books of their lives, they had come to the ‘last page’ of 
the bombing volume.”11 Aggrieved people describe parole hearings as events that have the effect of 
throwing them back to the undesirable state of grief: “I would love to be able to put this in the past 
and go on, but the laws of our justice system don’t allow me to do that. Regardless of how many 
years go by, I have to relive this every time he (the murderer) is up for parole.” 12 
 Harsh sentences—despite the protracted legal proceedings that often follow them—promise 
the aggrieved the possibility of grieving on their own terms. The testimonies in the above paragraph 
suggest that the adversarial legal system’s proceedings place the aggrieved in the position of reliving 
trauma rather than contributing to movement towards understanding and healing. There is a shared 
sense that the perpetrator is a burden on the aggrieved as long as they are living, speaking, 
potentially free from carceral control. It follows that harsh sentences are desirable because they act 
to remove the burden of having to fight for the public recognition of their pain. Harsher sentences 
serve as a means for this recognition in an institutional context with limited support for aggrieved 
persons.   
 In this section, I have defined “closure” for aggrieved people in the aftermath of murder 
beyond the mass-media conception. The more compelling definition of “closure” refers to the end 
of a particularly difficult and compulsive state of grief; it is not the return to normality 
unencumbered by grief.  Through harsh punishments, the criminal justice system is said to support 
this movement of grief. According to advocates of this notion of closure, these punishments remove 
traumatizing burdens from the aggrieved: The aggrieved no longer have to share a world with an 
executed person. They never have to attend a parole hearing when the perpetrator is sentenced to 
life without parole. The role of the criminal justice system—with regards to the aggrieved person—
is to make them free to grieve on their own terms. Time and space that are uninterrupted by the 
demands of the criminal justice system are said to create feelings of control and intentionality that 
are conducive to more desirable experiences of mourning. 																																																								
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 38. 
12 Heidi M. Zinzow, Marti P. Thompson, and Alyssa A. Rheingold, “Homicide Survivors: A Summary of Research,” in 
Victims of Crime, ed. Robert C. Davis, Arthur J. Lurigio, and Susan Herman, Fourth Edition (Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publications, Inc, 2007), 148. 
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Section II: The Criminal Justice System Beyond the Removal of Burdens 
In this section, I argue that research on trauma reveals that the lifting of burdens that closure 
promises is insufficient to the challenge of supporting aggrieved people facing trauma. It is 
insufficient because of its too-hopeful conception of the temporality of trauma and healing in the 
aftermath of a traumatic event. Although we would hope for trauma victims to be able to step over a 
threshold such that debilitating effects would be things of the past, the psychiatric research I cite 
below—as well as the narrative of Jean Améry in chapter four—tell a different story. The 
temporality of trauma cannot be put neatly into the past; it disrupts the present with unexpected 
ferocity at unexpected times. Psychiatric research points to the ways in which traumatic experience 
affects the nervous system such that the benefits of “closure” discussed in the above section is 
undermined.  
 Psychiatric research on victims of traumatic stress reveal that victims do not escape from the 
intensity of traumatic grief by escaping the situations that bring back memories—the trials, 
confrontations with the perpetrators, the parole hearings. The tragic character of traumatic stress is 
that it causes the breakdown of the capacity to distinguish threatening stimuli from safe stimuli even 
in the most mundane contexts. Psychiatrist Bessel van der Kolk writes:  
Dissociation is the essence of trauma. The overwhelming experience is split off and 
fragmented, so the emotions, sounds, images, thoughts, and physical sensations 
related to the trauma take on a life of their own. The sensory fragments of memory 
intrude into the present where they are literally relived. As long as the trauma is not 
resolved, the stress hormones that the body secretes to protect itself keeps 
circulating, and the defensive movements and emotional responses keep getting 
replayed… [M]any people may not be aware of the connection between their ‘crazy’ 
feelings and reactions and the traumatic events that are being replayed. They have no 
idea why they respond to some minor irritation as if they were about to be 
annihilated.13 
 
I quote at length to highlight the way in which re-traumatization operates as an unexpected intrusion 
from within the body and psyche of aggrieved persons. The survivors and aggrieved people quoted 
in the above section sought freedom from the external stimuli that would remind them of past 
traumatic experience. Many of them connected that freedom to a sense of moving on to healthier, 
more productive forms of grief. Van der Kolk argues convincingly that traumatic experience (when 
experienced and relived in the context of traumatic stress disorder) imprints itself within the body 
and psyche such that everyday decisions can often trigger unwarranted fight, flight, or freeze 																																																								
13 Bessel van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (New York: Viking, 2014), 66. 
			 37 
responses. The wound of traumatic stress becomes parasitic on situations that prima facie have no 
relation to the traumatic experience. 
 This is where psychiatric research has resonances with the familial experience of trauma that 
I described in my first chapter. In that first chapter, I connected my grandfather’s escape from Nazi 
Vienna and his silent work of dealing with the pain that accompanied the murder of his family to the 
undermining of his ability to be a supportive parent. Van der Kolk speaks of the experience of 
traumatic flashbacks in ways that resonate with those family dynamics. He writes:  
These reactions [traumatic responses to triggers that have only vague connection to 
the actual trauma] are largely irrational and largely outside people’s control. Intense 
and barely controllable urges and emotions make people feel crazy—and makes 
them feel that they don’t belong to the human race. Feeling numb during birthday 
parties for your kids or in response to the death of loved ones makes people feel like 
monsters. As a result, shame becomes the dominant emotion and hiding the truth 
the central preoccupation.14 
 
Trauma makes participation in community and relationships challenging. The alienation from the 
ability to feel pleasure and the inability to mourn and grieve when one desires is painful. These are 
behaviors and attachments that make the pleasures and pains of communal, relational life what they 
are. Without the capacity to participate in sociality through rituals of pleasure and mourning, 
frustration makes way  for the inability to connect meaningfully with even the closest loved ones. It 
makes responsibilities to broader communities similarly challenging.  
The discourse of “closure” fails to meet the challenge that traumatic experience creates for 
the aggrieved, their families, and their communities. When advocates of “closure” seek to free the 
aggrieved from the burdens of their experience by relieving them of fears around the perpetrator 
and experiences of reliving trauma through proceedings in the criminal justice system, they seek to 
help the aggrieved into a state where they are free to grieve and memorialize in a more desirable, less 
disruptive way.  
If trauma and grief were linear—where success is reached once the stage of desirable grief is 
achieved— then seeking “closure” would be a sensible aim for those aggrieved by murder. This 
implies that once the aggrieved reaches the more desirable state of grief, there is no going back. Van 
der Kolk’s research suggests that the contrary is true. If trauma alters stress hormones such that 
ordinary life can become unnerving or terrifying, then the nature of trauma is to disrupt the feelings 
of safety, distance, and calm that are characteristic of that second, more desirable stage of grief.  																																																								
14 Ibid., 67. 
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 If the nature of trauma is the disruption of everyday experience and relationships, a criminal 
justice system sensitive to trauma would offer resources to assist the aggrieved person in 
reconstructing their sense of safety and trust in the mundane. In what follows I will suggest that 
rather than a progressive movement away from melancholia, ongoing efforts are required to address 
the traumatic experience as well as flashbacks, numbness, and shame. This work is not about 
releasing the aggrieved from traumatic experience, but instead taking up that traumatic experience as 
an occasion for teaching and learning. The aim is to make it possible for the aggrieved to safely and 
meaningfully return to traumatic experience in the context of a community of support.  
To support these claims, I look to family experience as an instance of the inadequacy of the 
narratives of closure for healing: They gained distance from trauma, but they did not experience 
recovery such that they could avoid the intergenerational repetition of traumatic experience. In 
conversation with social psychological literature, I show how narration of traumatic experience and 
community support could serve as resources in the recovery from trauma. I then look to Du Bois’s 
essay “On the Coming of John” for a model of using narrative and community support as a means 
of confronting traumatic experience. From Du Bois’s reflections and his notion of “contribution,” I 
outline forms of narration and community pedagogy that have the power to contribute to healing in 
the aftermath of the traumatic grief that accompanies the loss of loved ones to murder.    
Section III: Familial Silence and Breaking the Repetition of Trauma Through Pedagogy 
 In this section, I’ll return to my familial case study and take it up in the context of 
psychological research around the repetition of trauma. I’ll first identify the dynamic of repetition in 
my familial case study. I will suggest that the repetition of trauma threatens aggrieved persons—even 
in circumstances akin to that of closure. I suggest that within storytelling and a trauma-sensitive 
community, there are resources to head off the intergenerational repetition of trauma.  
Insofar as my family escaped the ravages of genocide in Europe, they came to a country 
where their whiteness produced the safety they needed to reestablish their lives and support new 
generations. They gained this protection in an environment where virulent anti-Semitism was traded 
for subtle and less violent forms. They were no longer threatened by the displacing violence that 
threatened in Europe. In the U.S., the Nazi violence that aggrieved them was subject to widespread 
condemnation. Their experience in the aftermath of violence met the central demand of advocates 
of closure: They gained distance from perpetrators that would allow them to exert control over their 
grief. Although this distance created a great deal of good in their lives, it was inadequate to prevent 
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the repetition of trauma. This repetition of trauma—like the flashbacks, numbness, and isolation 
described in the above section—was an intrusion of past traumatic experience in a present.  
My great grandparents grew up in Bessarabia (present-day Ukraine). They fled before the 
worst of the Romanian nationalist and National Socialist violence. In exile, they joined family in the 
Bronx and lived in their apartment on Olinville Avenue for as long as anyone can remember. As the 
oldest of my generation, I am the only one of my generation with a distinct memory of my great 
grandparents. I took great pleasure in lighting my grandfather’s pipe against the cries of my parents, 
aunts, and uncles: “Get the child away from the fire!” “You have LUNG CANCER!” The 
apartment shook with the 2 train and my great grandmother’s cooking made the apartment savory 
with schmaltz. I remember how the anticipation of seeing and being seen by my great grandparents 
sent me into fits of joy. In me, my great grandparents must have seen the fulfillment of their struggle 
to reconstruct a family in the wake of the destruction of everything and nearly everyone they knew.    
 Although my experience of my great grandparents and their success at reconstructing 
kinship might seem to be a sign of closure around trauma, their silence around the pain and loss of 
their exile from Eastern Europe created lasting challenges to their flourishing and that of succeeding 
generations. When my grandmother was in her mid-40s, she was diagnosed with terminal cancer. As 
was the custom in the 1970s, the doctor told only her husband, my grandfather. My grandfather 
(who himself escaped from Vienna, Germany and left many behind) convened with my great 
grandparents and my great aunt and uncle. Together, they decided not to tell my father and aunt, 
who were ages 16 and 12. Nor did they tell my dying grandmother. The lost opportunity to say 
goodbye to their mother haunts my father and aunt to this day.  
If my great grandparents had the emotional, linguistic, and embodied resources to not only 
speak of their pain, but teach others about the meaning of loss in Bessarabia and the means by 
which they found strength in exile, those skills could have translated to an ability to communicate 
about their daughter’s illness. If they were able to communicate the pain of exile as something 
instructive, they could have understood that pain and loss are not to be avoided at all costs. They 
could have taken up the pain of grief as something that human beings need resources to face 
together. Without these resources, there was a tragic repetition: As the Nazis took away my 
grandfather’s and great grandparents’ ability to say goodbye to their family and friends, my father 
and aunt were denied the opportunity to say goodbye to their mother.  
My contention is that my grandparents needed a form of pedagogy that would have allowed 
them to become teachers of pain and loss. Specifically, I am thinking of resources that would have 
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allowed them to say “You’re dying” to my grandmother and “Your mother is dying” to my father 
and aunt. With these words come the responsibilities of comforting the dying and addressing 
adolescent struggles with loss. These are among the most difficult human responsibilities. Rather 
than begin the work of grief in a familial context, my grandfather and great grandparents made a 
choice to let the work of grief follow from death. By my father’s account of events, his father and 
grandparents justified the decision through the language of “protection”: The idea that the 
knowledge of terminal illness would harm my grandmother and somehow make her give up her 
desire to live. I believe this paternalism masked their inability to take up the difficult responsibilities 
that would come with telling the truth.  
Taking up the responsibility of caring for a dying mother and her teenage children required 
skills that my grandparents lacked.  Fascist violence robbed them of the ability to experience 
movement, loss, and death in the ways that their communities and families were prepared for. They 
were unable to experience those tragic circumstances through the language and ritual that make 
them bearable. There was no ritual to deal with the murder of nearly all the people they left behind. 
They lacked the sense of community necessary to share the burden of loss. To make and share 
meaning in exile is extraordinarily challenging. My grandparents did enough of this work to live and 
support three generations of family, but they lacked the resources that would have made it possible 
for them to express and share the meaning of loss for themselves and for succeeding generations.  
Murder also creates loss that is outside the socially expected and supported forms of 
grieving. As in the case of my grandparents, I contend that those who experience the murder of 
loved ones should have access to resources that help them to create shareable words, artifacts, and 
stories. The aim is not freedom from the stuckness of traumatic experience and flashbacks, 
repetitions, and isolation, but the possibility of re-experiencing trauma in a context that allows for 
richer possibilities of support.  
I will elaborate this claim through scholarly engagements with the “compulsion to repeat 
trauma.” Within this field, I focus on attempts to understand the question “Why do those who 
experience trauma repeat it in new contexts and upon those who are not responsible for the initial 
trauma?” By addressing this question, I’ll seek a richer explanation of my grandparents’ behavior and 
for the therapeutic basis for my emphasis on storytelling in the aftermath of trauma.  
Section IV: The Vicious Cycle of Traumatic Repetition 
I will take up the psychiatric model of Bessel van der Kolk and the psychosocial conceptions 
of Robert Jay Lifton to offer two perspectives on the repetition of trauma. Lifton works from a 
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psychodynamic frame developed from a Freudian background. Freud suggests that the repetition of 
trauma is an attempt to master that which previously overwhelmed feelings of safety and control.15 
For Freud, on an unconscious level we recreate traumatic situations in the hope that this time we 
can be the active subjects of the experience rather than the passive recipients of traumatic 
victimization. Lifton looks to the case of the My Lai massacre committed by U.S. soldiers during the 
Vietnam War.16 Days after suffering casualties of their own, Charlie Company went on a rampage of 
rape and murder that killed nearly all the civilian inhabitants of My Lai. The psychodynamic reading 
of this massacre contends that the traumatized soldiers took part in a dynamic of repetition insofar 
as they recreated the violence that they initially experienced as victims—this time on much larger 
and more terrible scale. Lifton writes, “...there is sexual innuendo throughout the descriptions of My 
Lai—the sense of men who had been inactivated and rendered impotent suddenly asserting a form 
of violent omnipotence.”17 Their enemy frustrated them with guerilla tactics. Lacking direct 
encounters with the enemy to release their desire for vengeance, they found civilians—due to a 
mixture of racism, sexism, paranoia, and military rhetoric—to be an adequate substitution.18 Lifton 
describes soldiers murdering civilians from a defensive crouch, as if simulating combat.19 
A form of traumatic repetition emerges: There is a traumatic experience: Losing fellow 
soldiers in Vietnam and—in the case of my grandparents—the murder of faraway family and 
friends. These experiences left the soldiers and my grandparents victimized and grieving. To escape 
the pain that comes with passive victimization, traumatized persons recreate aspects of the violence 
they experienced as victims and impose it upon persons who act as substitutes for those responsible 
for the initial violence. As noted by Cathy Caruth, in the Freudian tradition traumatic victimization 
overwhelms consciousness.20 Trauma overwhelms our capacity to order and edit perceptual 
experience, which maintains our sense of stability and security in the world. By repeating trauma 
upon substitute persons, we seek to impose stability out of previously overwhelming experiences by 
taking the position of an aggressor rather a victim.  
																																																								
15 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 11. 
16 Robert Jay Lifton, Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans Neither Victims nor Executioners (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1973), 33-72. 
17 Ibid, 54. 
18 Lifton suggests that without a sense of purpose in Vietnam, memorialization of others who were killed through 
violence became the singular means by which the U.S. soldiers made their mission meaningful. Lifton describes this as 
the “survivor mission” mentality. Ibid., 55. 
19 Ibid, 50.  
20 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 61. 
			 42 
 There is another line of thought by psychiatrists who look to neurobehavioral studies to 
understand the dynamic of repetition. Bessel van der Kolk cites studies that suggest that traumatic 
experience is strongly correlated with hyperarousal and an intense drive to the familiar, even if 
familiar circumstances are detrimental to the organism’s well-being.21 Extreme adverse responses to 
novel stimuli offer a distinct, but still plausible hermeneutic by which to understand the repetition of 
traumatic experience. The unconscious desire to master is read now as a somatic need to remain in 
that which is known—circumstances in which the traumatized person has knowledge and feels the 
capacity to exercise a measure of control.  
The massacre inflicted by the U.S. soldiers in My Lai is rendered as the desire to reduce the 
adverse stimuli (the enemy defined broadly enough to include Vietnamese civilians) to nothingness. 
Rather than respond to these persons with ethical discernment, they destroyed everyone in the 
village, leaving the soldiers “safe”: alone with themselves. The soldiers responded to adverse stimuli 
with intense violence—a brutal attempt to regain the control that was lost with the loss of their 
fellow soldiers. My great-grandparents and grandfather’s repetition is rendered as avoidance of the 
adverse stimuli that would come with speaking truthfully about my grandmother’s death. Their 
previous traumatic experience made the work of going into unfamiliar emotional space 
extraordinarily difficult.  
Although there are differences between these two ways of interpreting the repetition of 
trauma, if viewed through the lens of vulnerability these accounts are more similar than they may 
seem. The Freudian account stresses activity in distinction to a state of passivity created by trauma. 
The neurobiological account stresses maladaptive passivity as the result of the fear created by trauma. 
In both accounts, there is a shared sense that vulnerability can be overcome. In the Freudian 
tradition, the activity of victimizing others overcomes the vulnerability that came with traumatic 
experience. In the psychiatric account, the avoidance behavior seeks to avoid the vulnerability that 
came with traumatic experience through the avoidance of novelty. Trauma creates discomfort with 
the vulnerability experienced in the past and the vulnerability that comes with living in the world in 
the present and future. The repetition of trauma—in the general sense that concerns me—can be 
understood as those actions which respond to possible vulnerable situations with actions that 
disperse traumatic experiences interpersonally and temporally.  
Section V: Storytelling and Community in Recovery from Traumatic Experience  																																																								
21 Bessel van der Kolk, “The Compulsion to Repeat the Trauma,” Psychiatric Clinics of North America 12, no. 2 (1989): 389–
411. 
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The recovery from the compulsion to repeat trauma has been described as “working 
through” trauma as opposed to “acting out.” Freud’s essay “Remembering, Repeating, and Working 
Through” distinguishes between the terms.22 “Acting out” is Freud’s term for the behaviors that 
contribute to a vicious cycle of repetition. The traumatized person repeats aspects of their trauma in 
their behaviors towards themselves and others, but they have no conscious awareness that their 
present behaviors are linked to a past trauma. Freud writes: “the patient does not remember 
anything of what he has forgotten or repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory, 
but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.” In compulsively 
acting out trauma without knowing what we are doing, we become trauma’s object.  
 In contrast, “working through” is the process by which this unconscious repetition becomes 
conscious. Trauma is taken up in language or action as a memory. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand 
Pontalis clarify the Freudian language: “working through is undoubtedly a repetition albeit one that’s 
modified by interpretation—for this reason—liable to facilitate the subject’s freeing himself from 
repetition mechanisms.”23 When we interpret trauma in language or action, the trauma becomes our 
object. In acting out, we attempt to come to terms with trauma by dis-identification with the 
vulnerability that came with the trauma. Insofar as we put trauma into language or action, we have 
the possibility of creating a relationship to our traumatic vulnerability. Such a relationship to 
traumatic vulnerability is a condition of possibility for a virtuous cycle where facing traumatic 
vulnerability brings about a community of support for healing: When we put our pain into words or 
action, others can learn where we hurt. This knowing opens up the possibility of solidarity in our 
attempt to respond to and recover from those pains. Storytelling does not automatically bring about 
a community of support, but under good circumstances—which I will explicate below and in the 
next chapter—it can act as a catalyst for that community.  
When we are consciously returning to traumatic memory, we make the traumatic experience 
shareable: We put it in terms or gestures that are intelligible to others. It means that we are telling 
stories that have the potential to break through the isolation that comes with the experience of 
trauma. These stories have the potential to invoke a community capable of ongoing support for the 
aggrieved.  
																																																								
22 Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through.” 
23 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), 488–89. 
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As we saw in the above van der Kolk quote, trauma creates challenges to taking part in 
communal life. The constant fear of being triggered as well as the experience of triggers and 
flashbacks themselves are burdens upon aggrieved persons. Both make participation in communal 
life extraordinarily challenging. I work from a social and political institutional perspective, and given 
what we know about the nature of traumatic symptomology, institutions are not well situated to 
ameliorate traumatic symptomology. This is an everyday struggle to distinguish threatening stimuli 
from mundane stimuli; it is an everyday struggle to resist the compulsion to repeat aspects of one’s 
trauma upon oneself or others. The problems here are too granular for effective intervention from 
an institutional organization like the criminal justice system. Where the criminal justice system can 
meaningfully contribute is in assisting communities to respond in better ways to aggrieved persons 
carrying the burden of trauma. In what follows, I ask: How can community best be constituted 
around the aggrieved? By what means can social and political institutions support the creation of 
such communities? Rather than promising relief from the burdens of trauma, my aim is to offer a 
schema of a community that could share the weight of traumatic burdens with the aggrieved.  
The community of support would be trauma-sensitive to the extent that instances of 
traumatic symptomology would be an opportunity to support the aggrieved person. This, in itself, is 
an important step insofar as persons experiencing traumatic symptomology are often taken by others 
as disruptive of the normal functioning of communal life. The support I am looking for would 
create opportunities for belonging even when the aggrieved person cannot act in accordance with 
norms of communal life. Whereas trauma is often experienced as exploitation of vulnerability, a 
trauma-sensitive community responds to vulnerability with compassion and care. They offer 
aggrieved persons the opportunity to reclaim vulnerability in its positive sense: as a signal for the 
need of attention and care. This is a community organized in opposition to vulnerability in the 
vicious sense where it signals weakness in the face of exploitation. Such a community would 
promote trust in others where traumatic experience undermined it. 
A community-based movement that seeks to transform traumatic vulnerability into 
vulnerability that summons communal support is one aspect of a larger response to trauma. In the 
schema of institutional response that I envision, the goal is a community of support whose direction 
and aims are in large part defined by the one that has experienced trauma. Here, there is not only 
compassionate responsiveness to traumatized persons, but there is a community that is built in 
dialogue with the harms aggrieved persons experienced and the ideals towards which they wish to 
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work.24 The traumatized person is thus not only a wounded person to be supported, but also a 
teacher of their experience. The following chapter will go further into the dialogic relationship 
between community of support and the articulations of the aggrieved person, but for now I will 
highlight the way in which narratives that address traumatic experience are critical to this process.  
 The movement from story to community support offers an alternative path to satisfying the 
desire for community solidarity in the aftermath of crime. Harsh punishment delivers a version of 
this solidarity: When life without parole or death sentences are handed down by the institution of 
criminal justice, it represents a polity standing behind the aggrieved. There is an acknowledgement 
of the wrong the aggrieved suffered and a willingness on the part of social and political institutions 
to take on the burden of administering punishment. In vernacular terms, this institutional response 
is how a polity contributes to making things right in the aftermath of murder. The process of a polity 
supporting stories that invoke community support is also capable of acknowledging the serious 
wrong that the aggrieved suffered. The gesture of listening and sympathizing with a story does not 
hold the same gravity as a gesture of declaring a perpetrator guilty and sentencing them harshly. Yet, 
there are advantages to this movement away from the fanfare: The support that comes from hearing 
and responding to story will be separated from a particular juridical outcome.25 But, this allows 
support for aggrieved persons that is more sustained than a singular action handed down by a 
judicial body. The criminal justice system I imagine takes a measure of responsibility for constructing 
a community around the aggrieved that can offer resources as they face ongoing repercussions of 
grieving for loved ones lost to murder.  
Further, telling stories around traumatic experience invokes a community of support insofar 
as these stories point to the harms of the specific trauma experienced and point to the aspects of 
memorialization or recovery that are most meaningful. These stories can thus call forth a response 
to traumatic experience that brings solidarity in repairing the harms and bringing forth 																																																								
24 A critical reader will suggest that there is nothing in my argument that prevents aggrieved persons from constituting a 
community on the basis of seeking recovery through harsh punishment of the perpetrator. This is reader is correct, but 
this does not mean that we are back where we started. Rather than institutions of criminal justice conceiving of the 
satisfaction of the aggrieved to be a singular achievement of harsh punishment, we now have a plural conception of what 
means to satisfy aggrieved persons in the aftermath of murder. The primary support is in building community around 
the aggrieved person; although I have offered therapeutic reasons for constituting such a community in accordance with 
non-retributive responses to murder, I have not yet provided an argument that harsh punishment is politically or 
ethically impermissible. Thus, communities I advocate for cannot be definitely delimited in accordance with non-
retributive responses to murder.  
25 This is not to say that activism for just juridical outcomes is in any way undesirable. I am arguing that the success of 
such activism should not determine whether or not the aggrieved are meaningfully supported in the aftermath of 
murder. 
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memorialization for loss. For such potential power to be realized, work is required on the side of the 
aggrieved and the community of hearers alike: For the aggrieved, the challenge is to name the harm 
experienced and the harms that continue to arise from it. The challenge is to articulate what they 
wish to be done for the sake of recovery. For the community of hearers, they must first choose to 
give their support to the aggrieved person. In choosing to give support, they are challenged to hold 
one another accountable to resist victim-blaming. They are challenged to support one another as 
they take on the emotional work of compassion. The community of support must be in dialogue 
with one another and with the aggrieved about how they want to fulfill the aggrieved’s wish for 
recovery. This process of articulation, choosing, and dialogue will be explicated in greater detail in 
the third chapter. 
When the harms of surviving loss of a loved one are articulated, whether they are feelings of 
responsibility or anger at the perpetrator, a picture is painted of what life is like for the aggrieved 
person. Such articulations tell the story of how the victim’s grief brings challenges to their attempts 
to live and love. Members of the communities that hear these stories can provide resources that help 
aggrieved persons to resist the sense of having to face those challenges alone. They can have a sense 
of what the day-to-day support that aggrieved persons need in the aftermath of loss. For instance, 
community members can connect aggrieved people to others who can speak to them of their 
experience of similar losses. Out of such stories, a path towards recovery can be envisioned by those 
who are more recently aggrieved.  
In this section, I have offered reasons that storytelling in the aftermath of murder is 
advantageous to the recovery of persons who are aggrieved by murder. In the next section, I will 
look to Du Bois for an instance of this storytelling in the aftermath of trauma and show how such 
storytelling invokes community.  
Section VI: Tragic Pedagogy: Du Bois as Teacher in an Anti-Black World 
In the following sections, I look to Du Bois’s writings for a notion of pedagogical 
storytelling that could be the basis for an alternative to “closure” as the aim of victims’ rights 
advocates. Du Bois’s notion of contribution offers a vision of responding to traumatic experience 
towards the ends of recovery and the elaboration of transformative political demands. I’ll begin by 
looking to “Of the Coming of John”26 as a model for the kind of pedagogy I advocate in the 
aftermath of trauma. Although Du Bois is responding to conditions of ongoing violence whereas my 																																																								
26 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Souls of Black Folk,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary Classics of the 
United States, 1986), 521-535. 
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grandparents are struggling with the grief related to past violence, I contend that there are shared 
benefits to storytelling in both cases. To tell the story of traumatic experience offers others a means 
to understand and empathize with the harm experienced. It opens up the possibility of those others 
choosing to create a community through which the burdens of tragic experience are shared.  
 These stories can also level a critique of a social arrangement or polity in which such 
traumas happen. The tragedies articulated can extend beyond the harms suffered by the aggrieved as 
an individual to the harms suffered by the aggrieved as a member of a larger social grouping. For 
instance, a Palestinian killed in an Israeli bombing raid is an affront to Palestinian people as such. It 
can extend to the ways in which that interpersonal violence is linked to social and political 
circumstances that affect all who live in a polity. For instance, one may link increased gun violence 
to “Stand-Your-Ground” laws on the books in many states. As such, the community of support is 
called upon not only to choose to support the aggrieved person in their recovery, but to memorialize 
the one who is lost through choosing to resist social, political, and legal arrangements which make 
the repetition of harms more likely.   
Du Bois writes “Of the Coming of John” from the perspective of an educator of young 
Black college students. He captures the struggle of sending students off into a world where the ideals 
of justice and beauty that educators seek to instill in their students create dissonance with the white 
supremacist world in which they live. This is a dissonance pregnant with tragedy, and the tragedy 
plays out in the pages of the short story. I will highlight the ways in which his storytelling functions 
as a contribution to a community of educators and students who work in fear of this tragedy. It is 
likely that many of them have already experienced it. 
John Jones is a well-loved Black college student from a small town in coastal South Georgia. 
In preparatory school, he plays the class clown until he is placed on academic suspension. He 
returns and completes his prep school and college degrees with fervor for learning. He finds 
inspiration in astronomy, history, and ethics. He returns to his small town in Georgia to open a 
school for Black children and “to settle the Negro problems there.” He knows the danger of such 
work. He quotes the biblical Queen Esther, “I will go in to the King, which is not according to the 
law; and if I perish, I perish.’”27 Upon his return, he alienates members of the Black community with 
his heavy sense of duty and his deprecation of religion in the contemporary world. Jennie, his sister, 
asks: “Does it make every one—unhappy when they study and learn lots of things?” Yes, John says, 
																																																								
27 Ibid., 528. 
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and he hesitates before affirming that he is nonetheless glad to have studied. Jennie expresses the 
wish to study despite the consequences: “‘I wish I was unhappy,—and—and,’ putting both arms 
about his neck, ‘I think I am, a little, John.’”28  
John goes to the town’s white Judge and requests a positions as a teacher at the Black 
school, and the judge agrees on the condition that he teach Black children to be the servants of the 
white townspeople. John says what he needs to get the job, but he is fired a month later when the 
judge hears that John taught his students about the French revolution. Walking home on the day he 
was fired, John sees Jennie fighting off the judge’s rapist son. He kills the Judge’s son in one blow. 
The story ends with John jumping to his death as a white lynch mob approaches.  
 John was the student that Du Bois and his colleagues sought to educate. He took his 
education as a means for his own empowerment, and he took up the burden of teaching in the 
community from which he came. John met and exceeded the standards of his educators, but one 
cannot meet and exceed those standards without also knowing and feeling the great injustice of 
white racism. The narrator describes John taking on the burden of this realization “He grew slowly 
to feel almost for the first time the Veil that lay between him and the white world; he first noticed 
now the oppression that had not seemed oppression before, differences that erstwhile seemed 
natural, restraints and slights that in his boyhood days had gone unnoticed or been greeted with a 
laugh.”29 John could no longer take part in the strategy of survival that plays down, laughs off, or 
accepts the injustice of white supremacy as a necessary feature of the world.  
 The educator and students’ dilemma is that good education makes one liable for death in a 
white supremacist world. To be educated is to feel one’s oppression more sharply, and thus to feel 
committed to overturning white supremacist orderings of lives. To be committed to overturning 
white supremacy is to risk death. Although the story is fictional, it points to a real and justifiable fear 
on the part of the educators of Black students: That a wide-ranging education will put students at 
violent odds with the society that they live in and the people in the places that they come from. By 
telling the story of the tragedy that has already happened and will happen in the future, Du Bois 
invokes a community of teachers and students to face the death that lingers too near the lessons they 
are teaching and learning.  
 To give language and invoke community around the tragic dimensions of Black education is 
to point to a troubling aspect of the liberal education that Du Bois advocates in earlier chapters of 																																																								
28 Ibid., 531. 
29 Ibid., 527. 
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the Souls of Black Folk.30 By telling this story, Du Bois resists a possible cycle of institutional failure. 
The Reconstruction-era Freedmen’s Bureau (1865-1872) worked on behalf of the education and 
support of formerly enslaved people. Given the political shifts ushered in by the end of the Lincoln 
presidency (1861-1865) and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, the support promised by the Bureau was 
in jeopardy almost as soon as it was established. After the Bureau was closed by an act of Congress, 
the work of the Bureau had to be taken up by other means. Black colleges and universities were one 
of many ways in which supporters of Reconstruction continued their work. But, to keep their doors 
open, these schools had to raise funds from private and public donors.   
 University and college fundraising then and now relies on idealized images of education and 
its outcomes for its students. Although potentially helpful in avoiding the repetition of a supportive 
institution whose doors closed too soon, this idealizing of college education opens up the possibility 
of another kind of institutional failure. This is the potential failure to openly address the risks of 
Black higher education in a white supremacist world. To face these risks is to offer a communal 
space to share strategies for living with this threat of tragedy. It is an opportunity to build a 
resistance to white supremacy that is particular to the experience of students and teachers: Knowing, 
feeling, expressing, and resisting the wrongs of white supremacist hierarchies should not bring about 
the threat of death. 
  “Of the Coming of John” stands as model for testimony in the aftermath of murder 
because it identifies the harm of the traumatic experience and through engagement with that harm, 
expresses a transformative political demand. The essay addresses personal, social, and political harm 
of white supremacist violence that murders those who gain knowledge from Black educational 
institutions and attempt to share that knowledge. The transformative political demand arises from 
the fact that John and Jennie should have been able to live without the fear of white-male 
supremacist violence encroaching upon their bodily integrity. John should have been able to live and 
work as an educated Black person in the U.S. Jennie should have been able to decide her path 
without the trauma of attempted rape and the grief that comes with the loss of her brother to 
murder. As such, Du Bois’ narrative invokes potential community with those who are also 
threatened by the traumatic experience he describes. He also invokes it with those who are invested 
in the political demand of protecting the lives, knowledge, and hopes that Black men and women 
embody. Insofar as he calls upon particular people to be a part of the community, he is describing 
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the particularities of the harm that could be addressed by that community: The possibility that the 
potential to teach and lead that educators cultivate in their students will be violently disrupted. The 
ways in which white supremacist violence shows up in what is constituted as a safe space for Black 
students.  
Section VII: “Contribution” as an Alternative to “Closure” 
Du Bois’s “Of the Coming of John” is an illustration of his notion “contribution.” In this 
section, I will explicate this notion and argue that it should orient the criminal justice system’s 
response to those aggrieved by murder. This is a conception of criminal justice guided by the Du 
Boisian ideal where all people live together in a polity that supports creativity, truth-telling, and the 
formulation of moral demands out of histories of violence and trauma.31 This is a polity in which 
groups, and the individuals that compose them, are defined by and esteemed in virtue of their ability 
to tell stories and make creative, epistemic, and moral contributions to social and political life.32 Du 
Bois envisions a polity where this esteem is demonstrated by learning from the cultures and histories 
of diverse groups and the individuals that compose them. It is a polity where respect for all is 
grounded in the potential of all to be teachers. 
I interpret the contention of the potential of all to be teachers to connect a philosophical 
anthropological claim to a political claim. What I term the “right to pedagogy” arises from two 
central claims of Du Bois’s philosophical anthropology. In the “Conservation of the Races,” he 
claims that human beings by nature live among and are identified with racial groups.33 They are thus 
connected to their own group’s aesthetic, historical, ethical, and epistemic traditions through myriad 
connections including kinship, belief, socio-economic position, and physio-biological similarities. All 
human beings can mine their own and other group traditions for insights of social, political, and 
aesthetic value, which I interpret as Du Bois’s notion of contribution. The potential for every human 
to do this work, and to put these contributions forward, is the potential for teaching. Human 
beings—by nature of living within and among groups with unique intellectual and aesthetic 
																																																								
31 This mirrors the regulative political ideals of Beauty, Truth and Right worked out in Du Bois, “Criteria of Negro Art.” 
32 The concept of contribution is developed throughout Du Bois’s career: W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of 
Races,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary Classics of the United States, 1986), 815–826; 
Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk. in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary Classics of the United 
States, 1986), 993–1002; Du Bois, “Criteria of Negro Art,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: 
Literary Classics of the United States, 1986), 993–1002; W. E. B. Du Bois, The Gift of Black Folk, The Oxford W.E.B. Du 
Bois (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
33 W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in Writings, ed. Nathan Irvin Huggins (New York, NY: Literary 
Classics of the United States, 1986), see p. 817 for anthropological claims and p. 820-825 for claims regarding 
contribution.    
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traditions—have the potential to teach. When I speak of the “right to pedagogy,” I interpret Du 
Bois’s long and varied oeuvre of pedagogical thinking as insisting upon the political normativity of the 
movement from potential contributor to teacher.34  
A criminal justice system that took the political normativity of movement from potential 
contributor to teacher as its aim would offer support to the aggrieved in the aftermath of murder 
such that they would be able to communicate about the experience of their loss and the meaning 
they wish to make out of it. This is a claim that I have argued for above, but grounded in Du Bois’s 
notion of contribution, it becomes richer: He locates our capability to communicate story and teach 
in our essence. Through the group traditions with which we identify, we inherit resources to form 
stories. We have a base of aesthetic judgments, knowledge claims, and moral experience that were 
motivated from triumphs and traumas alike. Thus, even when communicating about traumas that 
seem unspeakable, these traditions offer support. When I speak of institutional support for 
storytelling, I imagine institutional resources put forward to engage willing aggrieved persons in 
delving into those traditions to find the inspiration and language with which to speak of their 
experience. This language can be used to teach lessons from what they experienced.  
“Of the Coming of John” illustrates the ways in which group traditions support us when we 
are challenged to communicate traumatic vulnerability. Charles I. Nero locates John’s citation of 
Esther within a long line of Black women poets and writers. Nero cites Mary Stewart (1803-1879) 
defending her right to speak on behalf of the abolition of slavery as a woman by analogy to Esther 
standing for her Jewish people.35 He cites Sojourner Truth (1797-1883) who also likens her struggle 
as a Black woman demanding the rights of full citizenship in the U.S. to that of Esther.36 Truth goes 
further in her New York City Convention speech and suggests that those who resist her message 
should remember the terrible fate of those who resisted Esther.37 African American Baptist women 
described Ida B. Wells as “a queen Esther, a woman of high talent, that has sounded the bugle for a 
defenseless race.”38 
																																																								
34 W.E.B Du Bois, “The Hampton Idea,” in The Education of Black People: Ten Critiques 1906-1960, ed. Herbert Aptheker 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 21–32; W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Revelation of Saint Orgne The Damned,” in 
The Education of Black People: Ten Critiques 1906-1960, ed. Herbert Aptheker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 
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35 Charles I. Nero, “Queering The Souls of Black Folk,” Public Culture 17, no. 2 (March 20, 2005): 266. 
36 Ibid., 267. 
37 Sojourner Truth, “Speech at New York City Convention” (Fourth National Woman’s Rights Convention, New York, 
1853), http://www.lehigh.edu/~dek7/SSAWW/writTruthSpeech2.htm. 
38 Nero, “Queering The Souls of Black Folk,” 267. 
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To give voice to the vulnerability that John faces in his decision to return to his hometown, 
Du Bois looks to a tradition of Black women who appropriate a Jewish figure facing genocide to 
speak about the injustices of slavery, patriarchy, and lynching at the intersection of sexism and 
racism. Du Bois, Stewart, Truth, and the African American Baptist women tap into a story that 
allows them to frame the complicated experience of knowing that the demand they level is 
unwelcome and knowing that the consequences of speaking it will likely be dire, but doing so 
anyway. It allows them, in the words of Nero, to engage in the practice of “voice merging,” which 
connects the sacredness of the duty of fighting racism and sexism to the sacred task of Esther saving 
the Jewish people from genocide.39 Although Nero speaks of this as a practice of legitimation, it is 
also a means to support these activists to communicate their challenges and the aims of their work. 
Through Black feminist and Jewish storytelling around Queen Esther, Du Bois finds a structure and 
tradition to frame the conflict of John and all—including himself40—who put their lives on the line 
for themselves and those they love and the racial group they identify with.  
Du Bois’s notion of contribution speaks to our capacity to tell stories of traumatic 
vulnerability. In above sections, I have identified this capacity to tell stories with the invocation of a 
community of support that would provide support and accountability for aggrieved persons in their 
processes of recovery. Once these stories are told, they leave behind a legacy that contributes to 
others who may suffer similar harms. As mentioned above, they have the potential to break the 
sense of traumatic isolation for listeners or readers who have also lost loved ones to murder. Telling 
these stories also creates a legacy that can open up a virtuous cycle: The contribution of the story of 
the experience of trauma supports others in the articulation of their own experience of trauma. The 
citations of Esther demonstrate this: Jewish people tell a story about their experience on the brink of 
genocide in Persia, Black women take up this story as a means to understand the risk and promise of 
standing as a woman for the sake of Black people in a white-male supremacist culture. Du Bois uses 
these traditions to articulate the vulnerability that comes with using one’s education for the sake of 
Black uplift in a white supremacist culture. These stories told about trauma are flexible, and thus 
relevant to attempts to tell stories and invoke new communities around new traumas.  																																																								
39 Ibid., 266. 
40 Nero identifies Du Bois’s own citation of Esther in his personal journals, quoted in David Levering Lewis’ biography. 
After celebrations in Germany on the occasion of his 25th birthday, Du Bois writes: “These are my plans: to make a 
name in science, to make a name in literature and thus to raise my race. Or perhaps to raise a visible empire in Africa 
thro’ England, France or Germany. I wonder what will be the outcome? Who knows?” In closing, Du Bois 
foreshadowed “Of the Coming of John” when he quoted Esther 4:16: “I will go unto the king—which is not according 
to the law and if I perish—I PERISH.” Nero, “Queering The Souls of Black Folk,” 268. 
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Du Bois writes: “We believe that the Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to 
civilization and humanity which no other race can make.”41 This refers in part to the legacy which 
Black traditions of teaching and learning have left and will leave for humanity writ large. This 
encompasses the work of leaving a legacy of story and teaching that can be useful for others who 
face vulnerabilities that challenge their capacity for communication. It also encompasses the socio-
political demands that arise out of the Black experience of group trauma. In the case of “Of the 
Coming of John,” it is the articulation of the wrong of white supremacist violence and the need for a 
community response to face this wrong. Although this wrong can be articulated by members of 
non-Black groups, there is an urgency and breadth of understanding of the harm and its repair that 
comes only with living with the threat of that violence on an everyday basis. There is an urgency that 
comes with seeing the work of institutions of Black higher learning undermined by that violence. 
In “The Conservation of the Races,” Du Bois develops the notion of “contribution” as a 
groundwork for a multiracial democracy in the U.S. He writes, “We believe that, unless modern 
civilization is a failure, it is entirely feasible and practicable for two races in such essential political, 
economic and religious harmony as the white and colored people of America, to develop side by 
side in peace and mutual happiness, the peculiar contribution which each has to make to the culture 
of their common country.”42 Du Bois is advocating for the possibility of racial distinction without 
white supremacist subordination of the striving, creations, and lives of Black people. In the presence 
of equality and justice, there is the possibility for persons of all races to be engaged in the work of 
contribution: Working to bring their aesthetic, ethical and epistemic insight and story into the world.  
My use of “contribution” as a means to guide an institutional response on behalf of persons 
who are aggrieved by murder diverges from the context in which Du Bois developed the term. 
Contribution, in the Du Boisian sense, is indexed to racial tradition and making that tradition 
meaningful for the purposes of democracy founded on respect for racial distinction. Within the 
framework of a multiracial democracy, there will be institutions like the criminal justice system that 
can take the principles of contribution as guiding principles without being strictly tied to supporting 
racial contribution. The notion of contribution I take as a guide for victim-oriented proceedings of 
the criminal justice system is supported by a racial tradition. It can uphold and project forward racial 
traditions, but it does not necessarily do this work. The group of interestin my dissertation is 
“persons aggrieved by murder.” They are united in grief over losing a loved one. Their contributions 																																																								
41 Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” 825. 
42 Ibid. 
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are for the sake of stheir own recovery and for creating a legacy of memorialization for the one that 
is lost. As with Du Boisian contribution, that work of recovery and memorialization is oriented 
towards creations of legacies that support the realization of flourishing for all members of the polity. 
Whereas Du Bois envisions a polity built out of the diverse teachings made possible by the support 
for the flourishing of diverse racial lineages, I envision a polity that supports the diverse teachings of 
those who are aggrieved by murder as an aspect of Du Bois’s project. With a community choosing 
to learn and engage in these practices of recovery, a legacy of support is available for others who 
suffer similar harms or wish to create richer forms of community support for grief. The teachings at 
stake are united by delving into grief and recovery. Not all of this work will be explicitly guided by 
delving into racial traditions of teaching and learning. 
The principles that I take from Du Bois to guide the transformation of the criminal justice 
system’s response to aggrieved persons are: The importance of having intellectual, moral, epistemic, 
and aesthetic traditions from which to tell one’s own stories; creating intellectual, moral, epistemic, 
and aesthetic artifacts are expressions of our human capacity to teach and learn; that those artifacts 
serve as a resource for those who seek to articulate their experience in the future; and the 
importance of building social and political demands out of the experience of injustice. When I 
recommend these principles to victim rights advocates, I offer resources to support storytelling and 
testimony such that the virtuous cycle that can result is made more likely. Such storytelling and 
testimony not only invokes community that can support recovery, but they also do important social 
and political work: Those stories and the work of those communities leave a legacy of testimony and 
response to trauma that can guide institutional transformation. This institutional transformation be 
oriented towards better communal support of the aggrieved. They can also be oriented towards 
preventing those harms from being repeated in the future.   
Section VIII: Forms of Contribution Though Grief 
An important aspect of the Du Boisian notion of contribution is the thought that we can 
return to traumatic experience and mine that experience for knowledge that builds community and 
enhances our own living and loving. In this final section, I will make the notion of contribution in 
the aftermath of murder concrete by providing four potential contributions through grieving that 
would constitute the testimony that victims’ rights advocates should seek.  
 First, there is the form of contribution through grieving that looks to experiences of loss to 
ground ethical principles for living together. In one of the most moving passages of “The Sorrow 
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Songs” essay, Du Bois contends that Black people in the U.S. have responded to 300 years of 
traumatic violence—in important part—with the demand for justice.43 He writes: 
Around us the history of the land has centred for thrice a hundred years; out of the 
nation’s heart we have called for all that was best to throttle and subdue all that was 
worse; fire, blood, prayer and sacrifice, have billowed over this people, and they have 
found peace only at the alters of the God of Right.44  
 
In the context of the “Sorrow Songs” essay, Du Bois describes the “gift of Spirit” as a prophetic call 
to white U.S. Americans “to despise not Justice, Mercy, and Truth” lest the nation be smitten with a 
curse.”45 In the midst of slavery, the “God of Right” knew the wrong that Black people were 
undergoing. Sorrow songs sung on behalf of the “God of Right” united people in the articulation of 
the wrongs of enslavement and the white supremacist ordering of human life. 
An orientation towards “Right” seeks to rectify a particular wrong while also teaching the 
lessons of those particular wrongs in a categorical way. Out of the Sorrow Songs, one can teach: 
“The suffering of chattel slavery ought never to be repeated” and “Humans ought to be able to 
build community through choice.” It is the categorical lessons which I emphasize here: Where a 
specific instance of traumatic violence is examined and taken as an opportunity to develop a 
principle by which to orient present and future living together. For my own work, I look to my 
family’s experience of genocide and their struggle to resist visiting aspects of those wrongs upon 
those they love as the foundation for not only condemning genocide, but also asserting that “Those 
who suffer traumatic harms should have support to resist the psychological propensity to repeat 
aspects of those harms on others.”  
 Second, there is a form of contribution through grief that looks to the person who was 
lost—a trait or a message—and takes up that as an aspect of oneself. In “Of Alexander Crummell,” 
Du Bois memorializes Crummell through an accounting of his lifelong struggle to communicate and 
build community around his work.46 Much of the essay is a tribute to the relentlessness of that 
struggle in the face of white supremacy. For Du Bois, white supremacy not only blocked paths to 
professional progress, but it brought out hatred and despair, which threatened to derail Crummell’s 
lifework. As Du Bois writes at an early stage of his career, he seeks guidance on how to face the 
inevitable obstacles that confront Black visionaries in a world structured by white supremacy. He 
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holds up Crummell’s example as one who labored honorably through obstacles: “He never faltered, 
he seldom complained; he simply worked, inspiring the young, rebuking the old, helping the weak, 
guiding the strong.”47 Insofar as Du Bois memorializes Crummell and takes on his example for 
himself, he makes loss meaningful through emulation. This is the work where aggrieved look to the 
one who is lost, interpret the lost one’s life in the context of lived problems, and seeks to gain 
guidance from there.  
 Third, there is a form of contribution through grief that looks to the experience of loss and 
seeks to learn something from that experience. What was a form of support for grief that was 
required, but that was absent? How did this experience of loss reveal the complicated nature of our 
relationship to other people? How does the experience of mortality bring about a need to reorganize 
our priorities? How does confrontation with terrible injustice or cruelty point to a need to build new 
forms of understanding ourselves and others? Out of these questions there is the possibility of 
contributing to others who might suffer a similar loss in the future. There is the opportunity to 
speak truth about the nature of our relationships and our attachments.  
Fourth, there is a form of grieving that works toward the transformation of the conditions that 
created the traumatic loss. This is one that takes up the political imperatives of resisting the 
institutional and social conditions that contributed to the occurrence of the trauma. This is the work 
of creating institutional space for the concerns that are raised in “Of the Coming of John” and in the 
work of all people who organize to take on a systematic issue. People from groups as diverse as 
AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) to the Tay Sachs and Allied Diseases Association take 
on this imperative. As do people who identify as victims and take up the mantle of victims’ rights as 
closure—despite being misguided in their calls for harsh punishment as a means to support 
victims—and those who take up their experience for the purposes of reconciliation or 
transformative justice.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have contested the underlying conception of grief at stake in discourses that 
link harsh punishment to closure for aggrieved persons. I showed that the conception of grief which 
assumes that harsh punishment establishes closure for aggrieved persons does not stand up to 
research on trauma. I have mapped a means of supporting aggrieved persons that does not rely 
upon the result of the sentencing phase of criminal trials. I contend that institutions of criminal 
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justice can lend support to aggrieved people by supporting their capacities to tell stories and teach in 
the aftermath of traumatic experience. Institutions can assist communities to not only be sensitive to 
the vicissitudes of traumatic experience, but to learn from aggrieved persons in light of their stories. 
I have looked to Du Bois for both an instance of this storytelling and a conceptual framework for it. 
Adapted for the purposes of supporting aggrieved persons in the aftermath of murder, I argue that 
Du Bois’s notion of contribution should take the place of closure as the aim of victim-oriented 
measures taken by the criminal justice system. Instead of promising to suture the wound of 
traumatic loss, the storytelling and social and political demands promoted by contribution offer a 
basis of ongoing support for aggrieved persons. This is support for the aggrieved to become 
teachers of their trauma. As such, they take on the power to guide the healing of their own trauma as 
well as the traumas of others. 
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Chapter III 
Testimony and Responsibility-Taking in the Aftermath of Murder: Beyond Victim Impact 
Statements 
 
In my previous chapter, I suggested that the link between harsh punishment and victim 
satisfaction is undermined by the ongoing challenges of traumatic experience. For both therapeutic 
and socio-political reasons, I argued that more robust support for victims of traumatic experience 
begins with support for them to make testimonial contributions: Creative artifacts, stories, demands 
that are drawn from the experience of loss and grief. I suggested that such artifacts, in the context of 
a compassionate community, could invoke ongoing support that goes far beyond that which is 
offered by a sentence handed down by a judicial body.  
In this chapter, I address the question: Does the victim advocacy I call for simply reiterate 
the demand for victim impact statements? A politico-legal achievement of the victims’ rights 
movement, victim impact statements allow for testimony from an aggrieved person in a form that 
seems to meet and even exceed the standard of victim-advocacy that I outlined in my previous 
chapter under the heading of contribution. Amidst a strong push for victims’ rights, Payne v. Tennessee 
opened the door for the testimony of the aggrieved in the sentencing phase of capital trials.1 They 
are also a part of non-capital cases in all 50 U.S. states.2 This chapter begins with a definition of 
victim impact statements and an outline of the jurisprudential debates that define the practice of 
testimony of the aggrieved in capital cases. Although there is variation among jurisdictions, at a bare 
minimum, victim impact statements allow aggrieved persons to testify to the emotional and financial 
harms that they suffered as a result of murder as well. They are also allowed to offer a glimpse into 
the life of the victim.3 This forum thus meets many of the criteria I spelled out in the proceeding 
chapter: There is a public forum supported by institutions of criminal justice for testimony and an 
opportunity for aggrieved persons to articulate the pain of loss and briefly memorialize the person 
they lost.4 Beyond what I outlined in the previous chapter, participation in the sentencing phase of 
the trial allows aggrieved persons to participate in the proceedings of the criminal justice system. 																																																								
1 Vivian Berger, “Payne and Suffering - A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique,” Florida State University 
Law Review 20 (1992-1993): 21. 
2 National Center for Victims of Crime, “Victim Impact Statements,” Victimsofcrime.org, 2008, 
https://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/victim-impact-statements. 
3 Wayne A. Logan, “Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials,” Federal Sentencing Reporter 19, no. 1 (2006): 05–12, 
doi:10.1525/fsr.2006.19.1.05. 
4 Edna Erez, “Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceeding,” Criminal Law Bulletin 40 (October 2004): 483–500. 
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Given that we invest sentences of punishment with the power to memorialize and affirm the value 
of the one lost to murder, this participation often feels like a contribution to the legacy of the victim. 
Although victim impact statements may seem to meet and exceed the victim support that 
that I brought together under the heading of contribution, I suggest these apparent benefits are 
outweighed by what is lost due to the adversarial context of these victim impact statements. The 
ongoing community support, which is crucial to the recovery of the aggrieved, will be limited at best. 
The testimony of the aggrieved is limited from two directions: It is limited by the requirement that 
the aggrieved speak to a limited scope of the harms experienced. It is limited by the fact that the 
institutional response to their testimony comes only in the form of prosecutors (and sometimes 
defense attorneys) attempting to turn the testimony in the favor of those they represent.  
My thesis is that the adversarial sentencing context is not the appropriate context in which to 
respond to the needs and demands of persons aggrieved by murder. I argue that the community 
formation which I sought in the previous chapter is best delivered through an institutionally 
supported forum outside the traditional proceedings of the criminal justice system. I will offer 
norms and guidelines for those fora and those who choose to participate in them. These are norms 
to guide the practices of implementing the virtuous cycle I outlined in my previous chapter.   
Section I: Victim Impact Statements in the Aftermath of Murder in the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System 
In cases of murder, victim impact statements refer to testimony given by aggrieved persons 
on the emotional, financial, and physical consequences of crime. These testimonies are offered 
during the sentencing phase of trials and at parole hearings. They are accounts of the consequences 
of crime that would not ordinarily be heard in the course of the criminal trial: They are meant to 
reveal aspects of the harm beyond the knowledge gained in the presentation of evidence, the 
testimony of witnesses, and the presentation of testimony mitigating the blameworthiness of the 
defendant. They provide testimony that guides the criminal court’s decision to award financial 
restitution to victims. In cases of murder, victim impact statements are generally reserved for family 
members, but in many districts, friends, community members, and even emergency personnel are 
allowed to testify. 
According to supporters, these impact statements offer victims a therapeutic opportunity to 
express themselves. For reasons similar to those I argued for in my last chapter, advocates see the 
act of testimony as a good in itself for aggrieved persons. Additionally, it gives aggrieved persons a 
forum where their status as persons victimized by crime is publically acknowledged. Victim impact 
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statements are also said to provide support for the determination of justice. According to advocates, 
the statements of aggrieved persons offer judge and jury a novel view of the harm, which assists in 
the determination of a sentence proportionate to the crime.5 
Victim impact statements are admissible throughout all fifty states and in federal courts as 
well. Not only are they admissible nearly everywhere, but 36 out of 50 states have passed victim 
rights amendments,6 most of which guarantee victims the “right to be reasonably heard.” The 
federal government also guarantees this right to victims through its 2004 Victim Rights’ Act. At 
present, the phenomenon of victim impact statements has spread throughout European and 
European settler-colonial nations: England and Wales, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and 
the Netherlands allow victim/aggrieved people’s testimony at some stage in the criminal trial.7  
In the U.S., controversies over victim impact statements as a practice are presently confined 
to scholarly legal debates. However, challenges to victim impact statements in cases of capital 
murder (where defendants are eligible for the death penalty) have gone to the U.S. supreme court in 
Booth v. Maryland (1987), Gathers v. Virginia (1989), and Payne v. Tennessee (1991). In Booth and Gathers, 
victim impact statements were ruled to be trespassing the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, specifically with regards the proportionality doctrine. Justice Powell, 
writing for the Booth majority, wrote:  
The admission of the family members’ emotionally charged opinions and 
characterizations of the crimes could serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury 
and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime 
and the defendant. Such admission is therefore inconsistent with the reasoned 
decision making required in capital cases.8 
 
The considerations regarding the character of the victim and the consequences for the aggrieved in 
the aftermath were ruled irrelevant to question of the defendant’s blameworthiness. The court 
argued that punishment should not follow from how pious or gracious the murdered victim was. 
Nor should it follow from how deeply missed the victim is. The principle behind the ruling is one of 
equal protection: Punishment should be consistent whether or not the victim’s memory garnered 
affecting testimony. Punishment should be consistent whether the victims’ loss is felt deeply by 
others willing to testify or not. In the Gathers decision, the court affirmed that considerations of the 																																																								
5 Paul G. Cassell, “In Defense of Victim Impact Statements,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 6, no. 2 (2009): 611–48. 
6 National Victims’ Consitutional Amendment Passage, “State Victim Rights Amendments,” Nvcap.org, 2015, 
http://nvcap.org/states/stvras.html. 
7 Vicky De Mesmaecker, “Antidotes to Injustice? Victim Statements’ Impact on Victims’ Sense of Security,” International 
Review of Victimology 18, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 134, doi:10.1177/0269758011432954. 
8 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 497 (U.S. Supreme Court 1987). 
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victim’s good character and religiosity in victim impact testimony ran afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment.9 Given that the moral and religious character of the victim was—in this case at least—
irrelevant to the defendant’s decision to commit the crime, the court argued that it should not be a 
part of the decision as to how that crime should be punished.  
 There is a Kantian commitment in the majority decisions in Booth and Gathers: Punishment 
should not hinge on the unforeseen or unforeseeable consequences of criminal behavior, specifically 
the effects on the family and community of the one lost to murder.10 Payne overturned both 
decisions—in part—on the grounds that the proportionality considerations of the Eighth 
Amendment do not necessarily rule out aggrieved people’s testimony. The Payne majority argued that 
the harms caused to family members in the aftermath of murder are not different in kind from the 
ways in which courts traditionally consider the consequences of criminal behavior to be relevant to 
punishment.11 This picks up a line of thought explicated by Justice White in his dissent to Booth. He 
argued that we expect harsher punishment for a reckless driver who unintentionally kills someone 
than to a reckless driver who harms no one.12 Punishment can thus follow from unintended 
consequences. The Payne decision suggests that the trauma of loss and the loss of the particular 
contribution that the victim made and/or was capable of making are unintended consequences of 
crime relevant to deciding punishment. Victim impact statements are admissible as a means to bring 
those unintended consequences into the view of the court.  
 The majority offered further defenses of victim impact statements in Payne: Given that the 
defendant has an extended opportunity to call forth witnesses for the purposes of testifying to their 
individual moral and social worth (for the purposes of mitigating blameworthiness), the majority in 
Payne argued that the victim should have the right to have witnesses testifying to their individual 
worth. In Payne, Pervis Payne’s girlfriend and parents testified to his church-going ways, his kindness 
to children, the absence of previous run-ins with police, and the absence of a history of drug or 
alcohol abuse.13 In other contexts, mitigating evidence may speak to the defendant’s work towards 
rehabilitative goals and their remorse for the crime. Mitigating evidence is offered in support of the 
contention that the defendant is worthy of a lighter sentence.  
																																																								
9 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989). 
10 R.P. Peerenboom, “Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Critique of Payne v. 
Tennessee,” Pepperdine Law Review 20, no. 1 (December 15, 1992): 25–72. 
11 Ibid., 27. 
12 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 497, 515 (U.S. Supreme Court 1987). 
13 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814 (U.S. Supreme Court 1991). 
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 The Payne court argued that if the character of the defendant is presented before the court 
without presentation of the character of the victim, it “unfairly weigh[s] the scales in a criminal trial.” 
Writing in dissent from the Booth decision, Justice Scalia explains the notion of balance in the 
sentencing phase that won the day in Payne: 
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render capital punishment a 
harsh penalty in the particular case be placed before the sentencing authority, while 
simultaneously requiring, as we do today, that evidence of much of the human 
suffering the defendant has inflicted be suppressed, in effect to prescribe a debate on 
the appropriateness of the capital penalty with one side muted.14 
 
Scalia frames the issue as one of procedural fairness to the prosecution. If the defense is allowed a 
wide scope in their attempt to show that their defendant is an individual deserving of a lighter 
sentence, then there should be a wide scope for the prosecution to show that the victim is an 
individual whose suffering justifies the harsher sentence. I will return later in this chapter to examine 
the presumption that the aggrieved person’s testimony is for the purposes of amplifying the 
prosecutor’s case.  
 The stakes of balancing testimony of the aggrieved with mitigation in the sentencing phase 
go beyond procedural concerns about fairness to the prosecution. The stakes are also therapeutic 
and symbolic. In a concurring opinion to Payne, Justice O’Connor writes:  
“Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization.” Brief for Justice For All Political 
Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 3. It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, 
and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the 
person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of 
that back.15 
 
 O’Connor suggests that the victim impact statements can take on a memorializing function that 
does not necessarily trespass on the Eighth Amendment. For O’Connor, the testimony that the 
victims’ son misses his mother could not have been enough to prejudice the jury beyond the 
prejudice that came with hearing about the extreme violence of the murders and rape committed by 
the defendant.16 This is a nod to the Booth court’s worry that victim impact testimony would 
“inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime 
and the defendant.” In instances where victim impact testimony has the prejudicial effect that the 
																																																								
14 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 497, 520 (U.S. Supreme Court 1987). 
15 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (U.S. Supreme Court 1991). 
16 Ibid. 
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Booth court feared, O’Connor says that the defense can point to the Fourteenth amendment, which 
guarantees due process.17  
Once constitutional worries are put aside, the aggrieved person’s testimony can play the role 
of returning personality to the victim of murder that was stolen by the perpetrator. We can 
understand this notion of redress in the context of the rhetoric of victims’ rights advocates, which 
O’Connor cites above. For many advocates of victim impact statements, the aggrieved are doubly 
wronged insofar as there they suffer the loss of loved one in murder and suffer a secondary harm 
that comes with being silenced in the proceedings of the criminal justice system.18 In effect: If 
deprived of the opportunity to speak to the traits, characteristics, and contributions of the victim, 
victims’ advocacy groups frame the government as repeating an aspect of the harm that was inflicted 
by the perpetrator. Through victim impact statements, the criminal justice system can resist such 
repetition and serve the aggrieved by including the memory of the victim in the sentencing 
proceedings of the court.  
In this review of the history of victim impact statements, particularly in cases of capital 
murder, I’ve addressed the procedural and victim-centered dimensions of their jurisprudential 
justification. The procedural considerations were highlighted in my explication of the Supreme 
Court’s broadening of the harms relevant for punishment and the claim that fairness to the 
prosecution requires the ability to present victim impact statements to the court. The overarching 
claim is that better sentencing procedures require the inclusion of victim impact statements. The 
questions that arise from this justification are many: Does bringing the testimony of aggrieved into 
these proceedings create circumstances where they exercise too much control over the punishment 
of the defendant? Does this testimony constitute a rejection of the tradition by which we prosecute 
criminal trespasses as harms against the state rather than harms between two individuals (and their 
families)? Is the testimony relevant to the question of determination of the defendant’s 
blameworthiness?  
On the other hand, considerations of the welfare of the aggrieved are also a part of the 
justifications for victim impact testimony in the rhetoric of victim rights advocates and in decisions 
of the Supreme Court Justices. The overarching claim is that support for the aggrieved and memory 
of victims is served through victim impact testimony. There are also enduring questions that arise 																																																								
17 Ibid. 
18 Cassell, “In Defense of Victim Impact Statements,” 464; Julian V. Roberts and Edna Erez, “Communication in 
Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive Function of Victim Impact Statements,” International Review of Victimology 10, no. 3 
(January 1, 2004): 225.  
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out of this claim: Does the testimony of the aggrieved create healing for aggrieved persons? Does it 
create a meaningful sense of participation for the aggrieved in the proceedings of criminal justice? 
Does it create a meaningful sense of memorialization for the victim? 
Section II: Victim Impact Statements as Support for the Aggrieved 
Both the procedural and welfare of the aggrieved justifications of victim impact statements 
are important for my argument in this chapter, despite the fact that my dissertation’s guiding 
question is one of the welfare of the aggrieved. My overarching question is: What should institutions 
of criminal justice contribute to the redress of those who are aggrieved by murder? The procedural 
debates and regulations at stake within the U.S. criminal justice system might seem to be beyond the 
scope of my dissertation. However, they are important insofar as they create the boundaries around 
testimony as it is presented under the heading of victim impact statements. For instance, insofar as 
victim impact statements are understood by the Court as a procedural balance to defense mitigation, 
the testimony of the aggrieved during the sentencing phase will be framed as support for 
prosecutorial arguments for aggravation. Against the defense’s attempt to put forward evidence that 
the defendant is capable of being a contributing member to society who deserves better than the 
court’s harshest sentence, the aggrieved’s testimony will be framed as an attempt to show that the 
character of the defendant is so blameworthy as to deserve the harshest sentence.  
I will argue ultimately that the procedural goals of victim impact statements create an 
untenable conflict with the goals of redress and recovery for aggrieved and the memorialization of 
victims. Before building that argument, I will look to arguments by advocates of victim impact 
statements who, like Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion cited above, suggest that that goals 
of welfare for the aggrieved can be achieved within the adversarial context of the sentencing 
proceedings. I focus on the overlap between the arguments of supporters of victim impact 
statements and my conception of contribution and community response to show the apparent 
sufficiency of victim impact statements as a form of redress. For that purpose, I’ll break down the 
points of intersection between victim impact statements and my conception of contribution and 
response: First, I’ll look to the ways in which victim impact statements encourage the testimony of 
the aggrieved. Second, I’ll look to the ways in which victim impact statements allow for this 
testimony to be heard by a receptive community. Third, I’ll look to how victim impact statements 
elicit support from those who hear them. 
In the preceding chapter I argued for the cardinal importance of persons aggrieved by 
murder articulating the harm they have suffered. I suggested that stories are the grounds on which 
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communities can be constituted in support of recovery and resistance to vicious cycles of repetition. 
I contended that institutions of criminal justice should take responsibility for encouraging the 
aggrieved to craft testimony on the experience of murder. I suggested that these institutions should 
take a role in constituting communities such that this testimony opens a virtuous cycle where those 
articulations could be taken up by others in the interest of the recovery of the aggrieved and the 
community that has suffered the violence of murder. In victim impact testimony, the institution of 
criminal justice supports the aggrieved in making testimony by giving them a privileged place to 
speak in the proceedings of the criminal trial. This is a process that is supported mostly by 
prosecutors and—in some jurisdictions—victims’ advocates who guide the aggrieved person 
through the process of testifying. Jurisdictions often publicize guidelines for the structure of 
testimony.19  
The expression of the dimensions of the harm experienced and the memorialization of the 
one lost to murder is encouraged by a criminal justice system that—at present—devotes the most 
socio-political attention and ritual to murder. It is not only the attention that trials give to the event 
of murder that makes them an important place for testimony, but it is also the ways in which trials 
have been given cultural meaning. We invest a memorializing function in trials, which contributes to 
the anguish that arises in miscarriages of justice and satisfaction when the guilty are sufficiently 
punished.20 Miscarriages of justice express more than incompetence or bias among those who 
decided the case: They are expressions of political disregard for the victim of murder. In cases of 
murder where the social positionality of the perpetrator is privileged above that of the victim, 
miscarriages of justice signal an institutional affirmation of the hierarchical valuation of privileged 
groups over others. In cases where guilty verdicts and sufficiently harsh sentences are leveled against 
privileged persons who have committed crimes against those with less privilege, there is sometimes 
occasion for relief. Those cases express the worth and value of the life lost despite socio-political 
pressures to the contrary. 
We invest criminal trials (and especially their verdicts) with the power to undermine and 
affirm the worth of the one who has been lost to murder. Advocates could argue that victim impact 
statements are meaningful because they give aggrieved people an opportunity to effect the sentence 																																																								
19 Douglas Evan Beloof, “The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model,” Utah Law Review, no. 
2 (1999): 289–330. 
20 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2002); George P. Fletcher, With Justice For Some: Victims’ Rights In Criminal Trials (Reading, Mass: 
Addison Wesley, 1995), 201–7. 
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handed down. In this context, their testimony does not only support their own grieving process and 
call forth the support of others—as I suggested in my previous chapter—but, it influences a socially 
and politically powerful means of memorializing. The aggrieved person has the opportunity to speak 
to those deliberating on the severity of punishment. They are thus speaking to people endowed with 
the power to affirm the socio-political worth and legacy of the dead through their decision.  
In addition to playing a role in memorializing the one who has been murdered, court 
proceedings create an opportunity for acknowledgement of the aggrieved’s status as one who is 
rightfully aggrieved by murder. In “Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating 
Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings,” Edna Erez 
argues for the importance of such acknowledgement of victim status. She cites an empirical study of 
the goals of crime victims in their participation in the criminal justice system, which “identified 
public recognition of victim status as the most significant [goal].” She continues, “The study 
confirmed that victims experience the refusal of victim status as secondary victimization, and that 
the VIS [Victim Impact Statement] can well serve victims by recognizing victim status.”21 They 
speak to a group of persons who have extensive knowledge of the details of the murder and have 
already decided on the guilt of the defendant. In victim impact testimony, aggrieved people speak in 
a forum where they are introduced and given space to speak as victims. These circumstances free 
them from the everyday burdens that come with telling the story from start to finish so as to 
establish their victimization. Unlike the everyday experience of explaining what has transpired, 
speaking to the court in the midst of their deliberations endows the aggrieved with an opportunity to 
speak with little likelihood of their victim status being gainsaid. It is, for instance, rare that the 
aggrieved will be confronted with a cross-examination where the defense attorney raises questions 
about the character of the victim and whether the victim deserved their fate.22  
For advocates like Edna Erez, Julian Roberts and Paul Cassell, victim impact statements 
encourage testimony and create the opportunity for this testimony to be articulated to a receptive 
audience.23 Testimony is meaningful for aggrieved persons for a variety of reasons: The power that 
comes with expressing one’s affection for the lost loved one. An opportunity to express the value of 
one’s loved one in proceedings that many see as an implicit form of memorialization. The 																																																								
21 Erez, “Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceeding,” 492. 
22 Wayne A. Logan, “Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital 
Trials,” Arizona Law Review 41 (1999): 159–60. 
23 Cassell, “In Defense of Victim Impact Statements”; Paul G. Cassell, “Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and 
the Effects of Utah,” Utah Law Review, no. 4 (1994): 1373–1469; Roberts and Erez, “Communication in Sentencing.” 
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affirmation of victimization that comes with being recognized by a group of people in a formal and 
institutional setting as one who has been harmed. This recognition and acknowledgement can 
sometimes be codified in the case law as judges will sometimes cite the victim impact testimony in 
their opinion. Erez cites empirical studies that suggest that such recognition makes victims feel 
included and seen in the proceedings.24  
Thus, victim impact statements offer those who have survived traumatic experience the 
opportunity to experience the positive transformation of the meaning of vulnerability that I spoke of 
in my second chapter. Murder exploits the vulnerability of the victims’ body for the perpetrator’s 
ends. Murder reveals the painful aspect of vulnerability in the relationship of the aggrieved to their 
lost loved one. The vulnerability that is constitutive of close relationship becomes an occasion for 
grief and pain. As we saw last chapter, victims of trauma—including those aggrieved by murder—
struggle to regain trust and feelings of safety in the vulnerability of relationship. The opportunity to 
make a statement to the court offers aggrieved persons the opportunity to share vulnerability with 
others who are prepared to respect and listen to it. Sharing vulnerability brings about the possibility 
of influencing proceedings that are endowed with the power to memorialize and affirm the worth of 
the victim. Victim impact statements create the opportunity to make vulnerability into something 
positive: An opportunity to be heard in a respectful way and a means to memorialize and honor the 
lost loved one. 
 In this section, I have offered evidence in support of the claim of victim advocates that 
victim impact statements benefit redress and recovery for the aggrieved. I have suggested that there 
are points of important overlap between my Du Boisian notion of contribution and the redress 
rendered by victim impact statements. I have suggested that victim impact statements may even 
render a greater service than my conception of redress insofar as they allow aggrieved people to 
exert influence on the judicial sentencing of the court. I do not stand in strict opposition to their 
claims. Although I will critique victim impact statements on the grounds that the testimony of the 
aggrieved is too narrowly interpreted within the adversarial sentencing phase, from the perspective 
of the victim’s welfare and recovery in the aftermath of murder, I see victim impact statements as 
rendering service.25 For this reason, I do not believe there are grounds for prohibiting victim impact 
testimony from the perspective of victims’ redress and recovery. My goal is to render aggrieved 																																																								
24 Roberts and Erez, “Communication in Sentencing,” 231. 
25 I have serious reservations about victim impact statements on procedural jurisprudential grounds of fairness and equal 
protection. But, making such an argument would require focus on jurisprudential questions that go beyond my 
dissertation’s focus on the serving the aggrieved.   
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persons a richer forum for redress and recovery such that victim impact statements would no longer 
be the primary space within the criminal justice system for aggrieved persons seeking 
acknowledgement and memorialization.  
Section III: Shortcomings of Victim Impact Statements 
In this section, I argue that the service that victim impact statements render to aggrieved 
persons is inadequate to their testimony. Advocates of victim impact statements rely on the notion 
that testimony articulated within sentencing proceedings offers satisfactory redress and recovery for 
the aggrieved. I contend that this overlooks the ways in which the testimony that aggrieved persons 
are allowed in this context is limited by procedural concerns and the aims of the prosecutors who 
have final say as to the content of the testimony. Advocates of victim impact statements may 
reasonably suggest that respectfully listening to testimony and acknowledging the aggrieved’s status 
as a victim of crime supports recovery for the aggrieved. I argue that this acknowledgement of status 
is insufficient to support aggrieved persons. What is missing is the ongoing support for the 
aggrieved that I highlighted in my previous chapter. Advocates of victim impact statements suggest 
that testimony contributes to more severe sentences, which is a means to memorialize the victim of 
murder. I contend that such a view invests too much memorializing power in a judicial authority that 
is not designed for this purpose.  
I will first look to the ways in which the procedural principles of the adversarial court limit 
the expression allowed by aggrieved people in their victim impact statements. Although the Payne 
majority allowed victim impact statements and overturned Booth, the Payne majority constrained their 
content in line with concerns raised by the Booth majority: Aggrieved persons could provide only a 
“quick glimpse of the life” of the victim.26 They may not express opinions on the sentence deserved 
by the victim. They may not express opinions about the character of the defendant. They may not 
express “comparative worth” evaluation where they compare the worth of the victim to that of the 
defendant.27  
There are judicial principles at stake in these constraints. The brevity requirement limits the 
recollections of aggrieved persons to establish the individuality of the victim without risking a 
sentencing decision based on factors that were irrelevant or unforeseeable to the defendant’s 
decision to murder. The prohibition against expression of opinions on the appropriate sentence 
speaks to the principle that the jury should determine the sentence as a result of weighing 																																																								
26 Logan, “Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials,” 5. 
27 Logan, “Through the Past Darkly,” 157–58. 
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aggravating and mitigating evidence rather than the desire articulated by the aggrieved.28 The 
constraints around claims about the defendant’s character and “comparative worth” assessments are 
in service to the principle of equal protection, the requirement that the court view each life as equally 
valuable no matter the character or good deeds of the life in question.  
Whether or not these constraints limit victim impact statements in present-day practice,29 
they reveal the ways in which the expressive ends of the testimony of the aggrieved are limited by 
the procedural principles of adversarial hearings. These are not constraints that make testimony 
impossible, but they show the friction between procedural principles oriented toward ends of 
fairness and the ends of recovery and memorialization for aggrieved persons. This means that what 
might be good for the ends desired by the victim must be balanced with ends of fairness and 
consistency of judicial procedures. These are not complementary aims. For instance, testimony 
restricted to provide only a “quick glimpse” to establish that one lost to murder was a person whose 
individuality is deserving of respect is not a robust form of memorialization. It does not allow the 
aggrieved to speak to the meaning of their relationship to the one lost to murder. The expression of 
anger at the defendant could conceivably be an important part of an aggrieved person’s testimony, 
but such expressions are subject to defense attorney’s objections. Further, the adversarial context 
means that victim impact statements are subject to cross-examination. This means that claims about 
the victim’s character are subject to scrutiny by the defense.30  
Given that these constraints have not been widely enforced and defense attorneys have 
remained cautious in their challenges to aggrieved persons offering victim impact statements, it 
would be wrong to suggest that the court is unduly restrictive for the testimony of the aggrieved. 
Nonetheless, the courts’ accommodations to victims and their survivors are in tension with 
foundational procedural principles. There is no principled reason that the procedural values could 
not be resurgent or that defense attorneys could not devise new ways of challenging the claims of 
aggrieved person’s memorializing testimony. The sentencing proceedings are a forum that serves 
victims in the context of serving procedural ends, they are thus not a testimonial forum reliably 
devoted to the therapeutic and memorialization processes of the aggrieved.   																																																								
28 It seems to create problems of arbitrariness if two people who committed the same murder would have different 
sentences simply because one victim’s family stood in favor of harsh punishment and another stood in favor of lighter 
punishment.  
29 Evidence suggests that these constraints have been considerably weakened since the Payne decision in 1991. Logan, 
“Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials”; Logan, “Through the Past Darkly.” 
30 Again, such impugning of the victims’ character in the response to the victim impact statements are rare, but there is 
no prohibition against defense attorney’s refining their methods and making the practice more widespread.  
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In her essay on the experience of the criminal justice system in the aftermath of her brother’s 
murder, Charisse Coleman describes the parameters set out by the Louisiana judge that constrained 
her and her family’s victim impact testimony. She writes:  
Cameron [the victims’ brother] could not testify about the income he lost when his 
depression in the wake of Russell’s murder crippled his ability to function in his job. 
He wasn’t allowed to mention his depression at all, in fact. Similarly, the judge ruled 
that Hugo [the prosecutor] could not elicit my testimony describing the months of 
insomnia.... Since sleeplessness could not be mentioned, the disruption to my work 
and general well-being that resulted from being awake all night and sleeping away the 
daylight hours would also go unremarked. My mother would not be telling the jury 
about the debilitation of a sorrowful fury that had no outlet, or of her often 
diminished ability to concentrate.... We were not permitted to tell of friendships that 
had evaporated overnight, or of friends who had drifted more gradually away, 
steered by the duration of our unassailable grief and their own queasiness and fear, as 
if the violence that had befallen us might somehow be contagious.31 
 
In the absence of the more permissive guidelines approved a year later through the victims’ rights 
amendment in Louisiana,32 the judge limited above testimony on grounds of precedent. The judge’s 
decision reflects a procedural commitment to restricting testimony on the symptoms of traumatic 
loss unforeseeable by the defendant when he perpetrated the murder-robbery.  
There are good reasons to side with the judge’s restrictions: Admitting the testimony that 
one family member suffered from insomnia and another suffered from depression brings up 
problems of arbitrariness in sentencing: If some aggrieved persons experience their grief more or 
less intensely than others, it is not clear why that should affect aggravation in the sentencing 
decision. Although most experience trauma in the aftermath of the murder of a loved one, it is 
questionable whether a potentially harsher sentence should be handed down because some aggrieved 
people are more demonstrably traumatized than others. I will further reflect on Coleman’s quote 
later in this chapter, but for now it is sufficient to note the ways in which the concerns about the 
criteria by which the jury decides blameworthiness conflict with the victims’ expressive goals of 
speaking to the full dimensions of their experience.  																																																								
31 James R. Acker and David R. Karp, eds., Wounds That Do Not Bind: Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty 
(Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 22. 
32 It is likely that a good deal of the above testimony would be admitted in light of the statute’s guarantee that victims 
have the right to “Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result  
of the offense.” Louisiana State Legislature, “Louisiana Victims’ Rights Laws,” State Constitutional and Statutory 
Victims’ Rights (Portland, OR: National Crime Victim Law Institute, 1998), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/4952-
louisiana. For timeline that includes Louisiana constitutional amendment, see Office for Victims of Crime, “Landmarks 
in Victims’ Rights and Services,” National Crime Victims' Rights Week-Resources (Washington, D.C, 2014), 
http://ovc.ncjrs.gov/ncvrw2014/pdf/Landmarks.pdf. 
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Beyond the procedural constraints on the testimony of the aggrieved, there are constraints 
that arise as a result of victim impact statements being framed as an extension of the prosecution’s 
case. Victims are understood by the court to be working in support of the prosecution. This is an 
understanding that manifests in practice: The prosecution is in charge of notifying victims, 
organizing and reviewing the testimony of the aggrieved, and submitting it to the judge in the states 
that require it.33 It also manifests in the ideological conception of victim impact statements as in 
support of the harshest sentence. Recall Justice Scalia’s justification of Payne on the grounds of 
creating “balance” between mitigation and aggravation testimony. He argued that allowing only the 
mitigation testimony without the testimony of then aggrieved silences the pro-death penalty side, 
and thus leads to an unfair debate. Scalia’s assumption is that the victim impact statements are 
necessarily an attempt to show aggravation as a counter to the defense’s mitigation of blame.  
The practical and ideological alignment of the prosecution and the aggrieved delimit the 
testimony of the aggrieved by creating circumstances where the testimony of the aggrieved is 
enlisted to show harm for the sake of demonstrating aggravation, and thus moving towards a 
harsher sentence.34 This means that the aggrieved are confined to testifying to the harms they 
experienced as a result of the murder and the qualities that made the victim’s life meaningful. This is 
important testimony, but it is nonetheless restrictive. The aggrieved has no opportunity to testify to 
what they need in terms of ongoing support for recovery. The focus on building a case against the 
defendant trumps the potential for building ongoing support for the aggrieved.  
 There is a mismatch between expansive testimony that speaks to the full extent of the harm 
the aggrieved person experienced as well as their conception of recovery in the aftermath of murder 
and the testimony allowed in victim impact statements. The problem with victim impact statements 																																																								
33 “Victims do not presently have party status at trial in any jurisdiction in the United States. In most state jurisdictions 
and in federal court, victims may hire attorneys. These privately funded prosecutors are under the control of the public 
prosecutor and participate at trial with the prosecutor’s permission.” Beloof, “Third Model of Criminal Process,” 320. 
34 This leads to problematic exclusions of aggrieved people who do not meet the prosecutor’s requirement for “good 
victims.” There is research on the exclusion of people of color from the victim status in the criminal justice system. One 
can speculate that the reason that prosecutors are statistically more likely to comply with victim rights statutes in the 
cases of white victims is because of the racist orientation of the criminal justice system: The testimony of aggrieved 
people of color is less likely to call forth sympathy from sentencing authorities than that of aggrieved persons who are 
white. See Julie A. Beck, “Victims’ Rights and Public Safety? Unmasking Racial Politics in Crime Discourses 
Surrounding Parole Revocation for ‘Lifers’ in California,” Western Criminology Review 11, no. 1 (2010): 20–36; Norman S. 
Early, Jr., “Racial Minorities for Victim Justice,” April 17, 2000, http://www.nvcap.org/docs/letters/rmvj.htm.There are 
also instances where the prosecutorial orientation of victim impact statements led to the exclusion of testimony from 
aggrieved persons with anti-death penalty commitments. See Murder Victims Family for Reconciliation, BRIEF OF 
AMICUS CURIA ON WRIT APPLICATION FROM THE DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, No. 
10258-02, accessed April 14, 2016; Wayne A. Logan, “Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror,” Georgetown 
Law Journal 96, no. 3 (2008 2007): 750–51.   
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has similarities with the problem I identified in discourses of closure in my previous chapter: There 
is a conception that the needs of the aggrieved are satisfied by a singular rather than ongoing form 
of support. In the case of closure, that satisfaction is said to come with the harsh punishment of the 
perpetrator. In the case of victim impact statements, the satisfaction is said to come with an 
opportunity to address the court. Advocates of closure and victim impact statements alike fail to 
extend institutional measures to ongoing reparation and memorialization beyond what the criminal 
trial offers given its focus on determining punishment for the perpetrator. The attempt to fit victim 
support within the framework of criminal trials undermines the potential richness that would come 
with proceedings focused on serving victims alone.  
 Advocates of victim impact statements might agree with my characterizations of the 
limitations of victim impact statements, but nonetheless suggest that those limitations are justifiable 
trade-offs for the ability to take part in the memorializing function that trials are endowed with. I 
disagree. I will distinguish and respond to two reasons that advocates might make this claim: First, 
there are those who are seeking acknowledgement of victim status in an institutional setting that is 
knowledgeable about the circumstances of the crime and prepared to confer that recognition upon 
the aggrieved. I take this conception of the good of victim impact statements to be a more general 
expression of the good of the testimony of the aggrieved in a forum that is friendly to it. Today, 
criminal trials are the central mode of bringing together a polity around murder, so it is no 
coincidence that this is where advocates focus their attention. However, I see no principled reason 
why these advocates would remain tied to victim impact statements if there were an alternative 
forum that could confer such acknowledgement on those aggrieved by murder with the possibility 
of more expansive testimony and response. 
 The second reason that an advocate of victim impact statements might contend that 
limitations on the testimony of the aggrieved are justifiable trade-offs for participation in criminal 
trials is that they see sentences as expressions of the worth of victims. The aggrieved person wants 
to contribute to the prosecutorial effort to get the harshest sentence because that sentence is a 
declaration of the value of the life of the victim. I take up aspects of this claim in my fourth chapter, 
but for now I argue that such a claim is a symptom of circumstances where aggrieved persons lack 
diverse opportunities to see the enormity of their grief and outrage reflected in socio-political life. In 
the case of murder, which constitutes an extraordinary trespass on socio-political norms, it makes 
sense that aggrieved persons would seek solidarity with others in the acknowledgement of the 
wrong. The criminal trial stands as the central opportunity for this acknowledgement at present. But, 
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the criminal trial is not the best forum for such acknowledgement: The aim of the criminal trial is to 
deliberate on evidence and decide on questions of the defendant’s guilt and punishment. Criminal trials 
are focused on alleged criminals, so the acknowledgement of the enormity of the aggrieved’s grief 
and outrage is indirect. If we give sentences too much power to memorialize and affirm the value of 
those lost to murder, we give it over to an institutional forum that can—even in the best of 
circumstances—come to a decision on a punishment that reflects factors that have little to do with 
the seriousness of the crime.35  
 I do not deny that court sentences are potent signals of socio-political valuations of the life 
of the victim. This is especially true when the sentences reflect the hierarchical ordering of persons 
present in socio-political arrangements at large. When the police officer who murdered Akai Gurley 
received a sentence of 800 hours of community service and five years of probation rather than a 
prison sentence,36 such punishment stands as an affirmation of an already established pattern of 
courts unwilling to hold police officers accountable for taking the lives of Black men. Most who kill 
by recklessly shooting a gun, fail to render adequate aid, and justify such recklessness by reference to 
their fear of the dark and being surprised by the sound of a door closing would not receive such a 
lenient sentence.37 Such a sentence gives the officer the opportunity to live where he pleases, remain 
with his family, and rebuild his life according to his own lights. This leniency is taken as an 
expression of the value of the life of the police officer and the devaluation of the life of Akai Gurley. 
For those aggrieved, the sentence suggests that Akai Gurley’s life was not sufficiently valuable to 
warrant a harsher sentence.38 It signals that the police officer’s life is too valuable to impose a 
sentence that would have disrupted his autonomy. 
 In the case of those aggrieved by Gurley’s death, it makes sense to suggest that victim impact 
statements would be desirable. Victim impact statements would allow them to affirm the value of his 
life by speaking to the gravity of their loss. This expression calls on the court to acknowledge the 
gravity of that loss by holding the police officer accountable. When the court’s sentence does not 
																																																								
35 Mitigating factors can involve issues from the convicted person’s past while aggravating factors can be the defendant’s 
criminal record, for instance.  
36 Alan Feuer, “Ex-New York Officer Gets 5 Years of Probation in Fatal Brooklyn Shooting,” The New York Times, April 
19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/nyregion/peter-liang-ex-new-york-police-officer-sentenced-akai-
gurley-shooting-death-brooklyn.html. 
37 Sarah Maslin Nir, “Officer Peter Liang, on Stand, Breaks Down as He Recalls Brooklyn Killing,” The New York Times, 
February 8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/nyregion/officer-peter-liang-in-emotional-testimony-
describes-the-night-of-a-fatal-shooting.html. 
38 In response to the sentence, Mr. Gurley’s aunt, Hertencia Peterson said, “There is no justice! Akai Gurley’s life didn’t 
matter!” Feuer, “Ex-New York Officer Gets 5 Years of Probation in Fatal Brooklyn Shooting.” 
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reflect the gravity of that loss, it is troublesome that there are no alternative institutional fora for 
such grief to be reflected. Without such a forum, aggrieved persons are made to rely on the criminal 
trial alone to yield institutional recognition for their loss.  
 An alternative forum devoted to testimony and the ongoing support of aggrieved persons 
could provide direct acknowledgement and action on behalf of aggrieved persons in the aftermath 
of their loss. This is not to say that the outrage at the injustice of sentences that fail to hold 
defendants accountable for violence would be diminished by such a forum. Such a forum could take 
on support for resisting injustice in the criminal justice system. But more centrally, this forum would 
allow for separation of the function of memorializing the one who was lost to murder from the 
function of deciding on the guilt and punishment of the one convicted. If those functions are 
separated, and the forms of support available for aggrieved persons were to proliferate in that 
alternative forum, the weight of memorializing the gravity of loss would no longer belong to the 
criminal trial alone. I would hope that aggrieved persons would no longer feel so driven towards 
seeing harsh punishment as the central means of socio-political memorialization. I would hope that 
they would no longer be willing to trade-off meaningful support for living in the aftermath of 
violence for the possibility of influencing the defendant’s sentence. It would offer a socio-political 
affirmation of the value of Gurley’s life such that it would not be entirely indexed to whether or not 
the officer received a harsh enough sentence. 
My contention that there is a need for alternative fora for testimony motivated by the 
shortcomings of victim impact statements as a response to those who are aggrieved by murder. If 
the testimony of the aggrieved is limited to victim impact statements as they are presently construed, 
the service that the criminal justice system can render to aggrieved persons is too limited. The 
testimony of aggrieved persons will be constrained by procedural principles of fairness. It is limited 
to serving the prosecution’s aim of arguing for a harsher sentence. It is not taken up for the 
purposes of serving the needs and pain of the aggrieved. Finally, the memorialization of the victim 
that takes place within the criminal trial is limited to acknowledgement that they have suffered 
wrongs and that they are worthy of respect by virtue of the sentence handed down. Judicial 
decisions are unreliable markers of the worth of the victim of murder. There needs to be alternative 
opportunities to affirm the worth of victims of murder. 
Section IV: Alternative Fora for The Testimony of the Aggrieved 
 Against the contentions of victims’ rights advocates—such as Erez and Cassell—who 
suggest that the aims of reparative support of aggrieved people can be achieved within the confines 
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of the criminal proceedings, I have argued that the procedural and adversarial context of those 
proceedings undermines the provision of meaningful reparative support for aggrieved persons. An 
alternative forum for testimony of the aggrieved would allow for testimony, response, and 
memorialization of victims focused on their redress and recovery. In this section, I will put forward 
the normative requirements of a forum that would serve the ends of redress and recovery. In my 
previous chapter, I defined redress and recovery through the lens of Du Boisian contribution. I 
suggested that the criminal justice system can support contribution through the provision of 
resources with which the aggrieved can make testimony that shapes the ongoing support they 
receive in the aftermath of death of a loved one by murder.  By normative guidelines, I mean the 
conditions which a good-enough forum must meet. They are also the conditions upon which the 
forum can be criticized.  
 Before I outline those normative guidelines, I will offer a clearer picture of how I envision 
this forum. I will set out to answer: Who will be present for these proceedings and what will the 
responsibilities be for the participants? These proceedings will be attended—first and foremost—by 
aggrieved persons. The requirements for who can participate as an aggrieved person will be widely 
interpreted—this can refer to family, friends, and community members. Those closest to the 
aggrieved will be eligible for the widest array of support services.  
The proceedings will be attended by people who choose to act in support of the aggrieved: 
They may be persons who are related to the aggrieved but not as seriously impacted. They may be 
persons who have themselves suffered loss and feel compelled to support others in their experience 
of loss. They may be members of the community who are for any reasons compelled to support 
persons through their experience of grief. I could imagine a civil volunteer programs like 
Americorps or Senior Corps where volunteers could be called upon to gather, hear the testimony of 
the aggrieved, and devise plans for ongoing support, memorialization, and learning. Roles and 
responsibilities post-victims’ forum will be shared according to factors such as availability and 
proximity to the aggrieved. An official trained to preside will be responsible for maintaining the 
order of the proceedings and upholding the norms of the forum. Grief counselors would assist the 
aggrieved in organizing their testimony, support the supporters, and assist in the organization of 
post-forum roles and responsibilities. 
The first requirement is that these fora acknowledge the status of the aggrieved as harmed 
and requiring redress. Above, I suggested that this is possible in the court setting insofar as those in 
the courtroom have already deliberated on evidence of guilt and have established beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that a harm occurred. The court was thus ready to acknowledge the aggrieved in a 
way that is not possible in everyday life. This acknowledgement was underlined by the legal-political 
authority invested in the court. In the proceedings I envision, the acknowledgement of victim-status 
of the aggrieved comes by virtue of the founding intentions of the forum. These fora are established 
for the sake of organizing a community to come together for the sake of persons who have been 
victimized by murder. Thus, the aggrieved person walks into the room surrounded by persons 
present for the purposes of supporting them.  
Against the background of a U.S. culture not adequately prepared to assist those aggrieved 
by murder through an arduous grieving process (as we saw in Coleman’s testimony above), these 
fora would provide a place for people to come together to learn to create that support. Grief 
counselors would assist supporters in maintaining their well-being: Helping to create balance so that 
supporters can maintain compassion for the struggle of the aggrieved without being overcome by 
the grief they are there to support. When the expressions of grief take the form of intense anger 
towards the perpetrator or others. When that anger is directed at the supporters themselves, 
supporters may need help maintaining their commitment or reinterpreting their role. If this support 
is present, it makes it more likely that the support for the aggrieved will persist over time.  
If there is persistent support for the aggrieved, there is the opportunity to create 
acknowledgement of grief through concerted action. In the court, there is acknowledgement insofar 
as one is listened to by a group of individuals versed in the details of the harm. In the forum, 
acknowledgement of testimony would be delivered via reliable communal action in response to it. 
This means that the aggrieved person would have greater responsibility. Given that there are no 
procedural questions of fairness to be faced by defendants, they would be free to address any harms 
they wish to. They are also free to memorialize the victim in any ways they wished to. But here, they 
would be responsible for testifying regarding the forms of support that they believe would help in 
creating recovery. Grief counselors can provide assistance in this work in accordance with group 
cultural, political, religious, or psychological traditions.  
In sentencing proceedings, direct institutional acknowledgement of testimony is 
communicated through the possible (but not guaranteed) citation of judges in their decisions. 
Otherwise, acknowledgement comes by indirect modes, such as interpreting the defendant’s 
sentence as a vindication of the testimony. The fora I propose would offer institutional 
acknowledgement of testimony by devoting resources to institutional reform developed out of the 
testimony in the fora. The testimonies given in these fora would offer a basis for recommendations 
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on topics of interest to the aggrieved: Prevention of future iterations of the violence their loved ones 
faced, recommendations on victim rights’ procedures in criminal proceedings, recommendations for 
reform of the proceedings of fora for the aggrieved. Federal and state panels would be convened to 
investigate testimony and highlight the elements of testimony useful for institutional reform. 
The second requirement is that these fora restore trust that has been undermined in the 
experience of traumatic violence. I first wish to define the notion of trust at stake as the assumption 
that the norms of respecting our bodily and emotional boundaries will be respected.39 This is a norm 
that aims to allow us to pursue everyday endeavors without excessive fear. After her experience of 
rape and attempted murder, Susan Brison writes, “...I felt, for the first time in my life, like I had a 
perceptual deficit—not the blurred vision from the detached vitreous, but, rather, the more 
hazardous lack of eyes in the back of my head.”40 In the aftermath of the experience of trauma, 
Brison feels the loss of her sense of safety in the world. Before, there was a sense that those who 
were in the periphery could be expected to respect her person. Now, there is fear of whoever is in 
that periphery such that they must undergo some scrutiny before they can be considered safe.  
Murder also undermines that norm of trust and general benevolence in a vicious way. Once 
this norm is undermined, questions arise for aggrieved persons about what people that surround 
them are capable of.  The questions that aggrieved persons have around the risk posed by their 
fellow human beings mirror those of Brison in the aftermath the rape and attempted murder she 
experienced. In their study of a sample of persons aggrieved by murder, a majority of participants in 
Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. Umbreit’s Assessing the Ultimate Impact of the Ultimate Penal 
Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison” identified issues trusting others in the aftermath 
of murder.41 One aggrieved person wrote:  
I don’t trust people. I’m very leery or wondering what it is they’re after or what 
they’re up to. It’s like I know going down the street that you can look at people—
and it’s more men—and they can look normal, but they’re not. How am I supposed 
to know this man is okay and this man isn’t? I think it shatters a lot of your belief in 
the goodness of humanity. That some human could do this [murder] for nothing.42  
 
In the aftermath of traumatic violence, others who were assumed to be benign or benevolent are 																																																								
39 See Walker, Moral Repair, 23. 
40 Susan J. Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 14. 
41 The study compared aggrieved persons in Minnesota with those in Texas. All aggrieved persons in Minnesota reported 
issues with trust over the 16-year span over which the study was conducted. Sixty percent of Texans reported trust issues 
over the 16-year span. Armour and Umbreit, “Assessing the Ultimate Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on 
Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison,” 113. 
42 Ibid., 77. 
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now assumed to be threats. According to the study, this general distrust persists whether or not the 
perpetrator is incarcerated. The threat that was embodied by the individual perpetrators of rape and 
murder become globalized in a way that affects the victim’s/aggrieved’s ability to live and interact 
with the world.  
Although fora for the aggrieved cannot hope to restore trust to their pre-trauma levels, they 
can affirm respect for bodily and emotional boundaries. They can offer a place where vulnerability 
can be refigured through supportive response. Murder and rape are acts of exploiting bodily 
vulnerability. In the context of a forum for the aggrieved, the vulnerability conveyed through 
testimony is a means by which to build a supportive community. Vulnerability becomes an effective 
call for support. Fora thus enact the relationship to vulnerability that would obtain in the world as it 
should be. This follows Margaret Urban Walker’s contention that reparation programs must be an 
“exemplification of the rectified relationship in the present and future that could, if sustained, 
become the basis for acceptable and stable moral, civil, and political relations.”43 Walker emphasizes 
the temporal aspects of this requirement: It is for the sake of assuring adequately respectful 
proceedings in the present and to assure that this relationship will obtain in the future. Although 
Walker is speaking specifically of reparations made by perpetrators for victims/aggrieved people, I 
see this temporal aspect as key. In the fora I propose, the responsive relationship to vulnerability is 
meant to guide the tenor of the proceedings and to show that this relationship to vulnerability is 
possible in the world outside of the forum. As opposed to what courts offer, the aggrieved are not 
only respectfully listened to. Their words are catalysts to action in response. 
Towards this end, it is critical that the forum’s facilitator take up strategies to build trust 
among members of the forum. This calls for clear expectations around the forum, particularly with 
regard to the responsibilities of supporters. The questions are: How do we define witnessing for the 
purposes of these fora? To what extend do supporters have a responsibility to act in light of the 
testimony of the aggrieved? This second question is especially relevant when the aggrieved person 
expresses the desire for vengeance against the perpetrator.  
The third requirement of the forum is that witnessing serve as a means to facilitate recovery 
of the aggrieved. This means first assisting the aggrieved in dealing with the ways that grief 
interrupts everyday life. This work challenges the isolation that often comes with loss. It affirms that 																																																								
43 Margaret Urban Walker, “The Expressive Burden of Reparations: Putting Meaning into Money, Words, and Things,” 
in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, ed. Alice MacLachlan and Allen Speight (Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands, 2013), 217. 
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there is a community that is prepared to check-in and care for the aggrieved as they recover. Second, 
witnessing means memorializing the life of the victim and affirming their value. This is the creation 
of a lasting artifact from the pain of loss. It is an opportunity for the aggrieved to channel pain into 
something beautiful and have a community of people who are prepared to assist in the process of 
creation. Third, witnessing means advocating for socio-political knowledge that comes out of the 
testimony and the experience of participating in the forum. This is the work of contextualizing the 
violence experienced in a socio-political context where murder is a social phenomenon that is nearly 
guaranteed to reoccur. Such context opens connection to a community of aggrieved persons in the 
past, present, and future who have asked important questions regarding murder: What are the means 
by which we might resist repetition of violence as a community?44 What are the means by which we 
might come together to provide greater support for aggrieved people in the aftermath of murder? 
This three-step process facilitates recovery by assisting the aggrieved with coming out of the 
isolation of grief and moving into community that shares the burden of creating artifacts and 
legacies that make healing meaning and teachings out of grief.  
The fourth requirement is that there be a division of labor among supporters. This will make 
the support offered more sustainable as it limits individual burnout and brings about the sharing of 
heavy responsibilities. I envision supporters hearing testimony and then offering their assistance in 
the processes of grieving, memorialization, or socio-political advocacy. Although there should be 
considerations given to relatively equal distribution of responsibility, this decision of where to 
contribute would belong to supporters. The responsibility of supporters is to acknowledge and enact 
support for the testimony of the aggrieved; but they also would be present as teachers and learners. 
An aspect of this teaching and learning would be sharing or expanding their own experiences with 
grief and recovery. This forum calls forth the knowledge and curiosity of supporters for the 
purposes of recovery, rather than for simply taking supporters to be subject to whatever demands 
are articulated in testimony. 
The fifth requirement is that the forum’s participants not act on testimony calling for 
vengeance against perpetrators. The aggrieved would be assured that their anger and desire for 
vengeance have a place in the forum. The supporters would be there to create respectful space for 
such articulations. The supporters could express solidarity and understanding of those emotions. 
They could express that their conviction that those expressions are justified. But, the focus of the 																																																								
44 Shelley Neiderbach and Susan Iwansowski, Invisible Wounds: Crime Victims Speak (New York: Routledge, 1986); Acker 
and Karp, Wounds That Do Not Bind: Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty. 
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action of the supporters would not be aimed at enacting anger and desire for vengeance.  
There are multiple commitments that undergird this limitation on the actions of participants. 
First, acting on desires for vengeance undermines the third of the forum’s requirement that the 
forum be dedicated to the recovery of the aggrieved. In my previous chapter, I argued that the relief 
that harsh punishment offers is undermined by the vicissitudes of traumatic experience. Second, the 
proceedings of the criminal court are already focused on the appropriate punishment of the 
defendant. The forum I propose should not duplicate the court’s proceedings. Nor would it become 
a staging ground for advocating for a certain punishment for the perpetrator. Although, the 
perpetrator and their fate often looms large in the testimony of aggrieved persons, the aim of these 
proceedings are organized to directly support aggrieved persons rather than duplicate the indirect 
support where the perpetrator’s treatment is said to create redress for the aggrieved. Finally, this 
quest for vengeance would undermine the sixth requirement, which I will explicate below, that the 
forum be committed to teaching and learning under the heading of “contribution.” Taking up grief 
as a ground for contribution means working from grief towards richer modes of living together. 
Acting for vengeance and out of anger undermines contribution by bringing a community together 
for the sake of doing harm to another. This not only creates more victimization that will require 
more efforts of recovery, but it brings a community together for the sake of denying the potential 
contribution of another. 
The highest aim of this proposed forum is the affirmation of the aggrieved as a teacher of 
their experience and of the knowledge they have gained living in the aftermath of traumatic loss. 
Each of the dimensions of the forum’s responsibilities calls for a distinct form of learning such that 
teaching is possible. Resources would be offered to aggrieved persons in support of their testimony. 
In speaking to the dimensions of grief, as we saw in Charisse Coleman’s testimony, there is the 
opportunity to express the full range of challenges. The experiences of insomnia, depression, 
inability to take joy in formerly pleasurable activities, and friendships and support networks unable 
to bear the burden of prolonged and complicated grief are common. A skill required on the part of 
the aggrieved is the ability to articulate somatic and emotional experiences in testimony. Beyond the 
ability to articulate the experience of grief, aggrieved persons would be called to articulate a pathway 
to recovery. This means offering a map of forms of support that would open possibilities for coping 
with stress; building a reliable support network; identifying sensitive days like holidays and birthdays 
and the kind of support that would be welcomed.   
Towards the creation of memorials, I envision resources to support the aggrieved in creating 
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narratives around the person lost to murder: These resources could take the form of assistance in 
identifying a trait that the aggrieved person wishes to integrate into their own life and put forward as 
a trait for others to integrate into their own lives. These resources could take the form of supplies or 
funds to create a public artifact or public memorial event for the victim of murder. These resources 
could take the form of facilitating everyday rituals for remembrance, aspects of which could be 
shared and practiced by participants in the forum. These practices reinterpret the memorials that are 
normally limited to private religious contexts and bring them into a socio-political context. Thus, the 
audience and meanings of the memorializing expand beyond the community that would come 
together and mourn deaths under circumstances that human beings are more prepared for.  
Towards the creation of socio-political contributions, I envision resources to support the 
aggrieved in orienting their resistance to the repetition of violence. These are resources of socio-
political education that assist aggrieved persons in making connections among social, political, and 
economic factors and the murder that has touched their lives. This learning would reveal the general 
dynamics of violence of which the murder they experienced is an instance. For example, if the 
murder took place within a context of gender violence, relevant political education could take the 
form of connecting aggrieved persons to traditions of teaching and learning on this historical socio-
political epidemic. The aggrieved person would be supported in becoming a teacher of the effects 
and meanings of the particular form of violence they experienced. Their advocacy in resisting the 
repetition of such violence would connect them to a larger community that shares their 
commitment.  
Although these fora prohibit seeking a harsh sentence for the perpetrator, they allow socio-
political critique which aims to resist repetition of certain forms of violence through, among other 
means, holding perpetrators accountable. In the case of Akai Gurley cited above, the forum would 
provide an opportunity for aggrieved persons and participants to come together and advocate 
against police violence against Black communities the police are supposed to serve. The work 
towards a harsher sentence for the officer who murdered Akai Gurley would be excluded from the 
forum. This is meant to distinguish the work of socio-political advocacy from advocacy for 
particular outcomes in individual cases. These fora would also allow for socio-political advocacy to 
be pursued on behalf of aggrieved persons as a group.. This would be an instance of reflecting on 
one’s treatment as an aggrieved person in the criminal justice system and seeking to develop the 
good and to transform that which was deficient. 
 These fora are an opportunity for members of a polity to be in dynamic relation to lineages 
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of memorializing the dead and supporting the bereaved. These are opportunities, in the most general 
sense, to affirm social bonds (shared grief over the one who is lost) and create new social bonds (out 
of the support rendered in a time of extraordinary vulnerability). For participants who are less 
intimately connected with the grief at stake, this forum is an opportunity to take part in the process 
of learning from the aggrieved such that the supporters would be able to bring their insights back 
into their own traditions of responding to grieving and murder. It is not only an opportunity for 
supporters and aggrieved persons to build on these traditions, but also an opportunity for them to 
make contributions from their traditions to the process of recovery for those aggrieved by murder. 
With the interactions of the demands of the aggrieved, the traditions of the aggrieved, and the 
traditions of supporters, there would be many opportunities within the fora for participants to make 
contributions to the community’s provision of support for the aggrieved. I envision these fora as 
opportunities to come together around grief that open our imagination about support and recovery 
from murder beyond the limited means offered by the criminal justice system.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that victim impact statements offer a deficient form of support 
to aggrieved persons. I have located this deficiency in the context in which such testimony takes 
place. The procedural restraints of equal protection under the law and consistency of sentencing, 
among others, limit what the aggrieved can say in their testimony and how the testimony of 
aggrieved persons is interpreted and responded to. As the only socio-political forum that is deeply 
engaged with responsibility and redress in the aftermath of murder, I have argued that criminal 
proceedings are invested with a burden that they are not prepared to take on adequately: The 
affirmation of the worth of the life of the victim. I’ve presented an alternative forum for responding 
to the aggrieved that would allow for expansive testimony and ongoing community support for 
those aggrieved by murder. I contend that such a forum can more adequately carry the burden of 
affirming the value of the victim and creating meaningful memorials that meet the criteria of 
contribution that I offered in the previous chapter.  
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Chapter IV 
The Retributive Demands of the Aggrieved: Jean Améry’s Challenge to Forward-Looking 
Conceptions of Victim Reparation 
 
In previous chapters, I have argued—contrary to many advocates of closure through 
punishment and victim impact statements—that we should separate the processes of supporting the 
aggrieved and punishing the defendant. I have argued that we can satisfy meaningful dimensions of 
redress for aggrieved persons without reference to the fate of the perpetrator. In this chapter, I 
explicate and respond to a counterargument from Jean Améry who argues in his essay 
“Resentments”1 that we should not separate support for the aggrieved from treatment of the 
perpetrator. For him, traumatic experience should be interpreted as a moral experience, one that 
makes moral demands that perpetrators be held accountable for their crimes. Release from the stuck 
temporality of trauma comes only with the satisfaction of those moral demands. Accountability for 
crime, in Améry’s thought, is first and foremost delivered when perpetrators are subjected to 
punitive measures. Thus, punitive measures against perpetrators stand as the primary means of 
opening the possibility of moral recovery for persons aggrieved or victimized by crime.  
Although I deny Améry’s claim that the perpetrator’s accountability is the only means by 
which to bring about moral recovery for persons who suffer traumatic loss, I take seriously his 
contention that moral demands for perpetrator accountability are of critical importance to many 
aggrieved persons. In contradistinction to other views I have considered throughout this project, 
Améry does not see punishment of perpetrators as a means by which to satisfy needs—such as 
support for grief or an affirmation of the value of the life of the victim—that could be satisfied 
through communities coming together in support of the aggrieved. Perpetrator accountability 
satisfies an essential demand of the experience of traumatic loss.  
To meet the challenge of integrating this demand for perpetrator accountability without 
trespassing my commitment to separating support for aggrieved persons from punitive proceedings, 
I propose integrating perpetrator testimony into the fora I have proposed. In Améry’s conception of 
collective testimonial responsibility-taking for Germans in the aftermath of the Holocaust, I find a 
notion of perpetrator testimony that could satisfy demands for accountability without requiring 
punishment. I argue that this testimony should not be limited to collective crimes, but that 																																																								
1 Jean Améry, “Resentments,” in At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities, trans. Michel 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 62–81. 
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perpetrators taking responsibility for their crimes, no matter what they are guilty of, allows 
victimized and aggrieved persons to hear articulations of remorse, truth, and the circumstances 
around the crime. In addition to the satisfaction of moral demands delivered by such testimony, it 
also has the possibility to deliver distinct goods that go beyond moral demands for accountability. 
For instance, this testimony may allow victimized and aggrieved persons to settle lingering questions 
and gain perspective on the stakes of the violence they suffered. This knowledge can contribute to 
restoration of trust and a more nuanced perspective on why the violence was committed. I thus 
conclude with a call for institutions of criminal justice to pursue a hybrid approach whereby punitive 
accountability is balanced with encouragement of discursive accountability.  
Section I: Linking Améry’s Demands with those of Aggrieved Persons 
Before delving into Améry’s counterargument, I want to briefly elaborate and justify an 
assumption that guides my work in this chapter: That we can take Améry’s articulations on 
resentment in the aftermath of the Holocaust and translate them as demands of those who are 
aggrieved by murder. It might seem as if there is a problematic gap between the experience and 
demands that someone would make in the aftermath of being tortured in the context of genocide 
and being aggrieved by murder. I will respond to two reasons that one might be skeptical of my 
translation of moral demands from Améry’s context to that of this dissertation. I will also justify my 
terminological shift from “aggrieved person” in previous chapters to “victimized person” in this 
chapter to capture the continuities between Améry’s experience and the experience of persons 
aggrieved by murder.  
First, it might seem as if I am conflating the experience of being directly victimized by crime 
with the experience of being aggrieved by crime. Although there are many important distinctions to 
be made between being victimized by crime and being a survivor of one whose life is lost due to 
crime, the lens of traumatic experience provides a connection between these disparate experiences. 
Although Améry does not use the language of “trauma” to describe these experiences, the temporal 
experience that he describes of being stuck in the past is one that is mirrored in the experience of 
many who experience the symptomology of what is presently called post-traumatic stress syndrome. 
Insofar as a large majority of those who experience the murder of a loved one suffer such 
symptoms, there is a shared relationship to temporality that creates, for Améry, a shared moral 
experience of revolt against currents that orient non-traumatized persons to the present and future. 
The focus for Améry is not with the experience of being directly victimized by crime, but the 
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relationship to the event of the crime. This is a relationship that directly victimized persons and 
aggrieved persons share.  
Second, one might worry about conflating the forms of redress proper to the circumstance 
of being a victim of a genocidal socio-political movement and to those proper to being the subject 
of a domestic crime. In the case of genocide, for instance, the institutional legal/socio-political 
responses to victims remain a work in progress. These programs were positively novel in 1966 when 
Améry published the essays that I focus on in this chapter. Cases of murder, on the other hand, are 
handled according to a well-established legal and socio-political precedents. Although Améry 
reckons with the problem of establishing justice and accountability for genocide, his focus remains 
on redressing the moral injury that he suffers during and in the aftermath of torture. As I have 
suggested above, the character of this moral injury is shared with all who suffer an irreparable injury 
or loss that they continually relive. This is an experience from which they cannot separate 
themselves by acts of will. Fortunetely for my considerations, Améry distinguishes between what 
would be acceptable punishment for a harm that was limited to a singular criminal act and one that 
is done in a genocidal socio-political context. I engage with this distinction in the fourth section of 
this chapter. 
In order to capture continuities between traumatic experiences of Améry being tortured in 
Auschwitz and the experience of being aggrieved by murder, I will use the term “victimized person” 
rather than “aggrieved person” or “victim.” Those aggrieved by murder experience victimization 
insofar as they are confronted with unexpected loss of a loved one as a result of a perpetrator’s 
crime. Aggrieved persons are not victims of crime as Améry and their loved ones are, but they share 
psychic wounds that come from unwarranted and unexpected traumatic experience. It is in this 
shared experience that I derive the relevant sense of victimization.  
Section II: The Moral Demands of Traumatic Experience 
I have so far interpreted traumatic experience in the aftermath of murder as an experience of 
vulnerability that calls for community support for the recovery of the aggrieved. By recovery, I have 
referred to the process by which aggrieved persons transform anger and grief into artifacts of 
testimony and memorialization. I have called on institutions of criminal justice to move beyond the 
proceedings on guilt and sentencing to create a forum that provides community support towards 
those ends of recovery.  Throughout, I have claimed that it is possible to separate the support for 
the aggrieved living in the aftermath of murder from the punishment that a state levels upon 
perpetrators of crime. In this section, I will interpret Améry’s account of the moral demands of 
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resentment as a counterargument to my notion of recovery and the separation of the juridical and 
victim-support proceedings. I will explicate his argument that the only adequate response to 
traumatic experience is backwards-looking and thus focused on the treatment of the perpetrator. 
Améry grounds the aggrieved persons’ articulations of anger at the perpetrator and desire for 
vengeance, which I spoke of in my third chapter, in the experience of resentment. He connects 
resentment to the stuck temporality of trauma that I identified in my second chapter. Resentment is 
analogized to holding a grudge in opposition to the biological, social, and political sense of the 
future as the potentiality for healing and reparation.2 As a survivor of torture in Auschwitz, he 
neither can nor desires to “[let] time heal his wounds.” In the effort to define resentment, he writes: 
In pondering this question, it did not escape me that resentment is not only an 
unnatural condition but also a logically inconsistent one. It nails every one of us onto 
the cross of his ruined past. Absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned 
around, that the event be undone. Resentment blocks the exit to the genuine human 
dimension, the future. I know that the time-sense of the person trapped in 
resentment is twisted around, disordered, if you wish, because it desires two 
impossible things: regression into the past and nullification of what happened. [...] In 
any event, for this reason the man of resentment cannot join in the unisonous peace 
chorus all around him, which cheerfully proposes: not backward, let us look but 
forward, to a better common future.3 
 
When Améry describes the genuine human dimension of the future as impossible, I understand it as 
a claim about the restriction of imaginative possibilities available in the aftermath of traumatic 
experience. For Améry, the imagination that is required to ground reconstructive future-oriented 
thinking in the aftermath of traumatic experience is blocked. The traumatized person is left behind 
in their experience, repeatedly saying this should not have been done, this must be undone.  For Améry, these 
are the central demands that follow from traumatic experience. This focus on the past opens up a 
gap between those who are traumatized and those who are less affected by that harm: Those who 
have been affected by traumatic experience are blocked from the possibility of accepting that this 
harm has happened and from imagining how to organize life in its aftermath. This is a notion of 
traumatic experience that resists my call for the integration of the lessons learned from that 
traumatic experience into a vision of the future. Améry suggests those aggrieved persons are likely 
incapable of taking up the imaginative capacities required for such testimony. 
In his essay “Torture,” Améry describes how traumatic experience breaks the distinction 																																																								
2 Améry sees the biological, social, and political realms as continuous insofar as their ends are the stable reproduction of 
life and community.  
3 Améry, “Resentments,” 68. 
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between past, present, and future. He writes: 
It was over for a while. It still is not over. Twenty-two years later I am still dangling 
by dislocated arms, panting, and accusing myself. In such an instance, there is no 
“repression.” Does one repress an unsightly birthmark? One can have it removed by 
a plastic surgeon, but the skin that is transplanted in its place is not the skin with 
which one feels naturally at ease.4 
 
The victimized person lives a painful contradiction. The harm the victimized person suffered is over 
yet it persists as an everyday reality. For Améry, loneliness and isolation in this non-normative, anti-
social temporality is essential to traumatic experience. Against my conception of resisting isolation, 
this isolation is a dimension of traumatic experience that cannot be avoided through a community 
rallying around the aggrieved. No matter how much the community works at acknowledging the 
gravity of the harm and providing them support, there is a mismatch of temporal orientation that 
creates a serious obstacle for shared reparative projects between traumatized persons and those who 
I’ve called supporters. The aggrieved person remains fixed and returning to the moment of suffering 
the harm while the future-oriented time sense of a community seeks to integrate that harm and the 
experience of it into its present and future.  
In response to isolation in the aftermath of trauma, I have sought to define the conditions 
for a trauma-sensitive community to come together around those who suffer the grief of murder. 
They would be aware of the vicissitudes of traumatic experience: Long periods of grieving, severe 
anger and desire for vengeance, the possibilities of repetition of trauma on non-responsible persons, 
and more. The community I’ve envisioned would be willing to acknowledge feelings of isolation by 
provisions of everyday support, witnessing the testimony of the aggrieved, and guiding them to non-
punitive pathways to recovery. This is a trauma-sensitive version of the ways that communities 
traditionally gather around bereaved persons: There is intentional space made for those suffering 
grief separate from the normal responsibilities of communal life. The aim is to provide support such 
that bereaved persons can take the steps they need to take to return to communal life with its 
responsibilities and rituals. In the aftermath of traumatic loss, I have argued that this return to 
communal life is best sought in a transformative mode. The Du Boisian notion of “contribution” 
captures this. Those who suffer the trauma of murder would not be simply returned to the life they 
had before, but they would have the space to offer testimony as a contribution to reorienting 
communal life according to the lessons of that experience of loss.  																																																								
4 Jean Améry, “Torture,” in At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities, trans. Michel 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 36. 
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 I believe Améry would object to my notion of transformative reintegration of traumatized 
persons into communal life on grounds that the distinction in the time-sense of the aggrieved does 
not call for doubling down on measures to create integration and recovery, but a response to the 
moral demands that are held within the stuck time-sense. Even with my modification of the 
traditional processes of support for grief, there remains an assumption that aggrieved persons 
should take up a future-oriented temporality and could make effort towards it without reference to 
the fate of the perpetrator. On the contrary, Améry suggests the moral demands that are at stake in 
traumatic experience are only met in reference to the accountability of the perpetrator.  
 The context of Améry’s account of the morality of traumatic experience is Germany twenty 
years after the 1945 Nazi surrender. Immediately following the surrender, Améry took comfort in 
the worldwide calls for retribution against Nazi Germany’s leadership and for Germany to become 
the disarmed potato farm of Europe.5 But, soon after, the Cold War set in. The capitalist 
productivity of Germany was the basis of a newfound alliance with North American and European 
powers. This created conditions in which the retributive demands of those formerly at war with 
Nazi Germany faded. In the years before the publication of the essays cited above, the Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem (1961) and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt (1963-5) brought the question of 
German guilt and accountability to the fore. With that, came arguments that victims should forgive 
perpetrators and be satisfied with the justice delivered at Nuremberg and the reparations given to 
the state of Israel  from Germany.6  
Améry finds this push for reconciliatory attitudes in German political and public opinion and 
intellectual circles. According to Hannah Arendt’s account of the context of the 1963-1965 
Frankfurt trial, the German public and the great majority of its judiciary could be still counted on to 
provide safe haven for Nazi war criminals. She finds German public opinion reflected in the 
argument of the Nazis’ defense attorneys that accusations against their clients reflected “not a 
German desire for justice but the world opinion influenced by the victims’ desire for ‘retribution’ 
and ‘vengeance.’7 The prosecution used the image of retributive and vengeful victims as a means to 
delegitimize demands for accountability of perpetrators. They sought to equate justice for Nazi 
perpetrators with the demands of a German public that by and large had no problem living among 																																																								
5 Améry, “Resentments,” 65. 
6 See Thomas Brudholm, “Contextualizing ‘Ressentiments,’” in Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Améry and the Refusal to Forgive 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 71–82. There, Brudholm offers historical expressions for the attitudes 
Améry responds to in his “Resentments” essay. 
7 Hannah Arendt, “Auschwitz on Trial,” in Responsibility and Judgment, Reprint edition (New York: Schocken, 2005), 228. 
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those perpetrators.8 Améry cites publisher Victor Gollancz and Jewish philosopher Martin Buber as 
two influential intellectuals “trembling with the pathos of forgiveness and reconciliation.”9 Others 
believed or sought to assure others that Germany’s generous reparations policy towards the state of 
Israel was sufficient atonement for the sins of National Socialism.10  
Améry finds a common thread within these calls for reconciliation with perpetrators: That 
the anger that comes from facing the irreparable harms of the past should be overcome to meet the 
demands of the present and future. This line of thought adheres whether those who advocate for 
reconciliation do so from a desire to protect war criminals, a Nietzschean commitment to 
interpreting resentment as self-destructive, or a notion that a bombed, pacified, reparations-paying 
Germany has met its obligations to its victims. For Améry, the injunctions to reconcile moralize a 
biological conception of healing: As the wounds of the body heal to allow humans to return to the 
normal functions of life, the gravity of the harms of the past can be overcome for the sake of the 
present and future. Although my notion of reparation differs from the notions of reconciliation 
advocated by Améry’s interlocutors,11 my notion of reparation is also subject to such a claim. I 
advocate for creating circumstances where anger of resentment can be expressed, but like Améry’s 
opponents, I seek that this resentment be transformed into a memorializing contribution for the 
sake of living with others in the present and future.  
Améry contends that deriving morality from the biological process of healing is immoral. He 
writes: 
Whoever submerges his individuality in society and is able to comprehend himself 
only as a function of the social, that is, the insensitive and indifferent person, really 
does forgive. He calmly allows what happened to remain what it was. As the popular 
saying goes, he lets time heal his wounds. His time-sense is dis-ordered, that is to say, 
it has not moved out of the biological and social sphere into the moral sphere.12  
 
When a traumatic harm occurs, a person in the moral sphere is committed to their experience such 
that they demand to make the past right no matter the consequences for the present and future. 
Persons in the immature biological and social spheres are distinguished by their forward-looking 
concerns with the continued and stable existence of the group and/or the individual. Forgiving 																																																								
8 Note also the National Socialist logic at work in the above quote, which suggests that Germans and victims of 
Auschwitz constitute two mutually exclusive groups. 
9 Améry, “Resentments,” 65. 
10 Ibid., 67. 
11 My notion of repair is focused on reconciliation with the world (with the past, with community, with living in the 
future) in the aftermath of trauma. According to Améry’s reading of his interlocutors, they are focused on reconciliation 
with perpetrators. 
12 Améry, “Resentments,” 71. 
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perpetrators or otherwise reconciling with the past creates the possibility of letting go of disruptive 
feelings of anger and desires for vengeance. Without those disruptions, it is easier to take up an 
orientation towards the future and join in the stable personal and communal reproduction of life. 
Those whom Améry criticizes have suffered or witnessed harms that were met with inadequate 
accountability measures, yet they nonetheless chose to move on and live a less disrupted life. 
According to Améry, they sacrificed the moral sense of the gravity of the harm they experienced for 
the sake of getting on with life.  
The moral person faces the damage that was done and holds perpetrators accountable for 
the harms they inflicted whether or not these accountability proceedings have any forward-looking 
benefits for the aggrieved or the society in which they live. Améry defends this moral response to 
the torture he experienced at Auschwitz and speaks to the accountability required in its aftermath: 
Man has the right and the privilege to declare himself to be in disagreement with 
every natural occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings about. 
What happened, happened. This sentence is just as true as it is hostile to morals and 
intellect. The moral power to resist contains the protest, the revolt against reality, 
which is rational only as long as it is moral. The moral person demands the 
annulment of time—in the particular case under question, by nailing the criminal to 
his deed. Thereby, and through a moral turning back of the clock, the latter can join 
his victim as a fellow human being.13 
 
Despite the pressures of living within a social sphere that privileges the future over the past, morality 
demands that the aggrieved and the victimized remain committed to the demands that the past be 
undone. It is the mark of the mature moral being to refuse to submit to the ease that comes with 
accepting the past as something that has happened and requires a movement towards the future. 
Although facing the past in this way might be arduous, holding fast to the gravity and need for 
accountability is the price of taking one’s own moral experience seriously. For Améry, it is the price 
of being an autonomous moral agent rather than one subordinated to forward-looking social and 
biological currents. What have been called symptoms of traumatic stress are better described as a 
moral commitment to protest the failures of others to take the gravity of past harms seriously 
enough. 
 I will focus on Améry’s notion of accountability and reconciliation for the rest of this 
section. I am specifically interested in explicating the claim that “nailing the criminal to his deed” 
meets the demands of Améry’s protest and thus opens the possibility of reconciliation between 
																																																								
13 Ibid. 72. 
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perpetrator and victimized person as well as imaginative access to the future. First, I will look to 
Améry’s account of his support for the execution of one of his torturers. An SS-man named Wajs 
repeatedly beat him on the head with a shovel handle and was “a repeated murderer and especially 
adroit torturer.”14 He writes, “My resentments are there in order that the crime become a moral 
reality for the criminal, that he be swept into the truth of his atrocity.”15 The moral reality of the 
crime is the experience of the revolt against reality: The intense reality of being victimized without 
recourse to assistance. To face this reality with the knowledge that what is happening should not be 
happening. To look back upon the harm and intensely wish and demand that it had not happened. 
To satisfy Améry’s demands, the perpetrator must be brought to this experience. The language of 
“swept” (hineinreißen) implies that such experience is done to the perpetrator from without.16  
In execution, Améry contends that this moral reality becomes shared between perpetrators 
and those who suffered crimes. He writes:  
When SS-man Wajs stood before that firing squad, he experienced the moral truth of 
his crimes. At that moment, he was with me—and I was no longer alone with the 
shovel handle. I would like to believe that at the instant of his execution he wanted 
exactly as much as I to turn back time, to undo what had been done.17 
 
The firing squad brings the perpetrator to the experience of being helpless in the face of violence. 
Améry supposes—he uses the language of “I would like to believe”—that in the face of such 
helplessness, the perpetrator will wish that they did not commit the crime that brought them before 
the firing squad. This supposition is sensible: In execution, the perpetrator’s criminal deeds become 
the condition for whether they live or die. If he had chosen better possibilities than torture and 
murder, Wajs could have lived. But, he chose destruction, which led him to this execution. 
Execution makes the perpetrator’s desire to live continuous with the wish that the past had been 
different.  
 But, why should such shared desire for the past to be different meet the demands of 
Améry’s resentments and be a condition for reconciliation between perpetrator and victim? The key 
is his claim that “The experience of persecution is, at the very bottom, that of an extreme loneliness. 
At stake for me [in Wajs’ punishment] is the release from the abandonment that has persisted from 
																																																								
14 Améry, “Resentments,” 70. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Jean Améry, “Ressentiments,” in Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2015), 127. 
17 Améry, “Resentments,” 70. 
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that time until today.”18 This is loneliness that comes with continuing to live despite living on a 
distinct temporal and moral track than the rest of the world. The protest of trauma is that which 
attempts to break the isolation that comes with an under-acknowledged sense of the gravity of the 
wrong that was committed. In the perpetrator’s execution, Améry finds another whose access to a 
meaningful future also depends on the crime never happening. What Améry seeks is a shared 
experience of the feeling that the ability to live is dependent on the past being different. This is a felt 
need for the past crime to not have happened.  
Perpetrators experiencing the moral truth of their crime, for Améry, is beyond knowing that 
they have done wrong or knowing that that the community condemns what they have done. To 
experience the truth of harm that one has committed is to feel the painful needs and loneliness that 
define living in the aftermath of traumatic experience. Although there are echoes of the retributive 
jus talionis, the eye for an eye, death for a death justification of punishment, the punishment itself 
does not balance the scales of morality. Punishment, for Améry, is a means to create shared 
experience and desire between perpetrators and those victimized by their crimes. The moral 
satisfaction is in the shared moral experience of trauma.  
 The shared moral experience of trauma brings about the possibility of reconciliation by 
shifting the moral identity of the perpetrator. In an already quoted section, Améry writes that this 
shared experience makes it so the perpetrator “can join his victim as a fellow human being.” In the 
section on the SS-man, he writes that “When they led him to the place of execution, the antiman had 
once again become a fellow man.”19 Although Améry doesn’t explicate the language of “antiman” or 
“fellow man,” his claims about torture and Nazism offer an interpretive structure. He writes that 
“torture was the essence of National Socialism...it was precisely in torture that the Third Reich 
materialized in all density of its being.”20 As the antiman, the perpetrator is entirely defined, like Nazi 
Germany, by the violence they/it wrought.21 There is no separation between the crimes they 
wrought and who they are. In terms of this dissertation project, they are incapable of making 
positive contributions because they are defined solely as the destroyers of the potential and actual 
contributions of others. They are not fit for sharing a moral world. 
 Insofar as the perpetrator is held accountable and thus brought to the moment of feeling the 																																																								
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Améry, “Torture,” 30. 
21 He describes National Socialism as the only political system that “not only practiced the rule of the antiman...but had 
expressly established it as a principle.” Ibid., 31. 
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existential demand that the past be different, the person who was once identified with their 
destruction becomes one who has wrought destruction, but feels the gravity of that destruction and 
wishes they had not. The shared moral experience of trauma between perpetrator and victimized 
person breaks the complete identification of the perpetrator with their crime. The perpetrator joins 
the victimized person not only in the experience of trauma, but in their judgment of that past event. 
The moral protest that defined the victimized person’s experience of the crime is now shared by the 
person who offended those moral demands.   
Even if it is only for a moment before execution, the fellowship that comes from these 
shared moral norms opens the possibility of reviving the trust in the world that was lost in the 
experience of trauma. Améry writes, “That one’s fellow man was experienced as the antiman 
remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror. It blocks the view of the world in which the 
principle of hope rules. One who is martyred is a defenseless prisoner of fear. It is fear that 
henceforth reigns over him.”22 Access to the imagination and its reconstructive possibilities has been 
blocked by the knowledge of having been defenseless in the face of traumatic experience and the 
fear of its repetition. This is fear that comes with having experienced a dystopic world ruled by 
norms of destruction. It entails distrust of voices of reconciliation that suggest such a dystopia will 
not return. Accountability is the condition of trust that the destructive dystopia relegated to the past. 
In execution, for Améry, both the polity and the perpetrator acknowledge the gravity of the wrong. 
They affirm that there is a moral community that is willing to meet the moral demands of the 
aggrieved. With such affirmation, there is the possibility of imagining reconstructive possibilities.   
The overarching claim that runs through Améry’s work is that holding perpetrators 
accountable for their crimes is the condition upon which the victimized person can morally reclaim 
futurity. The counterclaim to my argument is now more sophisticated than that of closure. The 
claim is not that punishment lifts the burdens of grief from the shoulders of the aggrieved, it is that 
punishment satisfies the moral demand that is integral to the traumatic experience of aggrieved 
persons. This is the demand that the perpetrator feels the gravity of the wrong they committed. 
Punishment is the means by which a polity assures aggrieved persons it is committed to the 
rightness of their moral judgment, that it is committed to a world that resists the repetition of the 
traumatic harm they experienced.  
 Throughout this section, I have pointed to the places that Améry’s argument comes into 
																																																								
22 Ibid., 40. 
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conflict with my claims in this dissertation. I have pointed to the ways that my aim of providing 
support for aggrieved persons, for Améry, are undermined by my de-emphasis of perpetrator 
accountability. Without such accountability, I believe that Améry would contest my claim that it is 
desirable for aggrieved persons to have the orientation towards the future that is required for 
contribution: The imaginative testimony that speaks to transformative lessons in the aftermath of 
murder. I believe that he would see my notion of community support as insufficient to morally 
reconstruct the trust that is required for the testimony I sought in my previous chapter. I believe 
Améry would contest the morality of my notion of recovery and its commitment to transform anger 
and resentment into memorializing artifacts whether or not the perpetrator has been held adequately 
accountable. For Améry, such work undermines the seriousness of the demands held within the 
anger and resentment of traumatized persons.  
Section III: Responding to Améry’s Moral Resentment  
 In this section, I will contest Améry’s claim that recovery and reconstructive imagination in 
the absence of full accountability is immoral. Although I find Améry’s moral defense of his 
resentments compelling, I deny his claims that resentment is the only moral response to traumatic 
experience. Testimony that takes up future-oriented conceptions of reconciliation do not necessarily 
undermine the gravity of that experience. I argue that victims of traumatic experience can look 
forward with others while meaningfully memorializing their experience. Further, I identify a 
problematic corollary of Améry’s argument: For him, the possibility of a moral recovery of 
victimized persons is dependent upon institutions holding perpetrators accountable. This leaves the 
vast majority of victimized persons, who will not see their perpetrators brought to justice, without a 
compass for moral recovery. I argue that there are alternative pathways to achieve the moral trust-
building that Améry attributes to punishing perpetrators: Communities that come together in 
support of aggrieved persons can also affirm the victimized person’s moral judgment. 
 Despite my denial of Améry’s contention that his commitment to the time-sense of trauma 
is the only moral experience, Améry’s response calls for reckoning. Although it is not the moral 
response in the aftermath of trauma, it is a moral response to traumatic experience. It is a response 
that challenges the principle of separation of punitive perpetrator accountability proceedings from 
the support for the aggrieved. I take this up as a challenge that calls me to integrate perpetrator 
accountability into the fora I have proposed. 
To review Améry’s position: Traumatized persons have a duty to hold onto the past and so 
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demand that the wrong be made right.23 This duty only loses its binding force when adequate 
accountability has been carried out. The recovery of imaginative future-oriented life without full 
accountability for perpetrators is a betrayal of the gravity of the harm one has suffered and an 
acceptance of pressure to conform to the social and political time-sense that are derived from the 
biological temporality of the healing of wounds. Améry requires that victimized persons preserve 
their wounds. Above, I referred to this duty to the past as a requirement that victimized persons 
“take their experiences seriously.” By continually facing the gravity of the experience of harm, the 
victimized person maintains the moral demand that past crimes should never have happened. To 
forgive perpetrators or reconcile oneself to the future for the sake of healing the traumatic wound is 
to give into a social and political time-sense inclined towards forgetting and silence. Silence and 
forgetting of past wrongs and its attendant lack of accountability is a failure to disavow the morality 
that guided the commission of the crime.  
Améry’s contention that the orientation towards healing and reconciliation cannot coexist 
with meaningful remembrance of the past relies on a flawed premise. It relies on the notion that the 
future-oriented time-sense of the social and political reproduction of life is impervious to the 
demands of the past. Although we can accept Améry’s contention that social and political 
arrangements are inclined towards the present and future, reconciliation with the past and even 
forgiveness for perpetrators are acts that may be for the sake of transforming the orientation of 
social and political institutions. Those acts have the power to transform the future through 
acknowledgement of the past. For instance, we can look at victimized persons who testified and 
even forgave perpetrators in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as attempting 
to create a legacy of peace as a memorial to the violence they suffered.  
Rather than suggesting the violence that was suffered was so horrific that it requires nailing 
perpetrators to their crime, the victimized person can say that the violence they suffered was so 
horrific that the cessation of the repetition of that violence requires a willingness to model 
																																																								
23 It is important to note the way that Améry’s normative claims are derived from his description of his condition in the 
aftermath of trauma. He frames the concerns of his “Resentments” essay: “What matters to me is the description of the 
subjective state of the victim. What I can contribution is the analysis of the resentments, gained from introspection. My 
personal task is to justify a psychic condition that has been condemned by moralists and psychologists alike.” Améry, 
“Resentments,” 64. His work in the essay is to show that the limits of his ability to conceive of the future and his 
inability to reconcile with the past are moral responses to the harms he experienced in Auschwitz. Yet, he goes further 
than simply suggesting they are morally justified: He describes them as the only moral response to the harms he 
experienced. Reconciliation becomes the immoral counterpoint to the moral conviction of resentment.  
			 96 
reconciliation between two previously warring groups. 24 We can look at victimized persons who lose 
loved ones to murder and devote themselves to preventing future iterations of the violence they 
experienced. 25 In both of these instances, the victimized person dedicated themselves to socio-
political transformation of then future as a result of their experience of harm, not despite it.  
The healing of the traumatic wound that comes from forgiveness or forward-looking 
devotion to transforming socio-political conditions, do not necessarily contribute to silence or 
forgetting that fails to condemn the crime. We can agree that commitment to unflinching 
preservation of traumatic experience stands out in a world that is often more concerned with the 
present and future than the past. However, allowing a wound to heal does not mean that the cause 
of the wound is forgotten or otherwise silenced. Such a response is possible, but we can also imagine 
one who allows the wound to heal to nonetheless have a forthright relationship to the experience of 
trauma. Their demands will not be grounded in Améry’s demand “This should not have happened,” 
but rather “This happened, my life will never be the same, and I must learn to live in its aftermath.” 
With this latter understanding of traumatic violence, the demand to disavow the moral values that 
guided the violence of the past can take many forms: It can come by testimony to the pain of the 
experience of violence. It can come by calling forth a community of persons committed to living 
together in the interest of preventing the repetition of violence. It can come by creating testimonial 
opportunities for perpetrators to take responsibility and express remorse. Whereas Améry calls for 
condemnation through punishment as the condition of reconstructive imagination, the 
condemnations that are discursively created out of testimony can create meaningful disavowal of the 
past without dependence on the achievement of punitive sentences for perpetrators.  
However, the condemnation expressed by punitive sentences handed down by legal 
institutions is powerful insofar as it has meaning for a wider public: When a state punishes, its 																																																								
24 This is the view of Desmond Mpilo Tutu and others who created and advocated for the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The TRC is formed—in part—to maintain peace during an unsteady transition from 
apartheid to democracy. Tutu grounds this work in the Nguni notion of ubuntu: “A person with ubuntu is open and 
available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper 
self-assurance that comes from knowing that she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are 
humiliated and diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated like they are less than they are.” If violence 
were to flare up between pro and anti-apartheid groups, the dehumanizing horrors of war would follow for both sides. 
Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 31. 
25 This is the work of Linda and Peter Biehl and others who engage in transformative justice projects. Their daughter 
was killed in an attack by anti-apartheid youth in the Guguletho township. The perpetrators apologized in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission proceedings and Linda and Peter supported their amnesty application. Together, 
perpetrators and the aggrieved set up a foundation in the honor of the victim, which serves township youth in the 
interest of non-violence and flourishing. Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, Open Media Book (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2003), 115. 
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punishment is delivered on behalf of all its citizens. The censure of action represented by 
punishment is understood by a vast majority of those citizens. The discursive condemnations I have 
outlined above lack the gravity of condemnation that state punishment delivers. Améry demands 
this wider condemnation. He writes, “If I remember rightly, it was Hans Magnus Enzensberger who 
once wrote that Auschwitz is Germany’s past, present, and future. But unfortunately he is not what 
counts, for he and his moral peers are not the people.”26 Meaningful accountability requires 
affirmation by the German masses. A small community of Germans taking responsibility for their 
National Socialist past is insufficient to satisfy Améry’s call for accountability.  
In response to murder, state punishment is the means by which mass condemnation is 
expressed. When an institution endowed with the power of political authority affirms the moral 
judgment of the victimized, it delivers a distinct form of satisfaction for aggrieved people. For 
instance, the capacity to trust in the aftermath of traumatic experience is reinforced by the 
knowledge that all citizens were—even in a mediated sense—represented in that condemnation. The 
discursive forms of the condemnation that I have outlined above do not deliver the mass 
condemnation that is a dimension of state punishment. 
I nonetheless reject Améry’s contention that only mass condemnation can satisfy the moral 
demands of traumatic experience. I reject this on grounds that it creates an exclusive disjunction that 
leaves too many victimized persons without moral recourse in the aftermath of trauma. Either 
victimized persons are affirmed in their judgment through mass condemnation and can morally 
proceed with reconciliation, or they are not affirmed and have no moral recourse to healing, trust, 
and the imagination of the future. This leaves a great majority of victimized persons morally limited 
to the preservation of their wound and the stuckness in the past this preservation requires.  
There are many reasons that state condemnation of traumatic violence is not delivered. 
Many of them are the result of malevolent practices (racism and sexism among prosecuting 
authorities, for instance) though not all are. Some are the result of an inability to gather appropriate 
evidence, to apprehend the perpetrator, or a defendant with mental disabilities that make holding 
them responsible inappropriate. As I argued in my third chapter, there is a mismatch between the 
aims of state punishment and the aims of the satisfaction of aggrieved persons that makes 
overreliance on state punishment for the satisfaction of victimized persons undesirable. Améry’s 
argument leaves too many—himself included—in a moral bind that can only be released by an 
																																																								
26 Améry, “Resentments,” 78. 
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unreliable mass condemnation of crime through state punishment.  
Victimized persons who lack recourse to the mass condemnation deserve less stringent 
criteria of moral satisfaction. It is reasonable to suggest that aggrieved persons could experience 
meaningful satisfaction of the moral demands of traumatic experience through communities of 
likeminded people. Contrary to Améry, I see Enzensberger and other Germans serious about 
envisioning responsibility in the aftermath of National Socialism as morally significant. Although the 
mass of German people or the perpetrator and their community may be unwilling to take 
responsibility for their past, there is moral value in a small group coming together to envision living 
with responsibility to a traumatic past. Even if the perpetrators remain at large or even sheltered, this 
smaller group is capable of creating a moral community that models responsibility to the moral 
demands of the victimized person. When crime occurs, whether it is the Nazi torture of millions or 
the murder of one, responsibility lies most directly with the organizers and perpetrators of those 
crimes. But responsibility can be taken up by others who are related to perpetrators through family 
ties, through identity, through ideology, through spirituality, and through shared citizenship.27 When 
those others come forward and affirm the moral judgment of the victimized, this is opens up the 
possibility of a new moral future. For instance, members of the racial groups represented by the 
perpetrator and the aggrieved can come together in light of a murderous racist crime to not only 
disavow what had happened but create new norms for living with one another in light of past 
violence. This opens the possibility of envisioning and modeling a moral future without neglect of 
the moral demands of the past. 
Despite my rejection of the claim that there is a moral duty to maintain resentments in the 
absence of full accountability for perpetrators, I take the maintenance of resentments in the interest 
of perpetrator accountability as one of many possible moral responses to the loss of a loved one to 
murder. Améry’s contention that traumatic experience contains moral protest makes an appropriate 
demand on his interlocutors to acknowledge the gravity of the past. In light of my work above, we 
can reinterpret his notion of accountability and suggest that holding perpetrators responsible is the 
only way to satisfy his legitimate moral demands for acknowledgement of the past without also 
suggesting that his demands are the only legitimate moral demands in the aftermath of traumatic 
loss. His moral demands could conceivably be shared by aggrieved persons who would be eligible 																																																								
27 See for instance this account of the healing of the relationship between the brother of the perpetrator and one 
aggrieved by violence. David Kaczynski and Gary Wright, “Building a Bridge,” in Wounds That Do Not Bind: Victim-Based 
Perspectives on the Death Penalty, ed. James R. Acker and David R. Karp (Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 
85–102. 
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for participation in the fora I proposed. Although the principles of the forum would deny the 
demand to focus efforts solely on securing punitive accountability, it is nonetheless important to 
consider how the forum could be opened to accommodate aggrieved persons who share Améry’s 
moral demands.  
Section IV: Integrating Discursive Forms of Perpetrator Accountability in the Fora 
In my previous chapter, I wrote that supporters would seek to acknowledge the articulations 
of anger, vengeance, and desire for harsh sentences for the perpetrator, but not guide their action by 
those articulations. With his conception of resentment, Améry gives such desires for anger and 
vengeance a moral dimension that creates a novel challenge to my notion of acknowledgement. If I 
were to follow Améry’s articulations to the letter, it would be necessary for me to shift the focus of 
the fora from the testimony and support of recovery of aggrieved persons to advocacy for punitive 
accountability for perpetrators. This would mean collapsing support for aggrieved persons into 
support for their punitive demands in the criminal juridical proceedings, which would trespass the 
principles I outlined in my third chapter.  
I will propose a solution to this apparent conflict by taking up Améry’s notion of discursive 
responsibility-taking in the fora I outlined in my third chapter. Although Améry sees this 
accountability as limited to meeting the demands of collective responsibility-taking (Germans who 
supported Nazism without themselves torturing or murdering), I contend that this notion of 
responsibility should be available in cases of individual perpetrators. This testimony can not only 
satisfy moral demands of accountability, but also deliver food to victimized persons in cases of 
individual perpetrators beyond what is possible in punitive forms of accountability. I do not argue 
that punitive accountability should be replaced with discursive accountability; rather, I see both 
forms of accountability as delivering distinct goods to victimized persons. I call for a hybrid notion 
of accountability that maintains the punitive accountability that defines current penal arrangements 
in the U.S. while integrating (and encouraging) discursive accountability measures. The fora I have 
proposed could be the place where discursive accountability measures could be realized. With this 
opportunity for perpetrators’ responsibility-taking testimony, the fora would offer the opportunity 
for aggrieved persons to satisfy moral demands of accountability without collapsing support for 
victimized persons into advocacy for punitive proceedings. 
For Améry, holding the perpetrator accountable is the only way to satisfy the moral demands 
he articulates. Although he sees harsh punishment as the primary means to such accountability, he 
also conceives of discursive pathways to accountability for the thousands of ordinary Germans who 
			 100 
upheld Nazi destruction without participating in its torture and murder. From them, Améry 
demands testimony that renounces the moral, intellectual, and cultural productions of Nazism; 
reflects the gravity of the loss created by their support of the Nazi regime; and a reflexive account of 
the violence that speaks to the constructive ideals to which they had access but nonetheless 
disavowed in their support for Nazism. Through this testimony, Germans affirm that they share a 
moral world with Améry because they too desire the impossible overturning of the violence that was 
done.  
Améry suggests that the widespread corruption in Nazi Germany made it so that his moral 
demands could not be satisfied by the punishment of individual perpetrators. He writes: 
If everything had taken place only between the SS-man Wajs and me, and if the 
entire inverted pyramid of SS men, SS helpers, officials, Kapos, and medal-bedecked 
generals had not weighed on me, I would have died calmly and appeased along with 
my fellow man with the Death’s Head Insignia [...]  
But Wajs from Antwerp was only one of a multitude. The inverted triangle is 
still driving me with its point into the ground.”28 
 
Through the engagement with the question of moral satisfaction in light of the execution of SS-man 
Wajs, Améry distinguishes between appropriate punishment for a criminal act of victimization (like 
the murders at stake in this dissertation) and the genocidal victimizations by Nazi Germany. If it 
were merely a criminal act, the execution would satisfy; but there is an entire socio-political 
arrangement behind the Waj’s torture and murders. Améry suggests that eye for an eye revenge—
killing one German for every one killed in the Holocaust or even torturing torturers with their same 
implements—would be unthinkably brutal. He writes that the justice “cannot consist in revenge 
dealt out in proportion to what was suffered.”29 In light of this, Améry looks to discursive forms of 
accountability that could satisfy his moral demands without nailing perpetrators to their horror of 
their crimes. 
Améry’s notion of discursive accountability aims to cultivate the victimized persons’ moral 
desire that the past be overturned among perpetrators. This involves perpetrators articulating and 
reflecting on their identities as persons who have committed serious wrongs.30 He calls them to face 
responsibility despite the ease with which they can flee from it in the capitalist, reparations-paying 
Germany of the 1960s.  Améry describes this alternative conception of accountability: 																																																								
28 Améry, “Resentments,” 70–71. 
29 Ibid., 77. 
30 Despite distinctions drawn in the secondary literature between Améry’s conception of resentment and justifications 
behind the South African Truth and Reconciliation commission, Améry’s notion of perpetrator responsibility-taking has 
resonances with the jurisprudence of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
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But if, in the midst of the world’s silence, our resentment holds its finger raised, then 
Germany, as a whole and also in its future generations, would retain the knowledge 
that it was not Germans who did away with the dominion of baseness. It would then, 
as I sometimes hope, learn to comprehend its past acquiesce in the Third Reich as 
the total negation not only of the world that it plagued with war and death but also 
of its better origins; it would no longer repress or hush up the twelve years that for 
us others were a thousand, but claim them as its realized negation of the world and 
its self, as its own negative possession. On the field of history there would occur 
what I hypothetically described earlier for the limited, individual circle: two groups of 
people, the overpowered and those who overpowered them would be joined in the 
desire that time be turned back and, with it, that history become moral... And in the 
end the Germans would achieve what the people once did not have the might or will 
to do…the eradication of the ignominy.31  
 
Resentment makes a moral demand to remember the traumatic event and the perpetrators who bear 
responsibility for that trauma. Améry points to the fact that Germany’s commitment to Nazism 
ended due to military defeat rather than the German moral commitment to doing right. Even if the 
German state dutifully pays reparations to Israel, there is a moral remainder. There is a necessity of 
taking responsibility not only by prosecuting those who have done wrong and contributing to 
reconstruction of the lives of those victimized, but by taking reflexive responsibility for how the 
moral commitment to destruction came about and remained in power.  
Reflexive responsibility-taking is critical to Améry’s notion of discursive responsibility. 
Perpetrators must take responsibility for the horror that is the stuck temporality of traumatic 
experience, which Améry describes as “the twelve years that for us others were a thousand.” This 
responsibility is taken not only by acknowledging how horrific this experience must be for 
victimized persons, but through reflexive testimony. The movement signaled by the “not only...but 
also” is from the thought that the violence committed was harmful solely for the victimized to the 
thought that such violence has reflexive aspects. As a bourgeois, secular Jewish, Weimar intellectual, 
Améry believed in the potential of German traditions of literary and political thought to bring about 
a polity that did not see its authority dependent upon genocidal ideals. For Améry, National 
Socialism denied life to its victims in the same way that it suffocated traditions of circumspect 
German ethical, cultural, and political thought. I understand Améry to propose a form of learning 
for perpetrators that orients them temporally backward: to a time when ideals and possibilities of 
doing otherwise than violence were generated and available. When the perpetrator considers their 
violence as negation of those “better origins,” they can attempt to reclaim those ideals. Such a 																																																								
31 Améry, At the Mind’s Limits. 
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reclamation project offers resources for perpetrators to generate meaningful critical perspectives on 
the place of violence in their lives. 
 The “eradication of the ignominy” among Germans requires sharing with victimized persons 
the impossible “desire that time be turned back and, with it, that history become moral.” This is the 
desire to remake the past according to what should have been the case. Améry seeks responsibility-
taking beyond apology for an instance of wrongdoing. By calling for history to become moral, he 
speaks not only of the need for the criminal deed to be undone but the entire web of choices and 
context that created the conditions of possibility for the violence.32 The reflexive element of 
discursive accountability serves this wider purpose. It points to the choices and context that allowed 
the negation of alternative ideals. In condemning the choices and contexts that preceded and 
conditioned the harm to another as well as the act of violence and its reflexive elements, Améry sees 
the potential for reconciliation. The moral satisfaction delivered to victimized persons by discursive 
accountability-taking is not qualitatively different than the satisfaction delivered by practices of 
punitive accountability.  
 Despite this equality of moral satisfaction, for Améry, discursive accountability is an option 
to be pursued when punitive accountability would be unacceptable.33 Although punitive and 
discursive accountability deliver the same moral satisfaction, punitive accountability has the pride of 
place in his account. He does not draw out the distinct elements of each form of accountability nor 
does he compare their relative goods. The reasons for such an ordering can be taken from historical 
context as well as Améry’s own reflection on discursive accountability. He describes his account as 
an “extravagant moral daydream.” While Nuremberg and the history of war reparations offers a 
historical example of punitive accountability, there is no precedent for collective discursive 
accountability. Beyond that, discursive accountability requires that perpetrators come forward of 
their own volition. In the 1960s Germany that Arendt describes, there is no reason to believe that 
former Nazis and their supporters would be contrite when confronted with the demand to take 
responsibility.  
 Practical difficulties of realizing discursive accountability aside, I do not believe there are 
moral or socio-political reasons to prioritize punitive accountability. If both forms of accountability 																																																								
32 The catalyst for my interpretation is Améry’s call for “the spiritual reduction to pulp by the German people, not only 
of the books, but of everything that was carried out in those twelve would be the negation of the negation: a highly 
positive, a redeeming act.” Améry, “Resentments,” 79.  
33 The basis for such an interpretation is twofold: The absence of discursive responsibility-taking as an option for SS-
man Wajs and the fact that his account of discursive accountability only arises after a consideration (and 
acknowledgement of the absurdity) of collective punitive measures.     
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can deliver the same moral satisfaction to victimized persons, I see no evidence or principled reason 
to believe that Améry would make the categorical claim that punitive accountability should trump 
discursive accountability. Although Améry limits discursive responsibility-taking to those collectively 
responsible for Nazism, and the examples he offers are of Germans taking responsibility for 
collective crimes, the path Améry prescribes to those taking discursive accountability for their 
actions are transferable to individuals taking responsibility for interpersonal crimes. They might not 
be speaking to alternative non-violent national ideals that they failed to take up, but they will be 
speaking to ideals they inherited from their experience, heritage, and religion. The origins of the 
ideals are less important than their capacity to be used as templates for the reflexive responsibility-
taking that Améry calls for. 
In the absence of the strict priority of punitive over discursive forms of accountability, we 
can offer a hybrid approach to punishment that combines both without trespassing the moral 
demands of traumatic experience. In my attempt to envision institutions of criminal justice in service 
to persons aggrieved by murder, I see both forms of accountability as delivering distinct goods to 
victimized persons. When I speak of “goods,” I refer to resources that meet stated needs of 
aggrieved persons that are beyond the scope of moral accountability in both punitive and discursive 
forms. My contention is that—as long as delivering these goods do not interfere with moral 
satisfaction on matters of accountability—the desirability of delivering those goods stand as reasons 
to motivate institutions of criminal justice to offer this hybrid of punitive and discursive 
accountability. I see the for a I have proposed as an opportunity for discursive accountability where 
the traditional juridical guilt and sentencing proceedings will enforce punitive accountability. 
Punitive accountability holds perpetrators responsible. The violence of the state deprives 
perpetrators of liberties that they would otherwise enjoy. From the perspective of those victimized, 
this is a form of accountability that creates boundaries between themselves and perpetrators and 
between perpetrators and the society of non-incarcerated persons. This separation honors victimized 
persons’ well-founded distrust of perpetrators of the violence. It offers aggrieved persons the space 
to mourn without the anxiety of having to avoid the perpetrator or even encounter them. For 
Améry, the perpetrator facing punishment is brought to share the moral demand that the past be 
different. As I have also noted above, punitive accountability stands as public acknowledgement of 
the depth of the harm suffered. It stands as a mass affirmation of the judgment of the victimized. 
Punitive accountability delivers a measure of control to victimized persons insofar as they know that 
the perpetrator is under the control of the state. Its deprivations may create a wish within the 
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perpetrator that the past be different. Mass acknowledgement of harm can indeed be an important 
dimension of trust-building in the aftermath of violence.  
 Discursive accountability calls for perpetrators to take responsibility for their crimes. 
Through moral commitment or incentive, perpetrators offer testimony that speaks to the truth of 
what they did, their reasons for committing their crime, and their remorse for what they have done.  
In an adversarial justice system that punishes harshly, the possibility of living a day outside of 
carceral control often requires that those accused of murder maintain a relationship to responsibility 
of denial, silence, or mitigation. Although criminal courts can establish a convincing narrative of 
who did what to whom, perpetrators admitting wrongdoing and seeking redress satisfy demands of 
the aggrieved in a way those narratives cannot. Perpetrators have epistemic access to details of the 
crime in a way no others do. In taking responsibility rather than mitigating responsibility, they are 
challenged to provide information about the circumstances of murder and victim in a way that 
resists victim blaming. This can satisfy the demand of aggrieved persons for motives of murder and 
the victim’s last words.34 An account of the motives has the possibility of resisting the distrust,  
described in my third chapter, that comes with murder seeming to come from nowhere and for no 
reason. The account of the victims last words can contribute to memorializing.  
Rather than imagine that perpetrators share the wish for the past to be different upon 
receiving punishment (as Améry does) or remain fixed to questions of whether or not perpetrators 
experience remorse (as many aggrieved persons do), expressions of remorse allow aggrieved persons 
to hear this remorse. It opens the possibility of victimized persons and/or their representatives 
asking questions of perpetrators to better understand this remorse. This satisfies the demand of 
aggrieved persons to hear perpetrators take meaningful responsibility for their crimes and express 
how those crimes have affected them.35 If aggrieved persons are satisfied by the testimony, such 
accountability provides a moral baseline for the possibility of jointly envisioning practices of moral 
reconstruction. These are practices that could support the proliferation of responsibility among 
perpetrators of crimes, memorialize the past, and prevent the repetition of the past harm. In 
discursive accountability, the knowledge of the crime is more robust than punitive accountability 
allows; remorse can be articulated and become the basis for shared moral reconstruction.  
																																																								
34 Armour and Umbreit refer to these questions of truth of the crime and perpetrators’ motives remorse as “remaining 
questions.” More than sixty percent of those surveyed possessed questions along these lines. Armour and Umbreit, 
“Assessing the Ultimate Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison,” 66. 
35 Ibid., 59–60. 
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There should be a balance between punitive and discursive accountability. A competition for 
pride of place leads to bad outcomes no matter which form of accountability comes out on top. If 
punitive accountability is too privileged, there is discouragement of responsibility-taking that can 
deliver truth and the possibility of meaningful reconstructive projects between perpetrators and 
aggrieved persons. If discursive accountability is too privileged, the polity neglects the importance of 
mass censure and respecting victimized persons’ desire for separation from perpetrators. When I call 
for a balance between the two forms of accountability, I call for a criminal justice system that 
attempts, as far as possible, to deliver these distinct goods in light of the conflicts that arise between 
them.  
Punitive and discursive forms of accountability fundamentally diverge on the conception of 
the trustworthiness of perpetrators. In punitive accountability, perpetrators are treated as 
untrustworthy. They have undermined communal trust and are thus untrustworthy enough to 
require the violence of the state to enforce separation between them and non-incarcerated members 
of the polity. In discursive accountability, trust in perpetrators is a requirement. Aggrieved persons 
must believe that the words expressed represent a genuine feeling of remorse.36 They must trust that 
the plan of redress perpetrators propose will be carried out as stated in testimony.  
This divergence between attitudes towards the perpetrator does not require that we choose 
one form of accountability or the other. Rather, we can say that each is appropriate at different 
times. The distrust communicated by punitive accountability is appropriate closer to the event of 
traumatic loss. Trust required by discursive accountability must be cultivated over a longer period of 
time. Building this trust requires ongoing commitment to taking-responsibility on the part of 
perpetrators, which could take diverse forms. It may, for instance, entail their reaching out to the 
victims’ loved ones to express remorse or a program of community-based work in which 
perpetrators serve others in the attempt to resist future iterations of the violence they committed. 
This process of perpetrators taking responsibility and memorializing loss requires learning to 
understand themselves as persons who have committed an irreparable crime, but who have often 
experienced victimization themselves.37 To explain why the murder happened, it is often necessary 																																																								
36 Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,” Journal of Social Philosophy 33, no. 1 
(January 1, 2002): 69, doi:10.1111/1467-9833.00124. 
37 James Garbarino is a forensic psychologist who contends that “Gross violations of the human rights of children 
ultimately lead to the most violent, inhumane actions by adults.” By gross violations, he refers to continuous experiences 
of violence and abuse in early childhood. Bronfenbrenner Center, James Garbarino: “Listening to Killers: Bringing 
Developmental Psychology into the Courtroom in Murder Cases” (Ithaca, NY: Beebe Hall, Cornell University, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OrTbL5G9RQ. In his book, he points to the moral damage of racism, domestic 
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to refer to prior experiences of victimization. The challenge for perpetrators is to speak to these 
experiences without using those experiences as an excuse for their crime. This calls for support in 
learning how to connect previous experiences of victimization to the murder they committed.  
Finally, there are practical concerns regarding how responsibility-taking can be encouraged in 
a context of a criminal justice system (like that of U.S.) where the possibility of living outside 
carceral control requires that aggrieved persons maintain their appeals and thus avoid the self-
incriminating testimony that is a dimension of discursive responsibility-taking. An account of an 
incentive structure that could convince perpetrators of the value of giving up appeals for the sake of 
taking responsibility for crimes is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
However, in light of the stakes of such a decision to effectively give up appeals, discursive 
responsibility-taking proceedings must offer substantial benefits to perpetrators. Preliminarily, I 
recommend meaningful reductions in sentences with additional support provided for perpetrators to 
achieve the ends of redress they outlined in their testimony. The higher stakes of such testimony 
require institutional criteria to judge its adequacy. The jurisprudence of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, for instance, offers an example of how to judge whether perpetrators 
adequately takes responsibility for their crimes.38 We can look to Améry’s requirements for reflexive 
testimony and sharing of the demands of the aggrieved to ground requirements for adequate 
expression of remorse. If the perpetrator is for any reason unwilling to engage in discursive 
accountability, this forum can create an opportunity for those related to the perpetrator through a 
wide variety of familial or community relationship to take a measure of responsibility and to pledge 
to come together to create healing and possibility of redress. 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have engaged with one of the most compelling and challenging 
counterargument so far. Through an explication of Améry’s argument in “Resentments,” I have 
presented reasons why one might take the foundational claims of this dissertation to be immoral. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the demands of redress for persons aggrieved by 
traumatic loss could be satisfied without reference to the fate of the perpetrator. I have contended 																																																																																																																																																																																		
violence, sexual abuse, gender violence, and poverty as critical to understanding why people murder: Garbarino, Listening 
to Killers: Lessons Learned from My Twenty Years as a Psychological Expert Witness in Murder Cases (Oakland, California: 
University of California Press, 2015). 
38 See, for instance, South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Amnesty Decision on Death of Steve Biko,” 
February 16, 1999, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1999/p990216a.htm; Truth and Reconcilation 
Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vol. 1 (Cape Town : New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 110–35. 
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that institutions of criminal justice could structure community support for aggrieved persons to 
deliver the goods that advocates of victims’ rights supposed to follow from punishment. The 
forward-looking goods of the Du Bosiain notion “contribution” that I have sought in the aftermath 
of trauma are—for Améry—morally conditioned by perpetrator accountability. For Améry, holding 
perpetrators accountable for their crimes satisfies a moral demand of people victimized by traumatic 
experience that can be satisfied by no other means. I have recognized Amery’s commitment to 
perpetrator accountability as one that the fora I have proposed must take seriously. I integrate this 
moral demand by offering a place for perpetrator testimony as a separate meeting of the fora. 
Through testimony that takes responsibility for crimes committed and offers a plan for redress going 
forward, the proceedings of the fora satisfy demands for accountability without collapsing support 
for aggrieved persons with the punishment of the perpetrator. Through this testimony, the fora 
offer the possibility of perpetrators and aggrieved persons coming together for the purposes of 
“contribution.” 
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Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation project, I have identified the shortcomings of efforts to support persons 
aggrieved by murder within the context of the present U.S. criminal justice system. I have shown the 
ways that discourses that promise “closure” for aggrieved persons through the harsh punishment of 
perpetrators fail to address the ongoing effects of traumatic experience. Instead of seeking closure, I 
advocate for cultivating capacities to live with the ongoing effects of traumatic experience. To this 
end, I argue that institutions of criminal justice should promote testimonial contribution in the 
context of community support capable of addressing prolonged struggles with grief. I have shown 
the ways that the sentencing phase of trials is not the appropriate context in which to hear and 
respond to the needs and demands of persons aggrieved by murder. Instead of limiting the formal 
testimony of aggrieved persons to victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of trials, I 
advocate for an opportunity to testify in separate fora convened for the purpose of supporting 
expansive testimony and providing ongoing community support as they reconstruct their lives.  
I have motivated this work by reference to the importance of envisioning institutional 
support for recovery of persons aggrieved by traumatic loss beyond punishment. In the U.S., we 
have invested punishment with the power to heal aggrieved persons and affirm the value of the lives 
of those lost to murder. At best, the punishment of perpetrators is an acknowledgement of the 
gravity of traumatic loss on behalf of a polity. This is a meaningful act of acknowledgement; 
however, when support for the aggrieved is narrowly focused on punishment, the potential for 
assisting in the reconstruction of life and learning from traumatic loss is undermined. In my 
dissertation project, I have envisioned fora that could cultivate these reconstructive and pedagogical 
potentials in the aggrieved and their communities. If realized, this reconstruction and pedagogy 
could be the grounds for resisting repetitions of violence, insight into how communities can come 
together to support aggrieved persons in the aftermath of traumatic loss, and creating meaningful 
memorial for those who are lost.  
I have acknowledged the importance of the accountability of perpetrators in the moral 
demands of aggrieved persons. I sought to integrate this accountability into my vision of criminal 
justice by offering an opportunity for perpetrators to offer responsibility-taking testimony. This 
testimony has the potential to satisfy demands of accountability while opening shared reconstruction 
among perpetrators, those aggrieved by their crimes, and the community of the aggrieved. I have 
pointed to complications that arise in the creation of this hybrid system of criminal justice where the 
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goods of pursuing a punitive response to crime are balanced with creating the conditions where 
perpetrators can testify to their wrongdoing.  
I plan on taking up these complications in a future project. There, I will look to the 
jurisprudence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa for criteria to judge the 
adequacy of perpetrator testimony and plans redress. I will offer more detail as to the pedagogy (and 
prison reforms) necessary for such testimony. I will reflect upon the sentence-reducing incentives 
that would be available for perpetrators whose testimony meets the criteria for adequate 
responsibility-taking and redress. It is worthwhile to incentivize discursive responsibility-taking by 
perpetrators because it has the potential to create good outcomes for aggrieved persons and create 
rich pedagogical opportunities for the perpetrator. It creates an opportunity for their contribution.  
There are compelling models for imagining the contribution of perpetrators. Former 
perpetrators working with youth to promote peace and non-violent community are my models for 
this work: In Chicago, Ceasefire community activists bring youth together to reflect upon violence 
and consider non-violent alternatives in circumstances that would ordinarily call for violent 
response.1 In these spaces, responsibility-taking and articulation of remorse are enacted in ways that 
have the potential to prevent the reoccurrence of violence. To build trust among youth trying to 
survive in violent circumstances, it is necessary for perpetrators-turned-activists to articulate the way 
they felt and thought at the time when they committed their violence, the circumstances of the 
violence they committed, and the struggles of living in the aftermath of this violence. I believe this 
attempt to resist the repetition of violence is a form of ongoing community redress and a compelling 
form of memorialization for the one lost to murder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
1 Wesley Skogan, Natalie Bump, and Jill Dubois, “Evaluation of Ceasefire-Chicago,” March 19, 2009, 
http://cureviolence.org. I believe that the epidemiological anti-violence principles of Cure Violence, especially in its 
promotional literature, are problematically insensitive to the ways in which poor communities of color are subject to 
violence beyond interpersonal violence. See Beth Richie for a much richer account of gender violence, the violence of 
economic divestment, and state violence within these communities: Beth Richie, Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence, 
and America’s Prison Nation (New York: New York University Press, 2012). Despite Ceasefire’s simplistic rendering of 
violence, I want to uphold their claim that anti-violence work is best guided by those who have experienced and even 
committed acts of violence within that community.  
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